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Construction projects, as complex systems of systems (SOS), increasingly 
involve institutionally diverse actors that escalate complexity of the projects. 
Examples of these actors include the export credit agencies, international 
organizations such as the World Bank, non-governmental organizations (NGO), 
regulatory actors, transnational organizations, as well as public and community 
groups. The observed surge in complexity of the projects aim to enhance their 
robustness in: i) sustaining the increasing demand for service of these projects, 
and ii) sustaining the contextual fluctuation in terms of social, environmental, and 
economical dimensions. For example, several financial institutions are engaged 
in the projects to enhance their economic sustainability, transnational and 
monitory actors to ensure environmental sustainability, and community groups 
and NGOs to ensure social sustainability of projects. The increasing complexity, 
however, results in fragility in the form of cascading failures and poor 
performance of projects. As a result, construction projects face emergent risks 
such as risks associated with the interaction of the institutionally diverse actors. 
The extensive list of projects that have faced emergent risks associated with 
interactional dynamics includes megaprojects or infrastructures with diverse 
institutional background such as Stuttgart 21 in Germany, the Belo Monte Dam in 
Brazil, the Keystone pipeline in North America, the Nabucco Pipeline in Central 
Asia and Europe, and the Bujagali Dam in Uganda. 
To address the emergent risks in construction projects, the concept of 
emergence in a complex system of systems (SoS) is studied in this dissertation.
xiii 
 
In construction projects, emergent dynamics occur at the level of a large-scale 
system (i.e., project), which is built from components that are systems 
themselves (i.e., actors). Reflecting this trend within the analysis provides a 
better understanding of emergent dynamics that arise, for example, from social 
and political interactions. In particular, this dissertation focuses on the analysis of 
emergent risks associated with interactions as a coupling of complex systems 
(i.e., actors) in institutionally diverse projects (i.e., SoS). Major objectives of the 
research include: i) defining emergent risks based on its interactional elements, ii) 
quantifying emergent risks based on the simulation of the equilibria of the 
interaction, and iii) mitigating the emergent risks at the policy and strategy levels. 
The framework to define emergent risks provides a descriptive account of the 
emergent risks associated with interactional dynamics. In order to quantify the 
emergent risk, the associated interaction is modelled through its equilibria. The 
equilibria are developed at the policy and strategy levels and simulated to obtain 
the risk profile. Finally, the mitigation strategies and policies are developed based 
on the framework of the interactional analysis and their effectiveness in mitigation 
of emergent risks is gauged through simulations. The proposed methodology 
was applied to cases of social opposition in infrastructure development in 
developing countries with the focus on hydroelectric projects. The dissertation is 
closed with suggestions on further applicability of the interactional analysis for 








CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The Architectural/Engineering/Construction (AEC) industry faces ever-
increasing complexity in multiple dimensions. The involvement of more diverse 
actors, extended project impacts over time and space, and increasingly intricate 
technology exemplify this complexity trend. Project planning is undeniably the 
foremost phase of a construction project that should identify and incorporate the 
complex nature of the projects. However, the inconsistency in reflecting different 
forms of complexity in current planning approaches often results in cost and time 
over-runs, conflicts, project re-negotiations, claims, and project modifications. 
This dissertation aims to introduce a novel dimension into project planning by 
applying the basics of social science and mathematics to address complexity in 
construction projects. Transferring the emphasis of analysis to interactions, as 
the main source of project dynamics, it studies the emergent dynamics 
associated with the interactions among the project actors as a prominent 
property of a complex system of systems. Therefore, this dissertation proposes 
the methodology of Interactional Analysis (IA) to accomplish the following: 1) 
define emergence in a complex system of systems: frame and structure 
dynamism within a complex system of systems such as construction projects; 2) 
assess emergent risks in a complex system of systems: quantify emerging risks 
associated with interactional dynamics; and 3) address complexity: propose a 
hybrid (quantitative/descriptive) methodology to develop mitigation policies and 




1.2 Problem Statement 
Increasing complexity of construction projects: construction projects 
are the context for multiple actors (contractual or non-contractual) to interact to 
attain a project’s ultimate goal. In the simplest format the interactional context 
involves the triplets of theowner, the contractor, and the engineer and their 
interactions, while the context can extend to include several other actors as 
financiers, users, regulatory actors, etc. The interactive collaborations of these 
actors may extend beyond any specific phase of the project life cycle 1 . 
Collectively, construction projects exhibit the characteristics of a system of 
systems (SoS), enumerated by Maier (1998), as they are comprised of 
heterogeneous actors (e.g., financiers, contractors, public, regulatory actors, or 
transnational actors) in a highly structured network and in a hierarchical order 
(i.e., individuals, firms, coalitions, projects, and programs). These characteristics 
can be observed even in the simplest format of the project as the triplet actors 
are heterogeneous within the structured network of the project and in their 
hierarchical order. However, the attributes of complexity described by Boulding 
1956, Carlson and Doyle 2002, Simon 1962, and Baccarini 1996 are increasingly 
observed in these systems of systems with the inclusion of institutionally diverse 
actors and the coupling of their interactions.  
Modifications of a system of systems to achieve higher robustness based 
on the characteristics of the system results in increasing complexity of the 
system (Carlson and Doyle 2002). In case of construction projects, robustness is 
to sustain fluctuations of the environment from one side and to secure the supply 
for an increasing demand for the service of these projects from the other side. 
For instance, the growing complexity of the network of projects is essential to 
address the growing demand for energy and secure sustainable energy supplies 
despite economical, social, and environmental instabilities. As a result, there is 
an increasing trend towards complex infrastructures such as the concept of 
                                            
1Construction project life cycle phases includes: Feasibility Analysis, Conceptual Planning, Detailed Scope Definition, 
Procurement, Detailed Engineering, Construction, Turnover, Pre-commissioning, Start-Up, and Operation (CII 1999). 
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Desertec that aims to address the increasing need for robust and sustainable 
energy for Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, or the Keystone XL 
pipeline that aims to address the increasing need for robust energy sources for 
North America. 
Consequent fragility of complex construction projects: the necessity to 
achieve certain robustness through increasing complexity is, however, 
compromised through the fragility towards unpredicted dynamics (Carlson and 
Doyle 2002). In the case of complex projects this fragility may be observed in the 
form of emergent risks associated with the interaction of multiple actors such as 
public NIMBY (not in my back yard), transnational oppositions, political parties, 
and local or multinational enterprises. The actual impact of these emergent 
dynamics on the responses of a complex system of system such as a 
construction project is significant and resulted in poor performance of these 
complex systems of systems. Several megaprojects and infrastructures in the 
global arena have been stalled due to emergent dynamics despite elaborate risk 
analysis and cost assessment. The extensive list of impacted projects includes 
water treatment facilities, hydroelectric dams, wind farms, pipeline projects, or 
even transportation facilities. For example, projects such as the concept of 
DESERTEC, the Keystone XL pipeline, and the Stuttgart 21 have all faced 
emergent risks associated with the interaction of multiple actors in the context of 
the project. To avoid cascading failures at the project level and deliver more 
sustainable projects, it is necessary to reflect these emergent dynamics in project 
planning and decision-making. 
Shortcoming of current methodologies in reflecting this trend: 
common planning approaches have been proven insufficient at reflecting the 
increasing complexities of construction projects. Performance paradox2, failures 
in project completion, cost over-runs, unforeseen conflicts, collusions, and delays 
have been frequently coupled with dissatisfaction of target-users and 
                                            
2
 Performance paradox is a term proposed by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) suggesting that performances of infrastructure mega 
projects are significantly below expectations despite increasing needs for more complex projects. 
4 
 
unprecedented friction with non-contractual actors, such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) or local communities. As a consequence of this political 
and social complexities, many projects deviate from their initial plans, for 
example; changes in the government’s approaches to the project developer and 
consequent project renegotiations in the Dabhol project in India, the negative 
impact of unforeseen interactions with non-contractual parties on the Bujagali 
dam project in Uganda, and the scrapping of the MAGLEV high-speed rail project 
in Munich. Deviations such as these indicate a vital need for a paradigm shift in 
the strategic risk management of construction projects to account for emergent 
dynamics associated with interactions in complex projects. Rather than following 
deterministic models, the outcomes of projects are usually determined through 
power trade-offs, as well as political and institutional arrangements (Figure 1.1, 
Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). 
.   
Figure 1.1 Precedence of Decision-making in Construction Projects 
 
Reflection of this shortcoming in risk assessment methodologies: 
one of the core tasks of project planning is assessing risk and devising risk 
mitigation strategies. Relevant interactional dynamics, including the institutional 
diversity of actors (static interactional dimensions) and the power relations 
(dynamic interactional dimensions), are often underrated in planning and risk 
assessment. Several models developed on the basis of the literature in the 
finance area (e.g., Dias 1995 and Ye and Tiong 2000) are insufficient for efficient 
planning of construction projects. These models are too specific to address all 
the practical aspects of the dynamic nature of construction projects. That is, they 
focus on limited dimensions of projects from financial point of view and disregard 
 
Appropriate Decision Making  








dynamics of complex construction projects. Many decision-making models lack 
integration of the emergent dynamics, political interactions, and complexities that 
occur during a project’s life cycle. Most of the existing models provide a single 
actor decision-making platform and lack multi-party decision-making dynamics. 
Even models that acknowledge the presence of complexities fall short of 
integrating the real causes of project dynamics and provide only abstract 
frameworks for project planning. The majority of the models neglect institutional 
arrangements, existing synergies between project actors, NGOs, government 
decision-makers, and strategic systems, all of which are indeed the dominant 
determinants of a project’s failure or success (Miller and Lessard 2000). It is 
critical to integrate these arrangements into different aspects of project planning 
and governance (i.e., risk assessment, strategy development, and institutional 
arrangement).  
Addressing interactions to overcome this limitation: the dynamic 
nature of the interactions, coupled with the diversity of the actors, increase the 
complexity of the context (Maylor et al. 2008). Many scholars have emphasized 
the importance of the institutional diversity (of actors) as a significant variable in 
project outcomes (Miller and Lessard 2000 and 2007, Mahalingam and Levitt 
2007, and Orr and Scott 2008). However, there is a lack of methodologies that 
integrate dynamic nature of interactions within the project planning process in a 
descriptive and quantitative approach. In summary, a paradigm shift in project 
planning, including a risk assessment and strategy development approach, is 
needed to address: 1) the ever-increasing complexity and institutional diversity of 
construction projects and consequent fragility of projects, 2) the interactional 
dynamics that impact project outcomes, and 3) the roots of the synergies 
impacting the strategic choices of the actors. The need for this paradigm shift is 
not limited to construction projects, as authors such as Helbing (2013) had 
identified the need for a paradigm shift from an actor-oriented to interaction-
oriented perspective to address emergence and disruption in systems (or system 
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of systems). IA offers such a paradigm shift in analysis of emergent dynamics in 
a complex system of systems. 
 
1.3 Research Background 
In the context of strategic management, risk is recognized as an essential 
component of planning and decision-making (Ruefli et al. 1999). Strategy 
developers often apply risk as a prognostic indicator for the consequences of 
decisions and plans. For construction projects, the consequences of decisions 
are often associated with the emergent dynamics associated with the interactions 
of multiple actors. These dynamics prove to be challenging in the risk 
management of projects since they are often undermined in analysis models. In 
the construction industry, risk is frequently addressed in a static approach 
through deterministic models, neglecting behavioral patterns and social 
interactions. The outcomes of projects, on the other hand, are often determined 
Figure 1.2 Interactional Analysis and Current Risk Assessment Techniques 
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through power trade-offs or political and institutional arrangements (Flyvbjerg et 
al. 2003). These determinants are not fully reflected in project planning and risk 
governance. On the other hand, the actual impact of emergent dynamics is 
significant and influences the responses of the projects as a complex system of 
actors. Several megaprojects and infrastructure in the global arena have been 
stalled due to emergent dynamics despite very accurate risk analysis and cost 
assessment. The extensive list of impacted projects includes water treatment 
facilities, hydroelectric dams, wind farms, pipeline projects, or even transportation 
facilities. Therefore, there is a need for complementary analysis to current 
procedures to integrate emergent dynamics that arise from the interactions of 
actors into the existing risk governance methodologies. Two common line of 
research concerning risk assessment in construction are i) the checklist 
approach that aims to channelize experts’ opinions in identifying the salient risk 
indicators and ii) dynamic models that seek to capture the interrelations of the 
risk factors (see “Body of Knowledge” in Figure 1.2). The former type neglects 
the dynamics and synergies of projects as a result of the interactions in a project 
while maintaining a static approach to project risk. The intensity of the identified 
risk factors may still be increased or diminished due to the synergic interaction of 
the actors. On the other hand, dynamic models emphasize the importance of the 
synergies but capture them through the interactions of the risk indicators. The 
interplay of the risk indicators will not reflect the root cause of the complexities 
and therefore will remain an abstract representation of the project dynamics. The 
fundamental roots of emergent risks and outcomes of complex construction 
projects originate substantially from interactions among diverse actors. As it is 
depicted in Figure 1.2, the risks indicators that are identified through checklists 
may be related to interactions in the context of the construction projects. In this 
case, the emergent dynamics associated with the interactional risks can be 
modeled through extensive study of strategic alternatives. Connecting the 
strategic level of decision making with the identified risk through the layer of the 
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project context provides a descriptive assessment of the emergent risks 
associated with the interactions in a complex construction project. 
The majority of the approaches to risk analysis in construction are also 
often normatively prescriptive. Rather than reflecting the actual dynamics, 
assessments often reflect the planner’s desired consequences of decisions (Han 
and Diekmann 2001). In other words, the models reflect the dynamics behind the 
decision making to prescribe the ideal actions (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
1953). However, risk analysis in strategic management should reflect the 
characteristics of the context and the stakeholders involved (Bromiley et al. 2001). 
Resorting to normative models may be attributed to the difficulty in quantifying 
interactional dynamics and associated risk. These dynamics are often treated as 
an emergent behavior of a complex system of systems. There is no explicit 
quantification method for the risks associated with emergent dynamics, and most 
of the time this type of risk is addressed either the same way as static risks or is 
based on qualitative approaches.  
Besides, the dynamics of the synergies associated with the complex system 
of systems are often studied by investigating the actors involved in the setting. A 
typical approach to analyze these dynamics involves matching the actors, which 
are formally connected in the network while considering their salient 
characteristics. Analysis of the synergic dynamics of complex settings, such as 
global construction, should not underrate the interactions as the main source of 
the dynamics.  
 
1.4 Research Questions and Thesis 
The core argument of the proposed research is that interactions reflect the 
multiple dimensions of a project’s complexity, including the characteristics of the 
actors and the dynamism of their synergies. Accordingly, the focal questions of 
the research are: 
• What is the practical definition of complexity in construction projects? 
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o What are the important features of the complexity in construction 
projects? 
o What are the important types of emergent dynamics in complex 
construction projects? 
• What is the impact of the emergent dynamics associated with interactions 
in project metrics and how this impact can be framed? 
• What is the extent of the impact on project risks and how can it be 
quantified? 
• How can project planners develop policies/strategies to govern the 
emergent risks associated with interactional dynamics of complex 
construction projects? 
The framework of the research is defined based on these core questions. 
Therefore, the research plan is organized in three major steps: 1) develop a 
generic framework to define emergent dynamics associated with interactional 
dynamics of construction projects, 2) to provide a quantification methodology to 
assess the consequences of complexity in construction projects, and 3) develop 
a road map to design mitigation policies/strategies that address the emergent 
dynamics of complex construction projects and validate their impact. In addition, 
this research provides a platform to investigate the influence of network and 
institutional resources in the interactional pattern of construction projects. The 
research as a whole will ultimately examine the initial research thesis. 
Thesis  
The emergent risks in a complex construction project, as a collaborative 
system of systems, can be analyzed based on the interactional dynamics and 




1.5 Research Objective 
The objective of this study is to propose Interactional Analysis (IA) as a 
methodology to address the emergent risks associated with interactional 
dynamics of a complex system of systems, such as construction projects. It aims 
to investigate the complexity of construction projects and the nature of the 
emergent dynamics in these projects as a complex system of systems (SoS). 
Furthermore, a platform to investigate these dynamics based on interactions of 
institutionally-diverse actors is developed, which includes a methodological 
approach to descriptive analysis of the risks along with a quantified assessment 
of these dynamics. The study also aims to provide a methodological pathway 
from the results of the descriptive and quantitative analysis to the development of 
mitigation mechanisms. The study initially focuses on the risk analysis of 
complex construction projects including development of mitigation mechanisms 
at the strategy and policy levels. Several examples and cases will be presented, 
but the study will elaborate more on the dynamics of social opposition against 
construction projects considering the developer and the opposition as two actors 
that support and oppose the project, respectively. The ultimate outcome of the 
research will provide theoretical insights about the nature of the complexities and 
their associated emergent dynamics. IA also complements the common risk 
analysis models in the construction industry and provides an additional tool for 
the descriptive/quantitative analysis of project risks and the development of 
policies/strategies to mitigate the impact of emergent dynamics (Figure 1.2). 
From a practical point of view, it will provide decision-makers of complex 
construction projects with a methodological tool to analyze the emergent 
dynamics of projects in contexts that involve the interactions of multiple decision-
makers. Theoretically, IA can be applied to any complex context that involves 
interactions and their emergent consequences, such as the economic and 
cultural dimensions of safety management, counterfeiting risk, effective 
governance of sustainable construction, building collaborative teams, and Joint 
Venture (JV) arrangements. A broader impact of the research is envisioned for 
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other areas, including homogeneous networks (e.g., financial networks), urban 
and coastal systems, transportation systems, energy networks, and disaster 
response networks. 
 
1.5.1 Research Objective 
• Define the complexity of construction projects and its salient features. 
• Investigate the development of a generic framework for comprehensive 
and universal analysis of emergent dynamics at the policy level in a 
complex system of systems, such as construction projects. 
• Further investigate the development of more detailed structures for 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of emergent dynamics at the 
strategy level in construction projects. 
• Assess the emergent dynamics associated with the interactional dynamics 
of institutionally-diverse projects and their impacts on project metrics and 
risks at both policy and strategy levels. 
• Examine the application of IA in the development of risk mitigation policies 
for complex construction programs/projects and assessment of the 
effectiveness of the potential mitigation policies. 
• Examine the application of IA in the development of risk mitigation 
strategies for complex construction projects/procedures and assessment 
of the effectiveness of the potential mitigation strategies. 
 
1.6 Scope of the Research 
Scope in terms of complexity: The scope of this study will be limited to 
single interactions in the context of complex construction projects. According to 
Meltzer’s rules (Meltzer 2006), models need to be built with minimal complexity in 
order to observe the main behaviors of a system and then the complexity can be 
increased gradually as needed. Therefore, at this stage, the study will be limited 
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to single interactions between two actors within the network of the project. As it 
can be observed in Figure 1.3, the context of the construction projects become 
increasingly more complex and include institutionally-diverse actors, beyond the 
traditional setting of owner, engineer, and the contractor (left side of Fig. 1.3). 
Within the network of the construction project, this study will focus on single 
interactions at the current stage to provide an in-depth analysis of each 
interaction that can be further extended to the network level in future studies. 
Figure 1.3 Traditional Concept of Actors in Construction Projects versus 
Current Project Settings 
 
Scope in terms of the nature of the problem:  Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) 
introduced performance paradox as a steep increase in the frequency and 
complexity of infrastructure projects despite striking poor performance of these 
projects in terms of sustainability metrics, i.e., social, environmental, and 
economic dimensions. The need for more infrastructure and their services as well 
as the increasing requirements of sustainability in these projects highlights the 
vitality of this analysis, since: i) this need is addressed through increasing 
complexity of construction projects, ii) increasing complexity in a system of 
13 
 
systems, such as a complex construction project, results in fragility towards 
emergent dynamics. As the complexity of construction projects exhibits an 
increasing trend, specifically in megaprojects and infrastructure development, 
addressing the associated challenges is needed. 
Different forms of emergent dynamics in complex construction projects can 
impact project outcomes and result in the observed poor performance of 
infrastructure projects. Projects are increasingly encountering legal, financial, 
political, and cultural obstacles. The involvement of institutionally diverse actors, 
extended project impact over time and space, and greater technological 
complexity has driven this trend. The assessment of complex construction 
projects is vital in order to improve effective planning of infrastructure projects 
and the performance of these projects and therefore addressing the issues 
indicated by the performance paradox. 
On one hand, the interactions in complex projects are planned to cover 
multiple phases of a project beyond the construction phase. On the other hand, 
the diversity of actors (and consequently their interactions) is considerably more 
than traditional project setting, since the main goal in current project settings is to 
spread responsibilities to a wider group beyond the contractors and owners. This 
trend includes social embeddedness of projects and to include more actors in the 
decision making process. Investigating this trend in project planning and program 
development provides a better understanding of the emergent dynamics that 
arise, for example, from social and political interactions. This goal can be 
achieved through and applying models that integrate actions of multiple actors in 
the process of decision making to increase social embeddedness of projects.  
Therefore, a complementary tool to provide a descriptive and quantitative 
analysis of emergent dynamics in projects could offer a source of developing 
mitigation approach in the form of policies or strategies. Specifically, the 
challenges of construction projects are shifting to social issues rather than 
technical challenges (McAdam et al. 2010). This study thus highlights social 
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opposition and its associated risks in complex construction projects as the case 
study throughout the research. Different dimensions of this issue are investigated 
within the research and suggestions are made accordingly. 
Interactional analysis of complex construction projects focuses on the 
particular characteristics of social opposition in construction projects. The longer 
the duration of the interactions between the contractual parties and the 
opposition, the more suitable they are for analysis. The diversity of the actors 
also results in a diversity of interactions that adds to the variation within the 
analysis. Finally, the interactions are likely to modify and transform the project in 
different phases of its life cycle. These characteristics can be integrated into the 
research to reflect the complexity of planning in an evolutionary context. 
Further Applicability: The model applied for the analysis of the interactions 
in complex construction projects can be simply adapted to other complex system 
of systems within and beyond the construction industry since the theoretical 
context of IA can be applied to any single interaction regardless of its context. 
The framework proposed for application in areas in the nexus of infrastructure 
and societies, such as project governance, conflict resolution, and policy-making. 
It can be further applied to homogenous networks such as financial systems, 
topics within the supply chain management in different industries (i.e., risk of 
counterfeiting), or analysis of trends in heterogeneous networks such as energy 
networks. 
 
1.7 Outline of the Dissertation 
IA, as a transformative concept, will evaluate the complexity of construction 
projects according to the power relations in construction project contexts and will 
analyze the consequent emergent dynamics. The research involves five major 
phases: 1) literature review to define the fundamental outline of the research as a 
multidisciplinary research, 2) development of a generic framework of interactions 
based on the proposed interactional elements, 3) development of a hybrid 
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(descriptive/quantitative) platform to devise mitigation policies for consequent 
emerging risks, 4) development of approaches to devise mitigation policies and 
assess their effectiveness, 5) development of specific models of the interactions 
according to the detailed stages of each interactional context to assess mitigation 
strategies for emerging risks. Chapter 2 reviews the literature of the research in 
more detail, which includes the topics of complexity and emergence in detail as 
well as other relevant areas such as risk, institutional theory, and interactions and 
synergies. Chapter 3 discusses in detail the methodology of the research as well 
as the applied approaches. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss IA at both the policy-
making and strategy development levels. Chapter 6 concludes the research and 





CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study aims to analyze complexity of systems of systems through 
assessment of emergent dynamics associated with interactions in institutionally-
diverse settings. It suggests the generic methodology of Interactional Analysis 
(IA), which can be applicable to any complex context. The practical dimension of 
the current study involves application of the proposed framework for risk 
assessment in complex construction projects. The body of knowledge discussed 
in this study comprises the literature of complexity, emergence, risk, institutional 
theory, and interactions. As is the case with topics such as complexity and 
emergence, a clear definition relevant to the problem statement is necessary. 
The chapter section on complexity involves elaborate discussion of the definition 
of complexity, as well as its implications within the construction industry. It further 
clarifies the emphasis of this research in the frame of reference of complexity. 
The next section then discusses emergent dynamics as the core property of 
complex construction projects, including the concept of emergence and 
associated contextual elements in construction projects as complex systems of 
systems. As the current study emphasizes institutional diversity in construction 
projects, the third section of this chapter provides a discussion on institutional 
theory and related previous research in the field of construction. The chapter 
continues with a thorough review of the concept of risk, and the body of previous 
research related to risk in the field of construction is discussed. Finally, 
interactions and interactional synergies are discussed, including a review of the 
literature in fields such as organizational theory, social science, and management 




The literature of complexity spans multiple fields, such as cybernetics, biology, 
physics, social science, economics, and engineering. This literature branches 
from general systems theory and identifies common and distinctive features 
recognized under the term complexity among all the relevant fields. Similarly, the 
field of construction has an ongoing discourse on the topic of complexity at 
different levels of analysis, such as the construction project level (Baccarini 1996), 
and for diverse sets of issues, such as project management (Maylor et al. 2008 
and Williams 1999). However, the application of complexity lacks a universal 
definition and a standard pattern of application (Bertelsen 2003). This deficiency 
necessitates a review of the common definitions of complexity and at the same 
time their implications within this research. The next section provides an 
overview of the topic of complexity and related definitions, and the implications of 
these definitions within the construction field are addressed in the section that 
follows. Finally, this chapter concludes with an overview of the application of 
complexity in this research. 
 
2.1.1 Definitions 
Simon (1962) generally defines a complex system as a system that is composed 
of numerous parts that interact in a non-simple manner. Carlson and Doyle (2002) 
distinguish complex systems through the heterogeneity of the actors within an 
intricate and structured network with hierarchies and multiple scales. Edmonds 
(1995) connects complexity to the degree of difficulty in representing a system 
solely through its parts and their interactions. Several other studies provide other 
definitions of complexity (Klir 1985, Kauffman 1993, Hinegardner and Engelberg 
1983, Levin 1998, Waldrop 1992, and Maylor et al. 2008, Arthur et al. 1997). 
Table 2.1 presents few studies in the literature of complexity along with the 
emphasis and the focus of each study. The common features of complexity 
among all these definitions are differentiation and connectivity (Baccarini 1996).  
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Before discussing these two features in the context of this research, it would be 




2.1.2 Complex Construction Projects 
In the context of construction, complexity may refer to different dimensions 
of projects. Williams (1999) enumerates structural uncertainty in terms of 
diversity of actors, multiplicity of objectives and interdependence of project 
elements, as well as uncertainty of goals and processes as the features of 
project complexity. Cicmil and Marshal (2005) highlight communication and 
power relations among actors, ambiguity of benchmarks, as well as changes 
over time in complex construction projects. Maylor et al. (2008) emphasizes that 
definitions of project complexity needs to reflect social aspects of projects. 
Similarly, case studies have revealed the increasing trend in multiple dimensions 
of project complexity. This complexity trend is increasing not only technologically, 
but on several other fronts as well, such as the institutional diversity of the actors, 
the coupling of their interactions, and the contextual complexity. The complexity 
of construction projects also can be discussed in terms of conceptualization of 
projects, here discussed through the spatial and chronological extension of 
projects as well as uncertainty. Indeed several studies suggested uncertainty as 
a major dimension of project complexity (Maylor et al. 2008, Turner and 
Cochrane 1993, and Williams 1999). In order to obtain a solid definition of the 
term complexity and to delineate the focus of the research, these dimensions 
therefore are briefly discussed as well. 
 
2.1.2.1 Technological Complexity 
The most basic implication of complexity in construction may refer to the 
technological complexity of projects. Maylor et al. (2008) describes this 
complexity as the level of the novelty of the system as well as uncertainty in its 
process. In this sense, the term complexity is applied for both processes and 
tools. The diversity of the tools and machinery as well as the interdependence of 
their parts exemplifies a typical case of complexity (e.g., oil rigs, heavy cranes, 
tunnel boring machines (TBM)). On the other hand, applying differentiated and 
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interconnected processes and methodologies is another form of technological 
complexity. The example of this type of complexity in construction projects is the 
case of high-rise buildings that employ almost the same tools as mid-size 
buildings while the planning is more complex. 
 
2.1.2.2 Contextual Complexity 
Contextual complexity implies differentiation and connectivity within the 
context of a project. This type of complexity may include the market, the 
institutional background of a project’s context, or the physical setting of a project. 
An example of this type of complexity can be observed in global construction, 
while the context of the new market itself is more complex (regardless of the 
involved actors), or a project in Alaska when the physical setting of the project 
proves challenging for an unfamiliar contractor. 
 
2.1.2.3 Diversity of Actors and Roles 
The diversity of the actors is one of the most salient dimensions of 
complexity in construction projects. Baccarini (1996) and Maylor (2003) label this 
complexity as the organizational complexity of construction projects. This 
diversity can be analyzed in terms of the institutional diversity of actors. As can 
be observed in Figure 2.1, there is an observable trend to increase the 
responsibility of other sectors in construction projects. These projects now 
involve not only contractors and designers but also actors such as financiers, 
international institutions and governing bodies, export credit agencies (ECA), 
non-governmental organizations, local communities, etc. This increase in the 
number and diversity of actors will increase project complexity tremendously 
since all actors pursue divergent goals and often are structured differently. Since 
the institutional diversity of actors is the core of this study’s analysis, this 




2.1.2.4 Coupling of Systems 
This dimension of complexity solely emphasizes the connectivity feature of 
complexity emphasized in definitions. As construction projects involve diverse 
actors as the vertices of the network, the interactions of these actors, as edges of 
the network, are another dimension of the complexity of construction projects. 
Maylor et al. (2008) categorizes this form of complexity as the dynamic element 
of complexity. These interactions are defined as the coupling of the actors, which 
by themselves are already complex systems. This research therefore focuses its 






































































Figure 2.1 Simplified Scheme of Major Actors for Public Private Partnership 
and their Interactions 
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2.1.2.5 Conceptual Complexity of Construction Projects 
The complexity of construction projects also can be discussed in terms of 
project conceptualization that pertains to how projects are defined and 
transformed from an idea to a concept and ultimately to the output (i.e., the built 
environment). This dimension of complexity is discussed in terms of spatial and 
chronological extension of projects, as well as associated uncertainties. 
 
2.1.2.6 Spatial Extent 
The extent of projects within space can be applied to frame the complexity 
of construction projects. Construction projects involve a network of actors and a 
back-up supply chain that transcends geopolitical demarcations. The complexity 
of projects and its trends also can be studied in terms of this extent. For example, 
an increase in trans-border projects can contribute to the escalating complexity 
trend in construction. This extent is made possible through multiple 
transformations, among them the application of distant communication tools. For 
example, telecommunication and transportation facilitates the contact of 
companies with oversees projects and encourages more companies to explore 
distant markets. 
The spatial extent of construction projects is also referred extensively 
within the literature. The construction field has extensively studied this dimension 
of complexity under the topic of global construction. Global construction research 
has involved multiple lines of enquiry, primarily owing to the multifaceted nature 
of the problems. Multiple researches have focused, among others, on social 
(Chan and Tse 2003), organizational (Keast and Hampson 2007), financial 
(Walsh et al. 2005), and contractual (Chen and Messner 2009), as well as the 
knowledge management aspects (Javernick and Levitt 2010; Taylor 2007). In 
addition, some researchers focused specifically on planning and strategy 
development in the global context. Market entry decision-making models 
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(Dikmen and Bignorul 2004; Han and Diekman 2001), risk assessment models 
(Hastak and Shaked 2000; Nasirzadeh et al. 2008; and Walewski 2005), and 
strategic management approaches (Miller and Lessard 2000 and Orr and Scott 
2008) are among these researches. This study investigates complexity in terms 
of the spatial extent of projects with its focus on the institutional diversity of 
construction projects. 
 
2.1.2.7 Temporal Extent 
Conceptualizing construction projects involves another dimension of 
complexity: temporal extent. The focus of construction engineering in this extent 
is now beyond the construction phase of the project, extending from policy-
making and concept development to project operation, project renovation, and 
reuse. Thus, the construction industry is extending its focus from one phase to 
the whole cycle of a project’s lifetime. As the life cycle will be repeated again in 
some different way after the last phase of a project’s lifetime, the industry will re-
invent the wheel integrating the lessons learned during the last cycle. For 
example, recent public private partnerships are introducing the concept of profit 
margin ceiling to reduce the risks of the contract breach observed in previous 
projects. The complexity thereby is increased exponentially through temporal 
extent of the project. The rule of the game in the new phases is entirely different 
than the construction phase and requires more planning deliberation. 
 
2.1.2.8 Project Uncertainties 
Several studies have emphasized the uncertainty dimension of complexity 
within the context of construction projects (Turner and Cochrane 1993, Williams 
1999, and Maylor et al. 2008). This dimension of project complexity is rooted in 
definitions of complexity proposed by Hinegardner & Engelberg (1983), Klir 
(1984), and Edmonds (1995), where they emphasize descriptive aspects of 
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complexity. In the context of construction project, the term uncertainty may refer 
to the lack of clarity of goals or performance metrics (Loosemore and McCarthy 
2008), lack of knowledge about processes and methodologies, or lack of 
information about the context or other actors. For example, the defined goal of a 
project may be ambiguous or poorly communicated which adds to the complexity 
of a project. Later in this chapter the concept of uncertainty will be discussed in 
more details. 
 
2.1.3 Increasing Trend of Complexity in Construction Projects 
Review of any of the aforementioned dimensions reveals the ascending 
trend of complexity in multiple dimensions of construction projects. Construction 
projects increasingly apply complex tools, involve complex procedures, include 
diverse actors and their interactions, expand to complex contexts, and require 
complex conceptualization. Several reasons may be enumerated for this 
increasing trend. Carlson and Doyle (2002) stated that the complexity of systems 
is not necessarily for functional purposes, but rather for robustness. They define 
robustness as sustaining the characteristics of a system (or system of systems) 
despit fluctuations in the behavior of its components or the environment (context). 
In the case of construction projects fluctuations of the environment from one side 
and the increasing need for infrastructure from the other side highlights the 
necessity of more complex construction projects. Flyvbjerg (2003) labels this 
situation as the performance paradox: the increasing need for infrastructure that 
coincides with the decreasing performance of these projects. In the literature of 
the area of infrastructure, this robustness is further described in terms of the 
triple bottom line of sustainability: 
• Economic robustness.  Infrastructure development faces the 
increasing problem of financial resources. In order to increase the 
financial robustness of infrastructures, actors such as financial 
institutions and credit agencies are integrated into projects, 
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complicated contracts such as concessions are devised, and 
mechanisms such as infrastructure bonds are introduced. The 
result of these inclusions is increased project complexity in order to 
achieve economic robustness. 
• Social robustness.  On the other hand, infrastructure projects face 
the rising challenge of social integrity. There is an increased need 
for the equity pillar of sustainablity, and projects are frequently 
encountered with social opposition, protests, or political 
controversies. The increasing complexity of infrastructure project 
networks and the involvement of more actors in decision-making 
aims to achieve social robustness in infrastructure development. 
• Environmental robustness. Similarly, there is a critical need for 
more environmental assessment of infrastructure projects. An 
increased number of actors in decision-making and policy 
development and the coupling of their interactions is necessary to 
increase the environmental robustness of projects. 
To summarize, the robustness required by sustainable infrastructures is 
achieved through increased project complexity. For example, increasing diversity 
of actors in construction projects includes involvement of export credit agencies 
(ECA) to increase economic robustness, public NIMBY to increase social 
robustness, and transnational groups to increase environmental robustness of 
construction projects. The attained robustness is needed to manage the 
anticipated fluctuations of the environment and the weaknesses of the system. 
However, the robustness achieved through complexity is compromised by 
fragility of these systems (Carlson and Doyle 2002). The fragility is in the form of 
cascading failures and includes rare and uncommon events as well as 
unanticipated flaws in the system (Carlson and Doyle 2002). In the case of 
complex construction projects, fragility is observed as emergent dynamics such 
as failures in project completion schedule, changes, and modifications, as well as 
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deviations from the constructon plans. Understanding the complexity of 
construction projects and its two features (i.e., differentiation and connectivity) 
enables project planners to address the fragility of these systems and the 
associated emergent dynamics. 
 
2.1.4 Complexity in the Context of Interactional Analysis 
Based on the discussion of the definition of complexity, the two important 
features of complexity includes differentiation and connectivity. This research 
focuses on the institutional diversity of the actors (differentiation) and the 
interactions of these actors (connectivity). The institutional diversity of the actors 
is primarily concerned with the second and third dimensions of complexity 
(contextual complexity and diversity of actors and roles) in construction projects, 
while it also covers conceptual complexity in terms of spatial extent. On the other 
hand, focusing on the interactions among the actors comprises a fourth 
dimension of complexity as well as conceptual complexity in terms of 
chronological extent since the timeline of the interactions reflects the different 




Emergent dynamics are a salient property of any complex system of 
systems, and several studies have tried to identify cases of emergent dynamics 
within diverse fields. Corning (2002) defines emergence as the outcome of the 
self-organizing system. However, self-organization and emergence should be 
differentiated: emergence is defined as any novel macro-level phenomenon as a 
result of interactions at the micro-level, while self-organization is an adaptive and 
dynamical increase in order and structure without control mechanisms from 
outside of the system (De Wolf and Holvoet 2005). In the case of the construction 
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literature, a joint venture may be considered as a self-organizing system as the 
order is not enforced externally, while social opposition can be considered as 
emergence as it is a novel property at the macro level of the project. Although 
both phenomena can happen in isolation, they often accompany each other in 
complex dynamic systems (De Wolf and Holvoet 2005).  
While emergence happens in diverse fields, Goldstein (1999) proposes 
five common properties necessary for any emergence phenomenon: 1) radical 
novelty, 2) coherence, 3) macro level, 4) dynamical, and 5) ostensive 
(observable). In this regard the emergence phenomenon is novel and has not 
been observed before. It is the result of interrelated parts that exhibit a coherent 
holism. It is observed at the macro level and as a result of dynamism within the 
complex system and is an observable phenomenon in complex systems. 
 
2.2.2 Emergent Dynamics in Complex Construction Projects 
Several forms of emergence can be observed in construction projects, as 
complex systems of systems that involve multiple actors. In order to have an 
overview of the cases of emergence in construction projects these categories 
can be discussed as follow: 
• Emerging contextual property.  Sometimes, the emergence is observed 
as the change in the properties of the project context such as the 
transaction costs associated with actions, project modifications, delays, 
cost overruns, etc. Extreme project modifications in the case of sudden 
fluctuations in the exchange rate of currencies in global construction are 
examples of this type of emergence. 
• Emergent actor. Due to the extent of construction projects and their 
impacts, often projects face actors that are not expected at the planning 
and feasibility stages. The emergent involvement of an unprecedented 
actor impacts project dynamics and change the equilibria of the project. 
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This type of emergence can be observed in diverse types of projects 
specifically in urban development when multiple actors may find conflict of 
interest with the project, such as the emergence of green party as an 
opposition in the case of Stuttgart 21 project in Germany. 
• Emerging coalitions. Several construction projects, such as the 
hydroelectric projects around the world, face emerging coalitions as a new 
emergent actor within the context of project. An example of this type of 
emergence includes transnational opposition groups in the case of 
hydroelectric dams such as the Bujagali hydroelectric project in Uganda. 
A generic pattern of these emerging actors is that they begin as a 
coalition between local public opposition including public “not in my back 
yard” (NIMBY) and transnational opposition groups such as “International 
Rivers.” 
• Emerging transformations of an actor.  In some cases, the emergence is 
observed as the emerging characteristic of an actor within the intricate 
network of the project. This form of emergence can be observed within 
public private partnership projects when the governing side of the public 
exhibits emerging properties after changes in the governments or 
elections, such as the case of Dabhol project in India.  
• Emergent synergies.  Emergence also can be observed in the form of 
synergies such as controversies or conflicts. In these cases, a complex 
construction project exhibits properties of emergence in association with 
interactional synergies among different actors. The conflicts and 
controversies surrounding the Keystone XL pipeline or California high-
speed rail project are examples of emerging synergies. This form of 
emergence cannot be attributed to any specific actor or environmental 
condition but it is rooted in the synergies that arise from the interaction 
among actors. For example, cultural and institutional differences might 
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trigger a problematic emergent synergy between the owner and 
contractors, such as the case of Bechtel’s arbitration in the UAE.  
As institutionally diverse construction projects face an increasing trend of 
complexity, often an assortment of these types are observed within projects. For 
example, an emergent actor most likely forms an emergent coalition and their 
action may result in an emergent contextual property. Therefore, to provide a 
methodological approach to the emergent phenomena of institutionally diverse 
projects, they may be studied through associated deviations in terms of project 
metrics (i.e., cost, time, environmental impact, quality, safety, etc.) 
 
2.2.3 Case of Social Opposition as an Emergent Dynamic 
The trend of increasing social opposition to large-scale and controversial 
facilities (Aldrich 2010 and McAdam et al. 2010) comes from a transformed 
global environment, the emergence of new actors such as transnational networks, 
coalitions, and social movements (Khagram et al. 2002), and changes in the 
power and norm structures (Sikkink 2002). The extensive list of projects facing 
significant social opposition includes megaprojects and infrastructure with diverse 
institutional background such as the Belo Monte dam in Brazil, the Bujagali dam 
in Uganda, the Stuttgart 21 project in Germany, and the Keystone XL pipeline in 
North America. Similarly, Japan’s entire commercial nuclear power program now 
faces retrenching as a result of public opposition (Aldrich 2013). The enormity of 
these deviations from planned outcomes despite the developer-perceived 
necessity of these projects suggests the importance of policy models that 
account for social and political dynamics. Complex project planning must 
integrate power trade-offs and political and institutional arrangements as major 
determinants of outcomes (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). Very few research projects 
have investigated the emergent dynamics of social opposition in infrastructure 
(McAdam et al. 2010) and even less has been done as far as analytical study of 
these dynamics (Dietz and Stern 2008).  
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In the context of this study, the emergent dynamics associated with social 
opposition in complex construction projects occur despite very detailed plans. 
While risk analysis is an integral part of planning, it often fails to systematically 
integrate these dynamics into risk assessment and risk mitigation. Common risk 
analysis models in construction take the checklist approach, which lays out 
experts’ opinions for salient risk factors (Hastak and Shaked 2000; Walewski 
2005). Models that go further and acknowledge the presence of complexities 
often provide a normative assessment of risks (Han and Diekman 2001; 
Nasirzadeh et al. 2008); such assessments may reflect desired outcomes rather 
than actual dynamics between different actors such as the opposition groups. 
These models, though accurate, neglect institutional arrangements and power 
relations among project actors despite the fact that they are dominant factors in 
determining failure and success (Miller and Lessard 2001). Developers must 
increase the credibility of their analyses through descriptive risk assessment and 
the integration of interactional arrangements into project planning. 
 
2.3 Institutional Theory 
The institutional, financial, and organizational set-up substantially 
influences projects and their associated risks as the risks influence those set-ups 
(Flybjerg et al. 2003). Institutions involve behavioral structures that shape and 
constrain an individual’s actions and relations. North (1990) called institutions 
“frameworks within which human interactions take place.” As interactions are the 
central focus of this study, the institutional diversity of interactive actors is the 
basis of the analysis. It may be argued that background diversity in construction 
projects has increased in recent decades due to several reasons, which include 
the following: 
i. Field expansion: the need for the cooperation of different types of 
public and private organizations such as financial institutions, 
international organizations, facility operators, etc. (This dimension 
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refers to the complexity of projects in terms of the diversity of the 
actors as discussed in the prior section.)  
ii. Globalization: the de facto symbol of modern life with its different 
dimensions. (This dimension refers to the complexity of projects in 
terms of spatial extent as discussed in the prior section) and includes 
the following: 
a. Global trend in business: increase in the portion of overseas 
involvement in construction companies’ portfolios (Hastak and 
Shaked 2000). 
b.     Global nature of projects: increase in the need for projects 
trans-border in nature (e.g. Nabucco pipeline, Desertec 
Foundation, etc.). 
The impact of institutional diversity goes beyond institutional risk and also 
influences other types of risk (technical, financial, etc.) in a subtle manner. 
Multiple researchers have studied these nuances and their related consequences 
in multiple aspects of construction industry. Miller and Lessard (2000 and 2007) 
and Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) emphasized the importance of institutional shaping in 
risk management. Mahalingam and Levitt (2007) studied the impacts of 
institutional differences on the safety aspects of global projects as well as the 
conflicts in global projects and their institutional roots. Orr and Scott (2008) 
studied the managerial aspects and the cost-related consequences of 
institutional diversity. Jooste (2010) explored public private partnership projects 
at the level of the organization, investigating institutional capacity building within 
the networks at that level. 
Scott (2001) identified three distinctive elements of institutions: 1) 
regulative, 2) normative, and 3) cultural-cognitive. Regulative elements concern 
the rules and regulations that are either created or evolve to govern behaviors. 
Normative elements, on the other hand, involve values and norms that impose 
constraints on social behavior. Finally, cultural-cognitive elements are 
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frameworks through which interpretations are made. The cultural side refers to 
rationalization with external symbolic frameworks while an internal sense- making 
procedure is more on the cognitive side (Orr and Scott 2008). All the 
aforementioned elements of institutions are transmitted through different types of 
carriers. Carriers that convey specific elements or their combination tentatively 
identified by Scott (2001 and 2003) can be categorized into four groups: 1) 
symbolic systems, which are diverse types of structured symbolic frameworks 
that encode and convey meaningful information; 2) relational systems, which are 
linkages among actors at different levels; 3) routines, which are patterned actions 
reflecting tacit knowledge of the actors; and 4) artifacts, which are the material 
culture devised by the actors. 
As the current study emphasizes the importance of the interactions among 
diverse actors, institutional diversity is the core of the analysis. This study 
integrates institutional theory into the common practices of the construction 
theory in a subtle manner to link construction industry social studies with 
common planning practices. Therefore, the proposed interactional analysis 
framework accounts for institutions and their elements by incorporating them into 
construction project planning tools. Apart from the subtle implication of 
institutional theory within interactions, the current study proposes network, 
normative, and cultural-cognitive resources as elements of interaction and 
provides a basis to investigate their influence within project dynamics (Phase I in 
Figure 1.3). 
 
2.4 Risk Analysis 
Risk is used extensively in settings that involve decision-making (Kangari 
1995). It is applied as a prognostic indicator for the consequences of decisions. 
Traditionally, the application area of risk was only limited to the negative 
implications (Damodaran 1997). For instance, the Merriam Webster Dictionary 
defines risk simply as “chances of loss.” Nonetheless, in a practical realm, “risks” 
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and “opportunities” are now used in conjunction with describing the uncertainties 
revolving around a project as the possibilities of “failure” and “success.”  Failure 
and success are extremes that determine the range of the outcomes for each 
decision. The Chinese characters for risk underline this importance as they 
consist of two symbols representing both danger and opportunity (Damodaran 
1997). Similarly, a more comprehensive definition of risk encompasses 
opportunities as well as threats, reminding decision-makers to consider a range 
of outcomes in the decision-making process.   
In many academic fields, risk suffers from the lack of a clear definition. This 
ambiguity has resulted in different interpretations and consequent illusions in 
terms of incorporating the term “risk” into practice. The construction industry is no 
exception, considering extensive practical use of risk in multiple decision-making, 
planning, and strategy development procedures in the industry. On the 
theoretical side, multiple researches have investigated risk and its applications in 
construction industry. An overall review of these studies cannot render a lucid 
definition of risk and its application. Therefore, it is necessary to explore risk as 
applied in the construction industry and contrast it with approaches in other fields. 
The result of this exploration will be a clearly defined foundation to reduce 
ambiguities in the definitions that pertain to a classified approach towards risk. It 
can also frame an ontological understanding of risk for the current study as well 
as for the construction industry in general. For this purpose, the review will 
include the distinctions between risk and uncertainty followed by the definitions of 
risk in other academic fields. Finally, the section will conclude with exploring risk 
and related implications in the field of construction engineering and management 
(CEM). 
 
2.4.1 “Risk” Vs. “Uncertainty” 
Risk and uncertainty are often mistaken for each other. Therefore, the first 
step in defining risk is to distinguish it from uncertainty. Several interpretations 
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have been suggested for distinguishing risk from uncertainty. Knight (1921) 
studied differences of risk and uncertainty from an economic point of view and 
suggested that knowing the probability of the decision’s outcomes as a key 
element in distinguishing risk from uncertainty. Risk was attributed to the known 
probability of outcomes, while uncertainty concerned the unknown probability of 
outcomes by Bromiley et al. (2001). Aligned with this definition, Miller and 
Lessard (2000) differentiated risk from uncertainty by the fact that the former can 
be described in statistical terms while the latter deals with unknown potential 
outcomes. This explanation was not aligned with the expectations of many 
practitioners in different fields however (Bromiley et al. 2001). A survey by Baired 
and Thomas (1990) argued for the importance of “knowing the probability,” 
Bromiley et al. (2001) clarified the strategic management approach by defining 
risk as the unpredictability of the outcome variables, while uncertainty was the 
perceived unpredictability of the contingencies. On the other hand, in philosophy, 
risk is considered the objective unpredictability of an event and uncertainty is 
connected to subjective unpredictability. While objective unpredictability deals 
with probability, subjective unpredictability deals with attitudes and expectations. 
When perceptions are considered to be part of the game, it should be noted that 
the lack of insight (background knowledge) will not result in risk elimination, but 
rather that the risks will remain unidentified.  Since the state of risk perception 
only exists in an evaluator’s mind, the lack of this state will automatically result in 
the lack of risk perception even though objectively risk does exist in that situation. 
Finally, in a game theoretic approach uncertainty is modeled as a move of 
nature3 in addition to the actor’s move while risk is modeled as changes in utility 
values. Therefore, uncertainty in the construction industry can be attributed to 
general unpredictability or a state of not knowing, while risk is always concerned 
with variations of outcomes in terms of project metrics. As this study is based on 
observations of project metric’s deviations from plans, it should focus on risk as 
defined and avoid uncertainty. The practical implication of this strategy is to focus 
                                            
3
 Move of nature in game theory is the option to integrate chance by an actor with no interference in outcomes (a.k.a. nature). 
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on the outcomes of projects rather than events and their unpredictability. The 
definition of risk will be further clarified in the next sections. 
 
2.4.2 Risk in Diverse Academic Fields 
Psychology, finance, economics, and strategic management are all 
concerned with risk and its application. However, the definition of risk varies 
among these approaches based on diverse assumptions and applications and 
the inherent vagueness of the term.  
Finance is one of the exceptions, though, with a robust definition of risk as 
this discipline closely models financial markets in the real world using the 
prevailing assumptions of an efficient market. The key fact in the finance 
literature’s approach to risk is that the term “risk” is often coupled with “return.” 
Therefore, the main emphasis is on the various rates of return as measured by 
standard deviation (SD). The variance of returns (or its square root, SD) is often 
applied as a quantitative measure of risk, considering the expected value of 
return.  
Variance = σ 2 = E {[R – E(R)]2} 
In this equation, R stands for the random variable of investment return, E 
stands for the expected value, and σ denotes the standard deviation (Smart et al. 
2004). Risk of default and bankruptcy is also of interest within the finance 
literature (Baired and Thomas 1990).  Generally, risk suggests a downside 
outcome of the action while most financial models relate risk to any volatility in 
return regardless of its favorability (Smart et al. 2004).  Although, by definition, 
risk is understood as the downside of return or the chances of loss, practical 
applications of risk in academic fields often consider the amalgamated value of 
any favorable or unfavorable variance in the outcomes and consequences of 
uncertain situations.  This difference can be attributed to the fact that analyzing 
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both favorable and unfavorable outcomes is the result of studying variation in 
returns, which includes both downside and upside outcomes. 
Risk in the management field is significantly influenced by psychology 
research to determine managerial preferences in decision-making involving 
uncertainty and the ability of managers to deal with risks.  
In psychology, risk involves individuals’ perceptions of risk, how risk 
assessment is developed, and its analysis at the institutional and society levels 
(Breakwell 2007).  In such studies, risk is often represented through an expected 
value, implying that exact probabilities are defined. The limitations of expected 
values should be regarded in assumptions to approximate risk in strategic 
management due to the greater presence of uncertainty as well as the 
complexities involved (Baired and Thomas 1990). 
Risk in management is significantly influenced by psychology research to 
determine managerial preferences in decision-making involving uncertainty as 
well as the ability of managers to deal with risks (Baired and Thomas 1990). 
Likewise, in psychological studies of risk, the expected value concept has been 
applied.   
The omnipresent vagueness in the development of strategies as well as the 
importance of actions through the selection of strategies and their influences in 
consequent decision are the key elements of defining risk in strategic 
management. Defining risk in strategic management was influenced by Bowman 
(1980), where the average ex-post analysis of return on equity (ROE) in studied 







Bowman (1980) argued the general belief, initiated from stock market 
analysis (finance), that risk has its rewards. Bowman provided some evidence for 
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cases where risk and return showed a negative relation in ex-post analysis. 
Therefore, risk in strategic management implies a broad definition encompassing 
probability, size, nature of outcomes, as well as causal uncertainties and lack of 
information (Baird and Thomas 1990). Bromiley et al. (2003) enumerated three 
major studies concerning risk assessment in strategic management: 1) prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), 2) behavioral theory of firm (Cyert and 
March 1963), and 3) agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Prospect theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) investigates 
the attitudes of managers towards risk considering the deficiencies of expected 
utility theory. Prospect theory proposes a fourfold pattern suggesting risk-
aversion behaviors in individuals in the domain of gains with high probability and 
risk-seeking behaviors in individuals in the domain of losses when the 
probabilities are high. In cases where the probability of loss or gain is low, risk 
attitudes may reverse suggesting risk-seeking for gains and risk aversion for 
losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1992).  The analysis in prospect theory is at the 
micro level (individuals and their preferences), and the studied cases were 
limited to absolute loses or gains.  Therefore, prospect theory could not suggest 
comparative assessments within the domains of loss and gain (Bromiley et al. 
2003). 
Behavioral theory of firm takes the approach of analyzing economic 
decisions by examining the internal factors of firms, such as their organizational 
structures and conventions (Cyert and March 1963). Unlike prospect theory, this 
study was at the firm level and contrasted the current status of firms with their 
aspiration levels, which were materialized through industry averages or past 
performances. The behavioral theory of firm can be applied to determine risk-
taking at the firm and organization level; however, its limitations must be 
considered (Bromiley et al. 2003).  
Agency theory examines decisions and risk-sharing problems via the 
relations of the principal who delegates the work to the agency (Eisenhardt 1989). 
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This line of research also can be applied to investigate governance strategies 
and the relations of an agency and a principal and their impact on risk and risk-
taking (Bromiley et al. 2003). 
In conclusion, risk in strategic management has broad implications beyond 
the definition of risk in the stock market. Therefore, approaches towards risk in 
strategic management should be beyond the variance of return. Investigating risk 
in global projects requires a strategic management approach, which inevitably 
leads to the definitions of risk in strategic management. The next section will 
further discuss the application of risk in construction projects and its implications. 
 
2.4.3 Existing Risk Analysis Models in Construction 
Risk has been studied extensively within the construction industry as it 
involves dynamic, risky, and capital-intensive projects. Several early works that 
proposed systematic approach to risk analysis include Hayes et al. (1986), 
Flanagan and Norman (1993), and Raftery (1994). Later on two dominant 
approaches for analysis of risks in construction research include frameworks to 
channelize expert opinion and models to study interaction of risk indicators. 
Hastak and Shaked (2000) proposed ICRAM-1 as a structured model for 
assessment of risk in global projects. Their proposed model employs a 
framework involving the indicators of  project risk in international construction. 
Firms opting for expansion in a foreign market can obtain structured evaluation of 
the involved risks based on the project context and its characteristics. Analysis is 
performed from the project point of view, identifying how project risk would be 
impacted by global, market, and project level characteristics (Hastak and Shaked 
2000). ICRAM-1 also considers micro-macro division based on spatial 
dimensions considering the following levels: global, market, and project. Although 
in ICRAM-1 the highest level is called macro level. Apart from the transfer of risk 
among the three levels, it also deemed some factors that represent interactions 
of multiple parties. 
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Table 2.2 Selected Studies on Risk in Construction Literature 
Research Reference Objective Focus Area 
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Han and Diekman (2001) proposed a Go/No-Go decision model for entering 
the international market. It adopted Cross Impact Analysis (CIA) for the Go/No-
Go application in order to evaluate the decision of entering new markets based 
on the risks involved. The core philosophy of the model was that strategic 
decisions are made based on the profitability of the project while profitability is 
not decisive for rejection or acceptance of a project and other factors should be 
taken into account. The proposed model is pointed to interaction and its 
importance; however, it does not focus specifically on interactions as separate 
parts of the project, thereby undermining the importance of the synergies 
developed in the project setting. It also neglected the interactions of entities 
beyond the contractor and owner. Finally, the Go/No-Go decision models’ 
application of sensitivity analysis may not be constructive in view of the detailed 
mapping of a strategic system of choices and actions, owing to their focus on 
aggregate variables (Miller, and Lessard 2007). 
To summarize, the approaches to risk in construction can be divided into two 
main categories. Some studies developed static assessment of risks for 
construction practitioners (Hastak and Shaked 2000, Walewski 2005, Moselhi 
and Deb 1993, Dey and Ogunlana 2001, and Fernandez-Denga et al. 2013). 
Some other research involved models that reflect the dynamic nature of projects 
(Han and Diekman 2001 and Nasirzadeh et al. 2008). However, the integration of 
dynamics into risk assessment models is usually based on the core idea of risk 
factor synergies. Risk factors as abstract indicators of project activities may not 
be an appropriate approximation of project synergies. Therefore tying risk factors 
to actual sources of synergies may provide more realistic picture of the project 
dynamics.  
As the concept of risk is diverse and can be interpreted and applied in variety 
of the topics, the literature of risk in construction is well beyond the two 
aforementioned categories. Tab. 2.2 provides a selected collection of these 
studies to showcase the extent of the risk literature in construction. Cheah et al. 
(2004) examined the strategic performance of firms in a global environment. In 
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this empirical study, certain characteristics of firms, which determine their 
performance in a global environment, are evaluated. A conceptual model in the 
study was created through the integration of collected data and strategic theory. 
One of the main conclusions of the study was the fact that strategies to 
success are not fixed and differ depending on diverse modes of operational, 
financial, technological, and human-related conditions (Cheah et al 2004). 
Dikmen and Birgonul (2004) developed a neural network model to assess 
decisions for entering international markets. It provided assessment of project 
risk considering interrelated parameters at different levels and their compound 
effect and developed a model that captures the relation between the decision 
facts (indicators) and the resulted attractiveness of the project (based on 
previous data and expert opinion.)  The model evaluated projects in a global 
market within a two-dimensional matrix of competitiveness and attractiveness. 
The complexity of the scenario and the resulted synergies are aimed to be 
captured by an artificial neural network (ANN).  One of the main limitations in this 
case was the fact that global projects are often unique, and training the ANN is a 
major challenge. In addition, the interactions of multiple stakeholders were not 
addressed within the model since the relations of a company with an owner or 
the public may produce different synergic results. As can be observed in these 
studies the focus might be on the project as a whole, evaluating its associated 
risk (e.g. Hastak and Shaked 2000), or one of the project actors and its related 
characteristics (e.g. Cheah et. al 2004). Both approaches ignore some of the 
stakeholders (e.g., public or non-contractual parties such as NGOs) and their 
interactions. The results therefore lack incorporating broader issues, such as 
sustainability in the evaluation of risks and opportunities in global construction 
projects, since their analysis approach is either at the macro level or is confined 
by the boundaries of a single project actor. Besides, the most common definitions 
in construction-based studies may be associated to the definition of uncertainty 
(as defined earlier) as well as the financial approach to risk (variance of return). 
Financial and market-oriented definitions, though useful for shareholders of 
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global firms and upper level management, are not efficient approximations for 
planning and strategy development in construction. The construction industry 
involves complex settings of a strategic management nature. Therefore, 
approaches towards risk in construction should not be limited to return variance. 
This study will focus on definition of risk in strategic management and its broad 
implications including the unpredictability of project outcomes in terms of different 
metrics4 as well as its causal roots. 
Similar to research, variety of models and approaches are applied for 
analysis and management of risk in construction. Dikmen et al. (2004) presented 
a list of commercial softwares for risk analysis. The common methodologies in 
the enumerated softwares include risk rating, Monte Carlo simulation, analytical 
hierarchy process (AHP), decision tree, influence diagram, fuzzy sets, neural 
networks, as well as Latin hypercube sampling (Dikmen et al. 2004). Recent 
studies such as the risk analysis of Panama Canal have taken similar 
approaches by applying Monte Carlo simulation. These methodologies assist 
decision makers to frame their decisions for a wide range of possibilities (e.g., 
Monte Carlo simulation) or based on the input of the experts (e.g., AHP). 
On the other hand, four common approaches to estimate the 
consequences of plans in construction industry include i) a predetermined 
percentage of the work, based on historical trends, ii) an expert’s judgment, iii) a 
quantitative risk analysis based on subjective probability and the degree of 
impact, iv) a regression analysis based on historical data of similar types of 
projects (Molenaar et al. 2010). Organizations apply different tools for this 
purpose. For instance, risk priority ranking methods as a qualitative/quantitative 
assessment method are commonly used while the California Department of 
Transportation (CalTrans) and the Office of Environmental Management in the 
Department of Energy (DOE-EM) use Monte Carlo simulation to acquire the 
probability of outcomes in the case of risk events (Molenaar et al. 2010). 
Accordingly, contingencies are categorized according to the knowledge of the 
                                            
4
 Project metrics include: time, cost, quality, and safety. 
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risk item and its quantity as known/known, known/unknown, or 
unknown/unknown (Molenaar et al. 2010). Emergent risk can be associated with 
the last two categories and therefore it is not quantified. Examples of these 
dynamics can be unprecedented social opposition as was the case of the 
Stuttgart 21 in Germany, since the risk and its quantity were unknown. On the 
other hand, opposition to the Keystone pipeline can be categorized as 
known/unknown because the opposition of environmentalists was perceivable 
but not quantifiable. Descriptive approaches to identify, assess, and respond to 
these dynamics can aid planners with multiple strategies to face the challenges 
of emergent dynamics. 
Recent approaches such as reference class forecasting (Flyvbjerg 2006), 
although providing more accuracy for plans as a whole, fall short of assimilating 
emergent dynamics. Reference class forecasting provides estimates for projects 
based on the data of the similar previous projects. The result can be an accurate 
assessment of the black box of a project in terms of the overall project metrics 
(cost, time, safety, and quality), while strategy developers are deprived of an 
accurate map of the detailed dynamics and their roots within the black box. 
Therefore, in the strategic management of projects, these approaches should be 
accomplished by methodologies that help decision-makers understand the 
dynamics and develop response strategies. Strategic risk encompasses a broad 
concept of risk, including actions, their consequences, and responses in the 
shape of risk mitigation strategy development. A platform to analyze the actual 
dynamics of risk is helpful to develop and integrate risk mitigation strategies into 
the risk assessment process. 
To summarize, risk in construction spanned over a wide range of issues and 
applied various methodologies and techniques to address it. Several studies 
have focused on quantification of risk, some on management risk systems, and 
further studies on refinement of mathematical approaches such as subjective 
probabilities, biases, and risk behaviors (Edwards and Bowen 1998). However, 
less has been devoted to emergent risks associated with the dynamics of 
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interactions and synergies among institutionally diverse actors in construction 
projects. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the selected research on risk in 
construction literature. Next section will discuss approaches to risk and risk 
assessment of dynamic system of systems in the context of the interactional 
analysis. 
 
2.4.4 Risk in the Context of Interactional Analysis 
According to the discussion on risk and its definitions, the strategic 
management definition of risk suits well with the approach of IA. Therefore, in this 
study risk is associated with the variations on the outcome of actions and 
includes context of the project as a complex system of systems, related actors, 
and their interactions. Siu (1993) suggested that risk analysis models should 
consider the major contributors to risk besides the overall risk associated with the 
system particularly to devise strategies to mitigate risks. As discussed 
construction projects are complex system of systems with dynamics associated 
with the interaction of diverse actors within these systems. Therefore, the risk 
analysis of these projects should investigate interactions and their associated 
emergent dynamics as the major contributor to risks. Quantitative definition of 
risk proposed by Kaplan and Garrick (1981) can be applied well for this purpose. 
Hence, risk can be defined as the set of triplets including the scenarios, and their 
associated probabilities and consequences. 
 
2.5 Interactions 
The literature pertaining to business and strategy management includes 
extensive studies indicating the importance of interactions in international 
business environment. The majority of the research focused on the actors rather 
than interactions and was limited to contractual stakeholders. IA, as proposed in 
this current study, may add a novel dimension to the nature of global construction 
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by shifting the emphasis to interactions. It also provides a broader implication 
considering political dynamics, power balance, and institutional capacity and a 
bridge to the risk assessment methods currently applied in global construction 
projects. The application can be extended to areas other than construction such 
as actors’ interactions within political, business, and social contexts. 
 
2.5.1 Interactional Dynamics and Synergies 
Interactions can be studied as communication networks or power relations 
between actors and institutions (Foucault 1982). Multiple researchers have 
studied communication networks in terms of knowledge mobilization (Javernick-
Will and Levitt 2010), information network dynamics, and boundary object (Taylor 
2007). This dissertation focuses on power relations, given their significance in the 
institutional arrangement of projects. This novel approach of the research is a 
crucial complementary analysis to precedent studies and common project 
planning methodologies in order to accomplish efficient project planning and 
project governance. 
Synergy, as defined by Corning (2002), is the combined effects of the 
components of a system that will not be attained individually (or in different 
combination). The global construction environment involves the synergies of 
multiple actors that interact in the short or long term in the project context. There 
are several models aiming to capture the synergies resulting from the 
relationships of multiple stakeholders. Since these synergies are more 
conspicuous in international environments, the majority of the research has 
investigated the dynamics of these environments.  
Hofstede (1984) introduced cultural dimensions, arguing that differences in 
values among cultures can be applied to categorize countries. It introduced 
Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism, and Masculinity as a 
proxy for cultural dimensions, having strong correlation with geographic, 
economic, demographic, and national indicators. Schwartz (1992) moved the 
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level of analysis to individuals, arguing that assessment of “psychic distance” for 
foreign investments is influenced by individual’s value perceptions. “Psychic 
distance” and “cultural distance” are two indicators that are used at the micro 
(individual) and macro (cultural) levels, respectively, so as to avail assessments 
in the process of decision-making upon entering international business. Kogut 
and Singh (1988) investigated the influence of the market entry mode by national 
cultures. They applied cultural distance as well as attitudes towards uncertainty 
avoidance to relate culture to the entry mode selection. The measure of culture in 
their study was built upon Hofstede indices; and they emphasized the importance 
of cultural determinants in managerial decision-making. Shenkar (2001) 
proposed a revision to cultural distance, labeling it as “cultural friction” with 
broader implications. Investigating the conceptual and methodological illusions 
present in cultural distance, this study attempted to provide a framework for 
application of the concept. The framework integrates an interface among different 
parties and the consequent friction through the asymmetric nature of synergies 
within different cultures. Robson, Leonidou, and Katsikeas (2004) conducted an 
empirical assessment of multiple projects to evaluate the performance of joint 
ventures (JV) in an international venue. The results foremost showed the 
importance of relational parameters among other parameters. 
While most of the research in this area focused on the interactions of 
contractual parties (contractors, financiers, JV partners, and owners), Aldrich 
(2010) investigated civil society and states and the impacts of their 
characteristics in strategies of building infrastructure in multiple countries. He 
investigated  facilities seen as undesirable by the host community.  Reactions to 
controversial facilities have often been labeled as Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY) 
politics. Aldrich (2010) addresses the impacts of society and the political 
structure of the government on the selection of infrastructure construction 




2.5.2 Social Exchange Theory 
Interactions are central theme of social exchange theory, as a paradigm that 
frames interactions according to the governing norms, and rules (Emerson 1976, 
Corpanzano, Mitchell 2005). While any form of activity among actors is 
considered as interactions, exchanges are specific to interactions that are formed 
as series of transactions (Cook 1977). In this sense the social exchange theory 
interprets social behaviors as exchanges among actors in the social context 
(Homans 1958). In the case of construction projects the example of opposition 
against infrastructure projects can be interpreted as the exchange of interactional 
resources among involved actors. Power relations among actors can be studied 
within social exchange theory considering the flow of resources (Cook 1977), and 
as a determinant of outcome of dynamics in the complex system of systems. IA 
refers to the literature of social exchange theory as well as social behavior 
(Coleman 1973) to develop its fundamental assumptions and frameworks. This is 
specifically emphasized in the thesis of the research on the importance of 
interactions and power relations in the outcome of emergent dynamics in a 




This chapter served as a basic foundation for the IA approach of this study 
by providing a summary of the theoretical research on complexity and 
emergence as well as the three main pillars of this study: risk, interactions, and 
institutional diversity. As depicted in Fig. 2.2 this study aims to provide the 
analysis at the policy and strategy levels. This chapter provides a basis to frame 
Figure 2.2 Literature Review in the Context of Interactional Analysis 
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emergent dynamics and their associated risks and to analyze mitigation policies 
and strategies in the context of complex system of systems such as construction 
projects. 
Despite frequent use of risk in the construction industry, there is ambiguity in 
its application. Therefore, the definition of risk was discussed from the 
perspectives of multiple academic and practical fields. Due to the strategic nature 
of the construction industry, the definition of risk in strategic management fits well 
with the understanding of risk in this study. Therefore, risk in this dissertation is 
tied to outcomes and their variations, but it also covers the nature and size of the 
outcomes as well as the context of the risk and associated causal uncertainties. 
Furthermore, this study focuses on interactions and associated emergent 
dynamics as the roots of synergic risks and avoids the gaps identified in the 
literature, namely 1) a focus limited on the perspective of a single actor (such as 
a contractor), 2) a holistic analysis of a project without considering its 
components, 3) an abstract view of dynamics through the interactions of risk 
indicators, and 4) normative approach to risk through neglecting emergent 
dynamics and their associated risks. 
Synergies generally have been studied with the focus on actors and their 
characteristics. The majority of the research also has concentrated on the 
contractual actors. Neglecting the non-contractual actors has been similarly 
reflected in the practice, causing significant deviations from the project plans. 
This study aims to avoid these limitations and shifts the focus to the interactions 
among the broader pool of actors. 
Emergent dynamics are observed frequently in construction projects, as a 
complex system of systems. These dynamics need to be quantitatively and 
descriptively addressed to provide a practical basis for managers to mitigate their 
consequences. Understanding root of these dynamics and their analysis will help 




Finally, the most salient complexity dimension of construction projects is a 
reflection of their institutional diversity. Integrating institutional diversity into 
construction plans will facilitate the institutional arrangement of projects and the 
collaborative governance structure of construction programs, as well as 
sustainable integration of project actors. By introducing new dimensions of 
institutional theory in construction projects through the interactional patterns of 
the actors, this study aims to channel studies on the institutional aspects of 
construction projects into the common practices of planning. 
Chapter 3 will describe the IA framework of this study and its three major 
components. It will also further discuss the literature while building the basic 




CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter introduces the overarching framework of the research 
including the methodologies and tools and their application procedures. After the 
IA core framework is discussed, its integration within existing risk assessment 
methodologies is outlined. The integration of IA into current risk assessment and 
project planning methodologies may contribute to our understanding of the 
nature of the complexities in: 1) the ever increasing complexities and the 
institutional diversity of construction projects specifically, 2) the consequent 
emergence in the form of changes in project outcome, and 3) the dynamics 
causes of the emergence and their implications in strategic choices of the actors. 
Understanding of these three aspects provides a basis to refine the existing 
process of risk analysis. In this sense, IA bridges the gap between the identified 
risk indicators and risk mitigation strategies/policies through interactions at the 
project level, as shown in the “Project Context” in Figure 1.2.  
Discussion of the IA core framework includes the major components, the 
types of input required, and the format of the expected output. The scheme of 
how it integrates within the current risk assessment methodologies is provided 
and the topic of game theory is discussed as the core methodology of this 
research. The application of simulation also will be discussed as a 
complementary tool to the game theory framework. Finally, the analysis 
procedure is discussed to revisit the effectiveness of the framework in answering 
the research questions and fulfilling the research goals. 
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3.1 Research Framework 
Traditional approach to construction has depicted projects as triangle of 
contractor, engineer, and the owner. As discussed in previous chapter, this 
perception towards construction projects has changed to a more complex setting 
involving more diverse actors (Figure 1.3). These actors may include the public 
user, the public not in my back yard (NIMBY), transnational organizations, 
financiers, upstream and downstream business, regulatory agencies, governing 
bodies, or political parties. IA aims to study emergent dynamics associated with 
the interaction of these actors in the complex context of construction projects. As 
it was discussed within the scope of the study, at this stage the study aims to 






























Current focus of IA
The Plan with Risk
Figure 3.1 Focus of IA within the Complex Construction Projects 
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to deliberate details of interactions and the mechanics of emergent dynamics. 
For this purpose each interaction is studied considering the associated actors. 
Actor A has plan i, such that i=1,…,n, that involves risk of interaction with actor B 
and the risk is associated with the action j of actor B, such that j=1,…,m (Fig. 3.1). 
For example, a project developer (actor A) might have plans for a project such as 
a wind farm, hydroelectric power plant, or nuclear power plant (Plan (i)) and there 
might be risks related to the act of opposition (action (j)) from the public (actor B). 
The rest of the dissertation focuses on the analysis of these single interactions 
and their associated emergent dynamics in the context of the complex 
construction projects. Last chapter suggests the expansion of IA into the network 
of the complex construction projects for future studies. 
In this chapter the overall framework of the IA is discussed for further 
deliberation in the following chapters. The discussion includes the components of 
the IA framework, the applied methodologies, and associated process including 
input data and expected output format of the framework. Before introducing the 
theoretical framework of the research, the problem is formulated based on the 
concept of system of systems. 
 
3.1.1 Construction Project as a System of Systems 
The concept of system of systems provides a venue for methodological 
formulation of the problem of emergent risks in complex construction projects. 
Maier (1998) proposed distinguishing features of any system of systems from a 
monolithic system as operational management independence of the components. 
That is, the component systems can operate separately and sustain their 
autonomous operation. In this sense, a complex system such as a tunnel boring 
machine (TBM) that is comprised of heterogeneous parts while those parts do 
not operate independently is not categorized as system of systems. In addition to 
these key features, systems of systems are geographically dispersed, and exhibit 
evolutionary and emergent behaviors (DeLaurentis et al. 2011, Maier 1998). 
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Accordingly a construction project can be categorized as a system of 
systems as involved institutionally diverse actors have operational and 
managerial independence, while they are also geographically distributed. 
Besides, as discussed in the second chapter, construction projects exhibit 
different forms of emergent behavior, besides their evolutionary nature. 
As focus of this dissertation, complexity of construction projects is required to 
be formulated based on the literature of system of systems. Complexity of 
system of systems can be attributed to heterogeneity of components, their 
interactions, as well as deep uncertainty in the state of the system (Agusdinata 
and DeLaurentis 2008). Heterogeneity of the actors and their interactions are 
main emphasis of this analysis, as it was mentioned in the second chapter. In 
addition, the study aims to analyze the emergent risks associated with the 
interactional dynamics within the construction projects. Therefore, the major 
focus of this study is to provide a quantitative and descriptive assessment of the 
uncertainties associated with the outcome of the project. 
 
Table 3.1 System of Systems Lexicon for Interactional Analysis 
Category Description 
Resources Power resources 
Stakeholders Project actors 
Operations Power dynamics 
Policies Contextual dynamics 
Levels Description 
α 
Individuals involved in or connected to the construction 
project 
β Actors involved in construction project 
γ Alliances or coalitions between actors 
δ Construction project 
δ Programs 
 
In order to address complexity of construction projects the taxonomy and 
lexicon of system of systems can provide a methodological formulation of the 
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problem (DeLaurentis and Callaway 2004). Taxonomy clarifies behaviors and 
features of the system for the purpose of modeling, while lexicon is a framework 
to communicate understanding of the model and its hierarchies (DeLaurentis et 
al. 2011). Table 3.1 describes the lexicon of interactional analysis in construction 
projects including multiple hierarchical levels in a construction project as a 
complex system of systems. In this sense, project actors of a construction project 
as stakeholders shape the system of systems along with the power resources. 
On the other hand, the dynamics of this system are power dynamics within the 
network of a construction project, while any exogenous dynamic is considered as 
contextual dynamic.  
In terms of hierarchy, the individuals are the base level of analysis (α level) 
where further decomposition of the system is not possible in the analysis. At the 
higher level (β level), an actor involving several individuals is formed, and 
multiple actors can make coalitions such as joint ventures in construction projects 
(γ level). Construction projects are a higher level of hierarchy involving multiple 
actors or coalitions (δ level). Several projects may be included in a program to 
form a higher level of hierarchy (δ level), such as the case of infrastructure 
development program (table 3.1). The analysis of this dissertation is focused on 
the interaction among actors (or their coalition) under the project (or program) 
level. 
In addition, the taxonomy of interactional analysis can be proposed to define 
systems of systems based on the types of systems, control of systems, and 
connectivity of systems (DeLaurentis et al. 2011). In terms of type of systems, 
each construction project as a system of systems is comprised of multiple 
systems, that is heterogeneous actors, and their power interactions. For the 
dimension of control, these heterogeneous actors are fairly independent and 
autonomous and can satisfy the assumptions set by Maier (1998), as they can be 
involved in other projects with other actors. Finally, the connectivity of this 
network in this dissertation is studied based on power relations. That is, these 
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heterogeneous actors have power relations with each other and interactional 
analysis aims to analyze the dynamics based on the connectivity of the system. 
Therefore, system of systems provided a framework to formulate the study of 
emergent dynamics in complex construction projects. It viewed projects as a 
system of systems comprising heterogeneous actors that have power relations in 
a hierarchical order. The ultimate goal of the interactional analysis is to provide 
quantitative and descriptive assessment of the emergent dynamics associated 
with these interactions or in the other words to address the emergent risk in 
institutionally diverse construction projects. 
 
 
3.1.2 Components of the Research Framework 
In order to address the emergent risk in institutionally diverse construction 
projects, IA core framework involves three intertwined components, including 
(Figure 3.2.): 
• Component I: Interactional analysis at the policy level 

































Figure 3.2 Interactional Analysis Framework 
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• Component III: Policy-making/strategy-development component 
(mitigation component) 
The first component aims to model interactions based on the literature of 
risk analysis, power relations in social science, and the bargaining game in 
economy (Kaplan and Garrick 1981, Dahl 1957, Foucoult 1982, Harsanyi 1962, 
and Wrong 1979, Coleman 1973). The analysis is performed at the policy level 
and provides the decision maker with a framework to develop the direction of 
actions and assess their impact. It looks at interactions as single instance actions 
and does not provide the detailed stages of the interaction. Modeling the 
interactions associated with emerging risks has a four-fold goal: 
• to provide a methodological approach to define the context of risk. 
• to facilitate descriptive analysis of risk. 
• to provide a platform to promote innovation in the development of risk 
mitigation policies/strategies, and 
• to facilitate quantitative analysis of associated risks 
 Figure 3.3 provides an example of some risks and their related 
interactions. For example, using the social opposition scenario against 
construction projects referred to earlier, this could be the degree to which the 
project developer can control the act of opposition from groups involved (such as 
transnational groups, public NIMBY, etc.) The risk of counterfeiting for the 
construction industry depends on the extent that the industry as a whole can 
control the act of counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items (CFSI). Finally, the 
risks associated with the enforcement of safety behavior depend on the degree 
that the governing body can control the unsafe actions of the labor (Fig. 3.3).  
Although the first component provides insights for the analysis of 
emergent dynamics at the level of policies, it does not provide a detailed analysis 
of different stages of the interactions. Therefore, the second component aims to 
address this shortcoming through structuring interactions in multiple stages (Fig. 
3.2). Therefore, after the first component provides direction of actions in the form 
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of policies, the second component provides specific actions and their sequences 
to reflect emergent dynamics associated with interaction of institutionally diverse 
actors. Each stage includes the actions and reactions of the actors involved and 
might lead to some terminal node outcomes with their associated dynamics. In 
this stage, different actions and their sequence are used to develop a detailed 
structure of the interaction. In the example of social opposition in construction 
projects, the output of interactional analysis at the policy level (component I in Fig 
3.2) is a descriptive framework of risk and its causes, as well as policies to 
mitigate this risk and their impact. These policies may include reward 
mechanisms, penalty mechanisms, public engagement, network building, or 
sanction mechanisms. For example, the World Bank proposed several 
compensation plans as reward mechanisms in construction of the Lesotho 
Highland Water Project (LHWP) in Lesotho and South Africa (Khagram 2004). 
Although the first component of IA provides quantitative and descriptive 
assessment of these policies, there is a need for analysis of detailed actions to 
understand detail strategies that are used to pursue the proposed policies. The 
second component in Fig. 3.2 provides this detail analysis as it structures the 
interaction as a multi-stage combination of actions and reactions. For example, 
the case of social opposition can be modeled as informal actions by the 
opposition group such as lobbying, protests, or media pressure, as well as the 
response of the project developer that may have the choice to respond with 
informal actions and negotiate with the opposition, or respond with the formal 
action and repress the opposition. Each stage at this component is defined within 
the model and different potential structures can be modeled and simulated to 
observer a range of potential outcomes as the risk profile of the project. This 
multi-stage structure can involve informal actions such as awareness campaigns 
or lobbying as well as formal actions such as filing a legal action. Accordingly, 







The third component in Fig. 3.2 serves to answer the key question of the 
research: what are the measures that need to be taken to respond to the 
emergent dynamics? In this component, the result of the assessment of the 
interaction, modeled as a bargaining game between two actors, is used to 
develop policies that can address the emergent dynamics and the associated 
risks. Similarly, the result of the detailed analysis of the interaction, modeled as 
an extensive game, is used to develop responses at the strategy level. 
Application of these two elements to develop mitigation strategies and policies 
provides a quantitative platform to mitigate emergent dynamics. Besides, defining 
emergent risks based on interactions provides a descriptive platform to mitigate 
associated emergent dynamics. The combination is a hybrid quantitative and 
descriptive analysis of risks in complex construction projects. As discussed, the 
mitigation component (component II in Fig. 3.2) is emphasized within the IA 
framework to answer the main question of how to address emergent dynamics in 
complex systems. Although this component is independent in a theoretic 
framework of interactional analysis (Fig. 3.2), practically it is intertwined with the 
other two components with the aim to offer a hybrid approach to strategy 
development and policy-making. That is, interactional analysis includes both 
A B
Project Developer – Act of Opposition – Transnational groups
Contractor – Collective Safety Behavior – Labor
Construction Industry – Act of distributing CFSI – Counterfeiters
Owner – Act of Claim – Contractor
Government – Collective Sustainable Behavior – Public
Figure 3.3 Example of Interactions as Defined at the Policy Level 
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descriptive and quantitative analysis of emerging risks, clarifying the decision 
space in complex system of systems such as construction projects. Therefore, 
component three is divided into two sections associated with the policy and 
strategy level of analysis (Fig. 3.2). And in this dissertation the two sections of 
the third component will be described along with their respective level of analysis 
in component one and two. As a result chapter four discusses the policy level of 
analysis along with mitigation at the policy level and chapter five discusses the 
strategy level of analysis along with mitigation at the strategy level. 
 
3.1.3 Types of Input Data 
The three components discussed in the previous section, i.e., interactional 
analysis at the policy level (component I), interactional analysis at the strategy 
level (component II), and mitigation component (component III), are nurtured with 
three types of data: likelihoods, transaction costs, and preferences (Fig 3.2). 
Likelihoods are the probabilities associated with different expected outcomes and 
take values between zero and the unit. For example at the strategy level 
(Component II in Fig 3.2), each potential outcome of the interaction, such as the 
negotiation or litigation, is modeled as a lottery game. Therefore, each outcome 
involves its associated probability of winning the lottery. 
Transaction costs describe the costs associated with each action and are 
used at the strategy level, where the interaction is modeled through its detailed 
actions. Each alternative formal and informal action at the strategy level of 
analysis (Component II in Fig 3.2) is associated with transaction costs. For 
example, legal actions involve different transaction costs compared to lobbying 
and as a result the impact on the associated risk profile will be different. 
Preferences are called the choice problem of the actor (Rubinstein 1998); 
and in economics (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953), it is described through 
the utility value that each actor associates with different outcomes or alternative 
choices. As this concept was profoundly based on the assumption of a rational 
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actor, it includes assumptions about the actor’s knowledge of the problem, clear 
preferences, and ability to optimize, as well as indifference to logically equivalent 
descriptions of alternatives and choice sets (Rubinstein 1998). Therefore, the 
concept of “bounded rationality” may be introduced to reflect more realistic 
models of an actor’s decision-making mechanisms. Bounded rationality 
addresses asymmetries in abilities of the decision makers in terms of their 
abilities to make decisions and their perceptions of the decision space. At this 
stage, IA limits its scope to the traditional view of utility- maximizing actors to 
maintain the focus of the research on the proposed framework and its application. 
The bounded rationality postulates are, however, discussed within the analysis 
sections of the methodology as well as the future research.  
At the policy level preferences are described through utility values. For 
example, the public NIMBY in case of infrastructure development associates 
different utilities with alternative compensation plans. In that case, employments 
offered as compensation might be associated with different utility values 
compared to cash compensations. For example, the New Okhla Industrial 
Development Authority (NOIDA) has granted an exclusive right of commercial 
land development to NOIDA Toll Bridge Company Limited (NTBCL) consortium 
in the region of Delhi-Noida-Delhi toll bridge (Pargal 2007). The high utility value 
that the consortium associates with such an exclusive reward is considered in the 
assessment of emergent risks. At the strategy level of analysis, the payoff is 
used instead of utility values to describe the preferences of actors. In the model, 
this assumption is translated into each actor choosing the alternative with higher 
payoff value. For example, the payoff of project modification in the case of social 
opposition in Bujagali Hydroelectric Power Station may be equal to the reduction 
in profit of project because of the requested modifications. Since payoffs have a 
linear function it simplifies calculations and allows deliberate focus on the model 
and its application. Therefore, this assumption at the strategy level is to avoid 




3.1.4 Output Format of the IA Framework 
This section aims to define the hybrid nature of the output of IA as a 
descriptive and quantitative form of mitigation policies and strategies. As 
depicted in Fig. 3.2, the emergent risks associated with the interactional 
dynamics are framed and structured in the first and second component of the 
research. As a result, the risks associated with interactions are defined in a 
descriptive framework and structure that reflects the interaction and associated 
interactional elements such as the actors involved and the resources applied. 
The descriptive frame of each risk is then translated into the mathematical 
equilibria of the interaction through game theoretic models. Finally, the equilibria 
of emergent risks are simulated to observe a range of potential outcomes and 
obtain the associated risk profile.  
Similarly, the strategies and policies are shaped based on the framework 
of the interaction, the strategies including sequences of the actions and their 
potential outcomes, the policies including the associated preferences. The impact 
of the mitigation strategies and policies is also analyzed through simulation of the 
equilibria to provide risk profile of alternative mitigations for the emergent 
dynamics. The descriptive and quantitative format of the output enables project 
planners to have a methodological description of the responses and a 
quantitative assessment of their effectiveness. Furthermore, the comprehensive 
format of presenting policies and strategies provides a platform to devise 
innovative policies and strategies to mitigate emergent risks. 
To elaborate more, the output of the interactional analysis includes a 
framework of the interaction, integration of the framework into the concept of 
emergent risk, sequential representation of actions, descriptive representation of 
policies, as well as associated risk profiles. Risk profiles along with the 
framework of risk facilitate decision making and increase the transparency of the 
interactional dynamics in a complex system of systems. At the bottom line the 
output can be used as a wide array of potential emergent dynamics, their 
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consequences, associated mitigation policies and strategies, and the degree of 
effectiveness of the mitigation policies and strategies. Potential scenarios as well 
as alternative mitigation policies and strategies are framed in a descriptive 
manner while the associated risks as well as impact of mitigation policies and 
strategies are presented in a quantitative format. 
 
3.2 Methodologies Applied in Interactional Analysis 
In order to perform the analysis associated with component I and II of the 
framework of IA depicted in Fig. 3.2, the interactions associated with each 
emergent risk are modeled based on the concept of game theory. Besides, the 
equilibria of the game at the policy and strategy levels are simulated to observe a 
wide range of potential outcomes and obtain the profile of the emergent risk. 
 
3.2.1 Game Theoretic Model of Emergent Risks 
Game theory provides a basis to analyze the contexts in which decision-
makers interact (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, Myerson 1997). The 
differentiating feature of this theory compares to other approaches in decision 
theory is the consideration of multiple rational actors within the decision context. 
This is in contrast with decision-making models that optimize the decision based 
on the assumptions of a single decision-maker within the context of the decision. 
For example, risk assessment models in construction are often modeled as a 
single decision maker and do not integrate the adaptive behavior of other actors. 
IA applies the concept of game theory to analyze the emergent dynamics 
associated with the interactions as it facilitates integration of dynamics 
associated with the adaptive actions of other decision makers into the decision 
and provides a multi-actor decision model. 
At the policy level of IA, each interaction is analyzed as a bargaining game 
between actors. Bargaining games investigate how a rational actor may choose 
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strategies to promote its interest against another rational actor (Harsanyi 1986). 
At this level of analysis, the equilibrium of the game is set based on the 
preferences in the form of utilities. This game is presented in the normal form 
assuming that each actor has only one move and the actors make their moves 
simultaneously and independent of other actors (Harsanyi 1986). That is each 
actor chooses a whole set of strategies as a direction of actions before the game 
starts. In this dissertation the direction of actions in the normal form of game is 
called policy, since policies also provide direction of actions for each specific 
case in advance. The decision is made to maximize utility of the actor. Therefore, 
in the context of interactional analysis each decision involves actors i, such that 
i={A,…,Z}, utility vector u(i)=Ui(σ(1),…, σ(n)} that indicates the utility of actor i, in 
case other actors choose actions σ(1),…,σ(n) (Harsanyi 1986). For example in 
the case of the construction project presented in Fig. 3.1, actor A associates a 
utility vector to different actions in the agenda of actor B. As depicted in Fig. 2.1, 
in the case of construction projects these actors may include financiers, 
contractors, owners, public, suppliers, etc. Therefore, in the normal form of game 
each actor chooses the direction of its action before the start of interaction, for 
example a construction project developer might follow the general policy of 
alliance with local contractors in foreign markets. This alliance can take different 
forms depending on the interaction, but the general direction of action is set 
before the start of interaction. 
On the other hand, the IA strategy level models interactions as an extensive 
form game in which the interactions are depicted according to the sequential 
moves of each actor (actions in figure 3.4). This form provides a more detailed 
analysis of different actions within the interaction and their sequence and is 
suitable for the strategy development level (Harsanyi 1986, Osborne and 
Rubinstein 1994), while the normal form of game is suitable at the policy-making 
level as it just provides direction of strategies for each actor. In the extensive 
form of game each actor decides its action exactly at the respective stage of the 
interaction (Harsanyi 1986). Therefore each actor has alternative actions at each 
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stage of the game and it decides between these alternatives. For example, in the 
case of social opposition against hydroelectric projects, transnational groups 
such as International Rivers (IR) choose from an array of informal and formal 
strategies to oppose construction of dams. These actions include protests, media 
pressure, legal actions, or political pressure (International Rivers 2013). The 
developer also can choose alternative reactions from its strategy set including 
repression, inhibition, negotiation, persuasion, or legal actions. At this stage IA 
provides an analysis of the equilibria of interaction for different alternative 
structures of the game which are created through selection of alternative 
strategies. Similar to the policy stage of analysis it is assumed that the actors are 
rational and choose alternative strategies that provides them the maximum 
payoff or utility. In order to analyze the range of emergent outcomes associated 
with interactional dynamics, the equilibria at both levels are simulated. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Example of Extensive Game between Two Actors 
 
3.2.2 Simulation of Emergent Risks 
Simulation facilitates observation of the behavior of complex, interactive 
systems under a wide range of conditions and allows for the development of 
emergent outcomes (Law and Kelton 1991, Ioannou and Martinez 1996). 





Payoff tuple (11) 
Action n
….
…. Action 1 Action n….
Actor B
Payoff tuple (n1) Payoff tuple (1n) …. ….
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the application of analytic and simulation methods (Dietz and Stern 2008). IA 
applies simulation to study variations of policies and strategies so as to provide a 
range of possible scenarios and their outcomes in the form of risk profiles or the 
probability of terminal node outcomes. Therefore, after descriptive framing of 
emergent risk and its mathematical modeling, the associated equilibria are 
simulated. Simulation triggered different variations within the model; and at the 
policy level of IA, simulation was performed to assess the changes in the 
interactional elements and mathematical functions of policies. The effect of 
variations is observed through changes in the profile of the emergent risk.  At the 
level of IA strategy development, simulation was applied for structural variation 
and contextual variation of the model. The result of simulating the equilibria of the 
interaction is an array of potential emergent outcomes associated with the 
dynamics within a complex system of systems. Therefore, the risk profile is 
presented as a distribution of outcomes for an assortment of potential emergent 
dynamics associated with each scenario of risk. At the policy level, simulation 
was applied to account for changes in the value of variables. To perform the 
simulation at the strategy level Anylogic Software is used, while at the policy level 
@Risk Sofware is applied. 
 
Figure 3.5 Flowchart of Simulation Input and Output 
 
The risk profile at different stages of the project can be updated into the 
simulation based on the observation and collection of the real data. As a result 
any observed inconsistencies in the assumptions and values of the variables can 
be corrected and updated in the analysis of the project risk. Besides, simulation 
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provides a wide range of potential outcomes and reduces the chances of surprise 
outcomes. As a result, any unprecedented emergent may be approximated and 
covered by the range of simulated potential dynamics. An example of surprises in 
construction projects is the case of an actor that is not initially mobilized and 
emerges during the project, such as the case of transnational organizations in 
dam construction. 
As the simulation involves using random variables, the effect of random 
generation should be same in simulated models. This consideration implies that 
the changes in the behavior of the model are the consequence of variations 
within the model and not the effect of the random variables used within each 
model. At the strategy level, simulations of each scenario are undertaken using 
matched pairs of random variables to cancel the effect of changes in random 
variables in the comparison of each alternative strategy. Matched pairs 
simulation synchronizes the effect of uncertainty for both alternative interactional 
structures (Ioannou and Martinez 1996) and omits the impact of random 
variables from the outcome of the model. 
 
3.3 Integration of the Framework within Current Planning Practices 
As described in Chapter 1, the IA framework can act as an ad hoc to 
current planning and risk analysis techniques in construction. A common tool for 
risk assessment in the construction industry is to channelize the opinion of 
experts through a checklist of risk indicators. In this sense, each actor might have 
a classified list of risks related to their plans. These classified lists may be 
developed from different documents and reports, certain procedures and plans, 
policies, or brainstorming within the organizations (Molenaar et al. 2010). This list 
can be applied within the risk assessment models to channelize expert opinions 
on the magnitude of risk. In certain industry focuses, such as the international 
construction market, generic lists exist that are compiled from expert opinion and 
an extensive literature review of the subject area. ICRAM-1, an international 
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construction risk assessment model (Hastak and Shaked 2000), or IPRA, an 
international project risk assessment model (Walewski 2005), are two examples 
of these generic models in the international construction arena. The subjective 
assessment of these models may not provide practitioners and strategic 
managers with the required insight into roots of the risk and the mitigation actions 
that can effectively address these dynamics. Therefore, a descriptive and 
quantitative model to analyze the related risks is required for the development of 
effective strategies to address the identified risks. The proposed IA framework 
can be applied to analyze risks suggested by the aforementioned models or even 
integrated within their structure to analyze and refine their assessments and 
develop strategies accordingly. 
 In order to showcase the adaptability of the interactional analysis 
framework within the existing models, the hypothetical example of the 
international construction project discussed by Hastak and Shaked (2000) will be 
used. ICRAM-1 provides a structured approach to channelize the opinion of the 
experts regarding the risks involved in an international project (Figure 3.5). It has 
three levels (project, market, and macro); the market level impacts the project 
level risks and the macro level impacts both the project and market level risk 
indicators. Each level includes an array of associated risk indicators. Experts 
determine the level of risk associated with each risk indicator to obtain the overall 
risk of the project as well as risks at each of the three levels. 
The hypothetical example in Hastak and Shaked (2000) suggested 
societal conflicts as the highest risk indicator at the macro level, which also 
impacts the market and project level risks. Although the strategy developer is 
now aware of the risk she cannot decipher this outcome as far as the root causes 
of the social conflicts, how they affect the project dynamics, and how efficiently 
they can be mitigated. 
The point of departure for the IA framework is at this exact point to frame 
and assess the risk context and to provide a quantitative and descriptive basis for 
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development of risk mitigation policies and strategies (Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 1.2). For 
this purpose, the risk indicator will be plotted at the context of the project 
including the associated actors and dynamics to link the risks with their roots. In 
order to have a methodological approach, this procedure is performed according 
to the proposed framework of interactional analysis. As it can be observed from 
figure 3.5 the framework of interaction is then integrated into the definition of risk 
as triplets of scenarios, their associated likelihood and potential consequences 
(Kaplan and Garrick 1981). The result is a descriptive framework of the emergent 
risk. This framework is used for two different levels of analysis named the 
strategy level and the policy level. 
 
 




The policy level of analysis models the emergent dynamics based on the 
bargaining game (Chapter 4), while the strategy level models the emergent 
dynamics in an extensive form of game (Chapters 5). The result is a descriptive 
analysis of the emergent risk identified and assessed by the existing model (e.g., 
ICRAM 1) as well as its quantified risk profile. Additionally, the analysis includes 
descriptive and quantitative representation of mitigation policies and strategies as 
well as their impact. The quantitative assessment of the emergent risks as well 
as the quantitative assessment of the impact of mitigation policies and strategies 
is presented as a risk profile of each scenario and the changes in the risk profile 
as a result of the mitigation action. Chapters 4 and 5 elaborate more on the 
details of the methodology. 
 As it was mentioned above, the input of the methodology is different at each 
stage. The risk assessment models such as ICRAM-1 are based on the experts’ 
opinion and their assessment of the level of risk associated with each risk 
indicator. In order to frame the emergent risk, interactional analysis applies 
description of the case in the form of field data, experts’ opinion, as well as 
archive of similar projects. The quantification at the policy level is based on the 
preferences of the actors in the form of utility functions. The strategy level at this 
stage applies payoffs instead of utilities to simplify representation of the 
dynamics. Additionally, the strategy level requires transaction costs associated 
with each action as well as probabilities associated with each outcome. Chapters 
4 and 5 provide more details on the required input of the framework. 
 
3.4 Case Studies 
The empirical body of this dissertation includes two major categories of 
cases. The first category includes descriptive account of cases that are reviewed 
to provide a practical example of the discussed phenomena. For this purpose, 
cases of infrastructure projects have been discussed throughout the manuscript. 
Majority of the cases are related to social opposition in hydroelectric 
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development to provide a consistent review of the problem. In order to provide 
breadth, other cases of infrastructure development have been used including 
bridges and roads, transportation hubs and associated facilities, energy 
infrastructure, or pipelines. 
The second category of cases is used to provide a consolidated example 
of the application of the proposed methodology in infrastructure development 
around the world. For this purpose, the proposed framework of interactional 
analysis is applied to perform a comparative analysis of emergent risks in dam 
construction. The construction of dams has declined sharply in recent decades 
due to emergence dynamics such as social opposition (WCD 2000, Khagram 
2004). Study of these dynamics in multiple contexts will provide insights into 
application of the methodology and its outcome. Therefore, the case study is 
focused on four contexts suggested by Khagram (2004) based on the degree of 
social mobilization and democracy. The understudied contexts represent the 
case of social opposition against dam construction in China, South Africa, Brazil, 
and Indonesia since 60s. 
Sources of the data for these cases are the literature of construction 
engineering and management, specifically the topic of infrastructure development, 
as well as the literature of social science and specifically public participation and 
decision-making. Therefore, the main resources are based on previous case 
studies. In the case of the comparative analysis of dam construction the data is 
based on the case study proposed by Khagram (2004), while the data is 
supported with several other case studies in related contexts such as Aditjondro 
(1998), Jackson and Sleigh (2000), or Rothman (2001). The analysis provides 
both proponents and opponents of dam construction with insights on emergent 
dynamics and the associated risk. The consolidated case study, the associated 




3.5 Verification and Validation 
Verification and validation are necessary to ensure that the model reflects 
the reality and delivers the specified goals. Verification aims to ensure that the 
model reflects the intended concepts and performs as intended (Law and Kelton 
1991, Macal 2005, and Delaurentis 2009). Validation, on the other hand, aims to 
ensure that the model is a reflection of the reality of the understudied system 
(Law and Kelton 1991 and Delaurentis 2009). The ultimate stage in this process 
is the credibility (accreditation) stage that aims to gauge the effectiveness of the 
model at the implementation of its results in the real world (Law and Kelton 1991).   
In order to gauge the accuracy of the model in reflecting the emergent 
dynamics of institutionally diverse construction projects, the validation and 
verification process is performed as suggested by Sargent (2010) and Law and 
Kelton (1991). The verification and validation stage includes conceptual 
validation, specification and implementation verification, and operational validity 
(Sargent 2010).   
• Conceptual validation: Face validation (Sargent 2010) is used to ensure 
that the validity of the interdisciplinary concept of the model is sound in 
each of the related fields. The interactional model, its equilibria, and the 
definitions of payoffs and utility values were discussed with game theory 
experts to validate their theoretical robustness. The concept of the model 
also was discussed with social science and construction engineer experts 
to ensure the relevance of the applied theories.  
• Specification and implementation verification: Game theory is widely 
applied in the assessment of collaborative decision-making contexts in 
social science and engineering. Ho and Liang (2004) applied game theory 
to analyze the dynamics of claim, Unsal and Taylor (2011) employed 
game theory for hold-up problems in project networks, De Mesquita and 
Lalman (1992) applied game theory to conflicts at the global level. In this 
dissertation game theory is applied to provide a mathematical model of 
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emergent risks in the context of complex construction projects. On the 
other hand, the simulation and analytical study of social dynamics and 
interactions are encouraged in the field of infrastructure (Dietz and Stern 
2008). Simulation of social and political dynamics may be an essential tool 
in addition to current simulation methodologies applied for construction 
processes. The extension to application of simulation is highlighted by the 
importance of social and political dynamics as well as the high uncertainty 
involved in these as well as any other forms of emergent risk. Therefore, 
the interactional models are simulated in this study to observe the 
behavior of the complex construction projects. 
• Operational validity: The performance of the simulation model was verified 
to ensure that it mirrored the equilibria of the game. This stage of 
validation involved techniques such as the extreme condition test, 
animation, and event validity (Sargent 2010). Pilot runs were performed 
with predetermined input-outputs to ensure that the simulation reflected 
the equilibria. The outputs were animated graphically to examine any 
specific pattern of behavior; and the output of the model was compared to 
specific cases to ensure the empirical validity of the output. For this 
purpose, the framework of interactional analysis is applied for comparative 
analysis of emergent in dam construction.  
To summarize, the interactional model and its simulations were constantly 
tested to recognize its level of accuracy in reflecting the purpose of the research. 
The purpose of this research was to propose the methodology of IA that would 
provide analysis of emergent dynamics in complex system of systems such as 
complex construction projects. To this extent, the model fulfilled the predefined 
purpose of the research. The ultimate merit of the research, however, is an 
unremitting process through application of the IA concept in different issues that 





This chapter introduced the overall IA framework in addition to the basic 
methodologies applied within the framework. First, the three major components 
were discussed: 1) policy level interactional analysis, 2) strategy level 
interactional analysis, and 3) mitigation action development. The third component 
was divided between the two levels (policy and strategy) for the sake of more 
clarity. Chapter 4 will discuss policy level IA and associated policy development, 
while Chapter 5 will discuss strategy level IA and associated strategy 
development. 
This chapter also provided a discussion of the methodologies applied in 
the IA framework. Game theory was discussed as the core analytical tool in the 
proposed framework as the emergent dynamics associated with interactions are 
modeled in this study as a bargaining game. As the equilibria of the interaction 
are simulated to observe a diverse range of outcomes due to variations, 
simulation is also reviewed briefly. Finally, the integration of IA as a 
complementary tool to current planning was discussed. As construction projects 
become more complex, involving a variety of political and nonpolitical 
organizations, IA can help construction project planners reflect the real dynamics 
of a project including risk analysis and policy/strategy development. This would 
enable identification of the interactions among the actors pertinent to specific 




CHAPTER 4. INTERACTIONAL ANALYSIS AT THE POLICY LEVEL 
Policy-makers are often challenged with the emergent dynamics of 
complex construction projects. The increasing trend of complexity in terms of the 
institutional diversity of projects highlights the importance of policies that 
effectively address risks that arise from the interactions of these actors. This 
chapter presents the policy level of IA as a hybrid - descriptive and quantitative - 
approach to govern the emergent risks associated with interactions in a complex 
system of systems. The policy level component of the IA framework is presented 
in view of the core philosophy of this dissertation, which is shaped based on the 
theories of power relations in social science. 
IA frames interactions as the coupling of complex systems, i.e., actors, 
and quantifies the associated emergent dynamics based on the equilibria of the 
interaction. The framework is further applied to investigate the dynamism 
inherent in the risk governance of complex systems. Then, the emergent risks 
can be assessed based on the equilibria of the game and considering the degree 
of interactional complexity. The outcome of the analysis at this level will be a 
foundation that will i) frame the ontological understanding of interactions 
including their consequent emergent dynamics and their associated risks ii) 
quantify the assessment of this risk, and iii) develop risk mitigation policies and 
assess their impact. 
In addition to the first component of the IA framework (i.e., the policy level of 
IA), the policy development section of the third component (mitigation component 
in Fig. 3.2) is also discussed as the development of mitigation policies to address 
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emergent risks (Fig 3.2). The policy component develops policies in the 
quantitative/descriptive format. Policy-makers can utilize this framework for 
effective governance of the emergent dynamics within interactional contexts, 
such as complex construction projects. Finally, the practical implications of the 
framework are discussed in global construction as a strategic management field, 
while practical examples of the field are provided throughout the chapter. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Power Relations within a Network of Actors 
 
4.1 Interactional Framework 
Dynamism may be interpreted differently depending on the context. In this 
chapter, dynamism is used to describe non-stationary status of a system (or a 
SoS) (Figure 4.1) that comprises multiple actors (the vertices of the network) and 
their interactions (the edges of the network). For example, in the case of Bujagali 
Hydropower Project in Uganda the project context includes diverse actors such 
as engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) consortium as the project 
developer (actor A in Fig. 4.1), the AES Nile Power Ltd. (AESNP) as the sponsor 
of the project (actor E in Fig. 4.1), the government of Uganda (actor F in Fig. 4.1), 




































export credit agencies of countries such as Switzerland (actor C in Fig 4.1), the 
World Bank (actor G in Fig. 4.1), as well as transnational organizations such as 
International Rivers (actor D in Fig 4.1) (Bosshard 2002). Accordingly, 
interactional analysis addresses the two important features of complexity 
described by Baccarini (1996): i) differentiation: i.e., institutional diversity of the 
actors, and ii) connectivity: i.e., the interactions among these actors. The 
interactions are viewed as the coupling of the actors (the nodes or vertices of the 
network), while each actor may itself be a complex system. In the case of 
Bujagali, the project developer wants to mitigate the risk of social opposition 
through inhibiting action of opposing the project by actors such as the 
International Rivers and the public NIMBY (Fig. 4.1). Interactional analysis 
focuses on these interactions, as one of the major sources of emergent 
dynamism in a complex system of systems. In order to start with minimal 
complexity in the model, the focus of this chapter is on the interaction of two 
actors within the context of the project (Fig. 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1 Basics of Interactional Analysis 
Purpose Analysis of emergent dynamics in complex system of systems 
Core philosophy Focus on interactions as coupling of actors 
Dimension of analysis Power relations 
Unit of analysis Actions in the form of policies and strategies 
Metric of analysis Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility values 
 
Table 4.1 presents basics of interactional analysis based on the 
formulation of the problem in the previous chapter. The fundamental purpose of 
interactional analysis is to analyze and govern emergent dynamics of a complex 
system of systems (Table 4.1). Interactional analysis studies emergent dynamics 
as a salient property of any complex system of systems. As mentioned in chapter 
two, emergence can be observed in diverse fields, while Goldstein (1999) 
proposes five common properties necessary for any emergent phenomenon: 1) 
radical novelty, 2) coherence, 3) macro level, 4) dynamical, and 5) ostensive. In 
this regard the emergent phenomenon is novel and has not been observed 
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before. It is the effect of interrelated parts that exhibit a coherent holism. It is 
observed at the macro level and as a result of dynamism within the complex 
system and is an observable phenomenon in complex systems. IA at the policy 
level aims to address the emergent property of a complex system of system 
associated with the interaction of diverse actors. Therefore, the focus is at the 
construction projects (δ level) and the system of systems is analyzed based on 
the coupling of actors, as complex systems by themselves. In terms of the 
operations in the system of systems (Table 3.1), IA at the policy level is focused 
on the direction of actions. 
Several forms of emergence can be observed in construction projects, as 
complex systems of systems that involve multiple actors: emerging contextual 
property, emergent actors, emerging coalitions, emerging transformations of an 
actor, and emergent synergies. Within institutionally diverse construction projects, 
often an assortment of these categories is observed. For example, in the case of 
hydroelectric infrastructure development around the world, social opposition is 
proved to be an emergent risk. The consequences are the sharp decline in the 
completion of dam projects around the world (Khagram 2004). As stated, this 
dissertation develops a methodological approach to the emergent phenomena of 
institutionally diverse projects and studies emergence through its reflections as 
the consequent deviations in terms of project metrics (i.e., cost, time, 
environmental impact, quality, safety, etc.) In order to mitigate the emergence at 
the policy level, the interactions associated with emergent risks are framed. This 
framework is applied in mitigation policy development and assessment of the 
effectiveness of mitigation policies. 
 
4.2 Structure of the Framework at the Policy Level 
Foucault (1982) suggested that interactions can be studied as 
communication networks or power relations between actors. Interactional 
analysis focuses on the latter (i.e. power relations) to develop its analysis 
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framework. In the context of global construction, a claim from a contractor is an 
explicit scenario where the contractor and the owner exercise power in their 
interactions. The interactions are directed, which means that the power exercise 
of actor A on actor B is different than the power exercise of actor B on actor A. All 
the interactions in a complex system of systems such as the one depicted in 
Figure 4.1 can be studied in terms of their power relations. The core philosophy 
of interactional analysis is to employ power relations within a complex system of 
systems to approximate consequences of the emergent dynamics. For this 
purpose the interactional analysis frames each interaction based on its elements. 
The framework will be further modified to the framework of the emergent risk 
which will be applied to develop and assess mitigation policies. 
The first interactional element is the actor who exerts its power, which will be 
called the power executor (e.g., actor A in Figure 4.1). The additional 
interactional elements are defined based on the five dimensions of power (Dahl 
1957): 1) extension of power, 2) scope of power, 3) base of power, 4) means of 
power, and 5) amount of power.  
Extension of power includes the set of actors that are impacted by power 
relation. In Figure 4.1, the extension of power of actor A (executor of power) 
includes actors B, E and F. The scope of power includes actions of the power 
respondents that are going to be targeted through power interaction. In Figure 
4.1, action X(i) from the agenda of the actor B is the action that is targeted by the 
power interaction with actor A. For instance, the scope of power of a governing 
body such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) over 
any contractor in a construction project is limited to safety-related actions. The 
scope of power in this interaction does not include other actions within the 
agenda of the contractor, such as actions related to contractual relations with 
subcontractors. 
Base of power, which is called power resources by Wrong (1979) and 
Galbraith (1983), is any resources applied in the power exercise. The base of 
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power can be categorized as personal, property, and organizational (Galbraith 
1983). It may include financial, legal, knowledge, technical, public (Wrong 1979, 
Galbraith 1983), normative, and cultural-cognitive resources, (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983, Scott 2001) the network, or combination of them. For example, in 
the case of Bujagali dam, the Ugandan High Court declared the contract as a 
public document that should be revealed to public. In this case, legal resource 
was used by the opposition to disclose documents pushing the contractor 
(AESNP consortium) not to keep the contract as a secret document and to 
increase the transparency of the process (African Development Bank 2008). 
Means of power, referred to as the power mechanism by Wrong (1979) and 
Galbraith (1983), are approaches to exercise power. Generally, they can be 
divided into condign, compensatory or conditioned mechanisms (Galbraith 1983). 
Wrong (1979) limited the means of power to the intended influence of behaviors 
and categorized them as force (coercion), manipulation, persuasion, and 
authority (Wrong 1979). Unintended influence as forms of power may also be 
considered as normative, and mimetic mechanisms described by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983). 
 
Table 4.2 Interactional Analysis of Risks Associated with the Public Mobilization 
and Relocation in Construction Projects  
Executor of power (actor A) Project developer 
Extent of power (actor B) Public NIMBY 
Scope of power Enforce mobilization 
Base of power Financial, Legal 
Means of power Force, Authority 
Default of power Resistance to mobilization 
Metric of power (Utility) Cost, Time, Social and environmental impacts 
Amount of power Probability of enforcing mobilization 
Cost of power Opportunity cost to enforce mobilization (for actor A) 




The amount of power indicates the extent of impact over the power 
respondents’ action. Dahl (1957) defined the amount of power of actor A over B 
as the degree that it can increase the probability of action X(i) (unfavorable to 
actor B and favorable to actor A) by exercising its power. For example, in the 
case of a construction claim the amount of power of the contractor over the 
owner is measured through its ability to increase the probability of obtaining claim 
approval (unfavorable to the owner). The amount of power of the owner over the 
contractor on the other hand is measured through its ability to increase the 
probability of rejecting the claim (unfavorable to the contractor). 
In an analytical attempt to quantify power, Harsanyi (1962) introduces two 
more dimensions: opportunity cost to exercise power (cost of power of actor A 
over actor B) and opportunity cost to resist the act of power exercise (strength of 
actor A’s power over actor B). Cost of power describes how much an actor has to 
invest in an attempt to exercise its power over the other actor. For example, in 
the case of social opposition in construction projects the developer of the 
construction project may have to spend different resources in its interaction with 
the opposition. The costs that the developer has to spend to exercise its power 
can be in different forms depending on the associated base of power (e.g., 
financial, legal, or normative). The strength of the power of the developer in this 
case is related to the resources that the opposition has to invest to sustain its 
campaign against the project. For example, in order to resist dam construction in 
Indonesia the opposition had to sustain cases ranging from intimidation to 
murder (Khagram 2004). In this case the opportunity cost to sustain the 
opposition is high. Therefore, the strength of power of project developer over 
project opposition is also high. It should be noted that the amount of power the 
developer has over the opposition in this case is measured through the increased 
probability of stifling the opposition campaign. Cost and strength of power can be 
described in terms of the utility values of each actor to indicate their preferences. 
Therefore, another element in framing interactions is the metric of power as the 
unit of analysis.] 
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Finally, an additional element is added to frame interactions, called the 
default of power. The default of power is the opportunity cost of failing in power 
exercise. In other words, default of power is the consequences for actor A if actor 
B does not perform action X(i). For example, in the case of social opposition in 
construction projects the scope of power is to resist the opposition against a 
construction project and the default of power includes partial/complete project 
modification. It should be noted that the default is quantified as the impact of non-
compliance by the extent of power for the executor of power and therefore is 
different from the cost and strength of power. Strength of power is the resources 
necessary to resist the exercise of power and cost of power is the costs to the 
executor to enforce power. Similar to cost and strength of power, the default will 
be gauged by the metric of power. 
In this section a framework of interactions is developed based on the ten 
aforementioned interactional elements, including the metric of power. In the case 
of construction projects, each project would be considered as a system of 
systems including the actors involved and their interactions (Figure 4.1). This 
framework is the basis of IA for analyzing policies in the form of actions in the 
complex system of systems. Each interaction within the construction project 
network is framed based on its interactional elements to facilitate descriptive 
assessment of emergent risks associated with interactional dynamics. Table 4.2 
presents this framework for the interaction of the contractor and public NIMBY in 
the case of public mobilization in construction projects. This framework 
represents the cases with minimal public participation in decision making, such 
as the case of Three Gorges Dam in China that was associated with relocation of 
over two million residents (Jackson and Sleigh 2000). In this case the project 
developer used force and authority as mechanisms of power along with financial 
compensation and legal bases of power. However, the interaction was 
determined only from the side of one actor, i.e., the project developer, and the 
public had little influence in the dynamics of the interaction. This framework will 
be further used to quantify emergent risks. Next section provides more details on 
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the development of emergent risk framework based on the interactional 
framework of policies. 
 
4.3 Interactional Framework of the Emergent Risk 
Mitigation policies to address the emergent risks are developed based on the 
proposed interactional framework. The definition of risk in the framework of risk is 
adapted from the literature of strategic management. Therefore, in this study, risk 
is defined as unpredictability of the variations of consequences of an action 
(Bromiley et al. 2001, Baird and Thomas 1990, Aven and Renn 2009). In this 
definition risk would encompass the context of the complex system of systems, 
its actors, interactions of actors, and consequent emergent dynamics. The 
proposed framework of interactional analysis discussed at previous section can 
be modified based on the set of triplets proposed by Kaplan and Garrick (1981). 
They frame risk as triplets of scenarios, their likelihood, and consequences 
(R = 〈Sc, P, C〉), where R indicates risk, and Sc, P, C, represent scenario i, its 
related likelihood, and its consequent impact, respectively. The triplets are then 




Scenarios are used to describe the pretext associated with each potential 
outcome, including emergent dynamics. They involve the interactional synergies 
among the actors in the context of a complex system of systems. Common risk 
Figure 4.2 Interactional Framework of the Emrgent Risks 
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assessment in construction projects includes scenarios such as failure of 
equipment, weather conditions, or underground geology. Interactional dynamics, 
on the other hand, concern the coupling of two or more actors and the 
consequent emergent risks. In this case, a structured format for the definition of 
scenarios provides clear understanding of the case and facilitates methodological 
assessment of the associated risk. Therefore, the scenarios are described 
through interactional elements, including: executor of power, extent of power, 
scope of power, base of power, and means of power (Figure 4.2). The first five 
rows in Table 4.2 present the scenario for the risk of social opposition in 
construction projects.  
The consequences of risk are defined by the default of power and are 
quantified in terms of the metric of power. Consequences are associated with 
scenarios and may be determined in terms of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
(VNM) utility value (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953). The VNM utility 
function of the decision-maker is a tool for logical deduction of its preference 
(North 1968), which is gauged based on the dynamics of the setting. A decision-
maker might define utility based on the metric of power such as cost, time, 
publicity rates (number of votes), safety (rate of injury or fatality), quality 
(acceptance of the product), or use a multi-dimensional utility value in the shape 
of a vector (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). For example, in a construction project, 
failure of equipment may be linked to damages and delays and would be 
quantified in terms of the consequent costs. In case of emergent risks associated 
with interactional dynamics, the consequences of social opposition against a 
construction project is related to the actions of opposition against a construction 
project and may be quantified in terms of the cost consequences of the act of 
opposition for the developer. 
Finally, the likelihood is a numerical measure of the state of knowledge or the 
confidence regarding each consequence (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). This 
likelihood is assessed in terms of amount of power, cost of power, and strength 
of power. A fundamental component of the methodology of interactional analysis 
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is the quantification of this likelihood. The quantification is different depending on 
the degree of complexity: i) unilateral interaction ii) bilateral interaction. Therefore, 
interactional analysis enables framing of the risk based on the interactional 
elements and power relations within a complex system of systems. The 
quantification of probability for each type of risk at the policy level is described in 
more details in the next section. 
 
4.4 Quantification of the Emergent Risks 
4.4.1 Unilateral Interactional Risk 
The involvement of actors in unilateral interactions is characterized by 
interactions between two actors while only one actor exercises power over the 
other. In this case the policies are developed based on the unilateral interaction. 
That is, only one actor has the ability to determine the amount of incentives and 
the degree of compliance of the other actor. In the context of the construction 
industry, an example is the risks related to project siting in non-democratic 
contexts. In these contexts, the project developer is able to exert its power over 
the public NIMBY while the public does not have resources of power to 
participate in the decision-making. The other actor may lack effective bases of 
power or may be unable to exert effective means of power. It can also include 
cases where the amount of power in one direction is either zero or negligibly 
small compared to the other direction. In some cases the actor might not be able 
or willing to trigger the required scope of the power (asymmetry of motivation in 
actors’ scopes). A mixture of the enumerated causes may result in unilateral 
interaction in the real world. 
The unilateral type of risk dynamism involves a single interaction, which is 
framed by its ten interactional elements including the executor and the extent of 
power. The interaction involves action X as the scope of power, unfavorable for 
the extent of power and favored by the executor of power. In the case of public 
mobilization in non-democratic contexts, scope of power (action x) is the act of 
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mobilization, which is unfavorable by the public NIMBY and favorable by the 
project developer. The analysis focuses on dynamics resulting from actor A’s 
efforts to increase the chances of actor B doing action X. The scenarios would be 
defined based on the executor, the extent, the scope, the base, and the means of 
power. In the case of siting construction projects in contexts with lower degrees 
of public participation in decision making process, the interaction is framed 
through the project developer as the executor of power and the public NIMBY as 
the extent of power, enforcing mobilization as the scope of power, financial and 
legal sources as the dominant bases of power, and force and authority as the 
dominant means of power. In this case, the executor of power utilizes the bases 
of power through the means of power to increase the probability of the scope of 
power being unfavorable to the extent of power, e.g. increase the chances of 
compliance to mobilization according to project plans and in other words reduce 
the risk of social opposition. 
The likelihood is linked to the probability of the scope of power. For instance, 
the risks related to siting construction projects would be linked to the probability 
of success in mobilization enforcement actions. Three elements of interaction 
(amount, strength, and cost of power) are used to define the likelihood of risk. 
Assuming  ! is a probability indicator for the risk that relates to the interaction of 
actors A and B, the maximum power of A over B is defined as the difference in 
the probability of B (∆ ) doing action X (desired by A) with and without A 
enforcing its power (Harsanyi 1962, Coleman 1973). Considering a bargaining 
game between the two actors, Harsanyi (1962) proposes that the maximum 
amount of A’s power over B regarding action X is equal to the differences 
between the utility of B in cases of actor A exercising and not exercising its 
power, (∆), divided by disutility of B doing the action X, (x): 
∆ = ∆#$              (1)  
In the absence of power exercise from actor A, actor B will not acquiesce to 
action X ( % = 0). By this assumption, the probability of risk for actor A is defined 
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as ! = 1 − ∆ . In a more generic form, actor B randomizes its behavior with a 
prior probability of  %. In this case, the probability of risk for actor A would be 
equal to ! = 1 −  % − ∆ . Therefore, risk is the factor of the amount of A’s power 
over B, which by itself is a factor of strength of A’s power over B and the cost of 
A’s power over B. Harsanyi (1962) assumed the game with complete information. 
In cases where this assumption is waived, the difference (∆ ) will be more 
accurately defined through the utility that actor A assumes actor B will assign to 
each outcome. Utility values can be assessed through certain equivalent as 
suggested by Howard (1968). Besides, ∆ < 1 −  % which means that the 
enforcement of power from actor A can not increase the probability of actor B 
doing action X more than the unit. 
In the example of siting in contexts with minimal degrees of public 
participation in decision making, let’s assume that the disutility of mobilization for 
the public NIMBY is the equivalent of $500,000, which may include the market 
value of the land, the cost of mobilization, the opportunity cost of mobilization, the 
sentimental value of natural habitat, and the cost of settling down in the new 
settlement. Further assume that the utility of the compensation is equal to 
$400,000 for the public NIMBY, which may include the value that the public 
associated with the provided housing. In this case, the likelihood of the risk of 
social opposition is up to 20% (∆ = 0.8). Assuming that the default of power as 
consequences associated with the risk of siting in construction projects is up to 
$5,000,000 for the project developer, the expected value of the risk is $1,000,000. 
In this case the default of power can be the utility that the developer associates 
with the project, considering that without mobilization the project is not feasible. It 
should be noted that the default of power is not a power exercise by our definition 
since the actor cannot determine the incentives or influence the interactions. It 
rather indicates the possibility that the enforcement of power would fail. In 
unilateral type of interaction, one actor is deprived of mechanisms to impact the 
power interaction, although the executor of the power might face some 
consequences in the form of default of power. For example, in the above context 
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with lower degrees of democracy, the public NIMBY might be deprived of power 
resources to bargain with the project developer. However, the default of power as 
non-compliance to action X, i.e., mobilization in this case, results in cost 
implications for the project developer, e.g. withdrawing the project. 
 
4.4.2 Bilateral Interactional Risk 
A more complex dynamic context can be observed in the case of reciprocal 
power relation between the two actors. In this case both actors would exercise 
power over each other within the context of the conflict. Examples of this type of 
risk dynamic in construction can be the case of a dispute between a contractor 
and an owner, or social opposition in the contexts with higher degree of public 
participation in decision makings. In the case of bilateral interactional risk, both 
parties have bargaining power over each other with the dynamics in the form of a 
two-sided conflict. 
 
Table 4.3 Interactional Framework of the Social Opposition Risk in Construction 
Projects 
Executor of power (actor A) Project developer 
Extent of power (actor B) Opposition 
Scope of power Resist opposition against project 
Base of power (actor A) Financial, Legal 
Means of power (actor A) Authority, Force 
Base of power (actor B) Public, Normative, Legal 
Means of power (actor B) Persuasion, Normative, Cultural-Cognitive 
Default of power Project modification, Litigation 
Metric of power (Utility) Cost, Time, Social and environmental impacts 
Amount of power Probability of resisting the opposition 
Cost of power Opportunity cost to resist opposition (for actor A) 
Strength of power Opportunity cost of opposition (for actor B) 
 
Similar to the unilateral type, this interaction is defined based on the ten 
interactional elements except that each actor has its own bases and means of 
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power. For example in the case of social opposition risk of siting in construction 
projects actor as the opposition has public, normative, and legal resources and 
can use mechanisms such as persuasion (Tab. 4.3). That is, the opposition can 
increase its bargaining power through persuading the owner based on its bases 
within the public, as well as channeling its opinion through norms and making 
sense of the context of the project. For example, in the case of the Narmada 
River and Sardar Sarovar, the transnational organizations increased their 
bargaining power of lobbying the decision makers in the World Bank with the 
mobilization of public through meetings and protests (Khagram 2004). Similar to 
the unilateral type of risk dynamism the interaction includes action X, unfavorable 
for actor B and favored by actor A. The maximum net power of actor A over B 
can be described in terms of the increase in probability of actor B doing action X, 
(∆ ) when actor A enforces its power. Harsanyi (1962) proposes the amount of 
power considering the Zeuthen-Nash theory of two-person bargaining games to 
be equal to (Equation 2): 




$∗ )                (2) 
While x indicates the disutility of doing action X for B, 4∗ indicates the utility 
for actor A from B taking action X, r indicates the utility of reward for B doing 
action X, ∗ indicates the disutility for A to reward B for action X, t indicates the 
disutility of penalty from A as well as retaliating to A for B, and ∗ indicates the 
disutility of penalizing B and reacting to B for A. The equation includes two 
different parts: the first quotient (/01$ ) representing the relative strength of A over 
B and the second quotient (1∗3/∗$∗ ) expressing the relative strength of B over A. 
Again, the probability of risk is defined as ! = 1 − ∆  in the case that actor B 
would not do action X if there is no power enforcement from actor A, and 
! = 1 −  % − ∆  in a generic form that actor B would perform action X before 
power enforcement of actor A with the probability of  %. It should be noted that 
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∆ < 1 −  %, which translates to the maximum probability of B doing action X to 
be equal to the unit. 
 
Table 4.4 Utilities of Both Actors in the Example of Bilateral Interaction 
x Disutility of B in case of compliance $500,000 
x* Utility of A as B complies $5,000,000 
r Utility of reward for B $300,000 
r* Cost of reward for A $300,000 
t Disutility of penalty for B $400,000 
t* Cost of penalty for A $100,000 
 
Assume again the case of social opposition against construction projects in a 
democratic context. In this case, the actors are the project developer and the 
opposition group (e.g., transnational movements). The interaction can be framed 
through the interactional analysis framework (Table 4.3), while it integrates the 
impact of the other actor into the analysis of the interactional dynamics. Lets 
assume that the developer has applied a mixture of reward and penalty 
mechanisms to ensure compliance of actor B and reduce the chances of 
opposition against the project. In this project the reward is cash and the penalty 
is in the form of law enforcement with the utility values and costs presented in 
table 4.4, the likelihood of risk of social opposition is equal to 28% (∆ = 0.72). 
After framing the emergent risks and quantifying them the next step involves a 
framework to develop mitigation policies and quantification of their impacts. Next 
section will discuss the development and assessment of the mitigation policies to 
address these risks. 
 
4.5 Policy Development for Mitigation of Emergent Risk 
4.5.1 Interactional Elements of Policies 
The risk mitigation policies can modify interactional elements of the risk 
scenario. The effectiveness of the mitigation policy is then gauged according to 
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the changes it makes in the likelihood of the risk so as to maintain a scenario 
based QRA. In this case, the risk mitigation policies can trigger the associated 
executor, extent, scope, means, and bases of power (Tab. 4.5). 
 
Table 4.5 Examples of Policy Development through their Interactional Elements 
Category Description 
Base of power Financial to Legal 
Means of power Persuasion to Authority 
Executor of power Coalition with a local agency 
Extent of power Limit the focus of mitigation on a selected group  
 
Lets assume the above example of social opposition risk in construction 
projects with the scenario of risk presented in table 4.3. In that example switching 
the base of power between financial and legal would impact the likelihood of risk. 
Considering the bilateral interaction this change can mathematically alter the cost 
of reward or penalty, as dynamics of legal approaches may be different than 
cash rewards or penalty. Similarly the project developer can switch its means of 
power between persuasion and authority, which translates in switching between 
reward (r) and penalty (t) in the equilibria. On the other hand, the executor of 
power can change within the scenario through coalition with local or international 
actors to increase the bargaining power. This increase will be reflected in the 
formula through the changes in the cost of reward and penalty as the coalition 
increases the bargaining power. Similarly, the other elements of the scenario can 
change to observe the effectiveness of a wide range of policy alternatives for 
each scenario (Table 4.5). The result is a methodological approach to the 
development of risk mitigation policies and descriptive assessment of risk. 
 
4.5.2 Mathematical Functions of Policies 
The power interaction among actors can also be represented through 
mathematical functions instead of specific values (Harsanyi 1962). In this sense, 
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policies are defined as changes in variables that are included within functions, or 
the changes of the functions themselves. That is the policies modify the 
contextual variables or change the dynamics as they represent a new function. 
An example in the case of social opposition against construction projects could 
be when the developer, as the executor of power, develops strategies to alter its 
cost function of rewards (r∗ = f(r)) or penalties (t∗ = f(t)). Strategies may include 
rewarding the social opposition with specific permits or potential future project 
awards, which cost less than their actual value to the developer (Tab 4.6). 
Obviously, the developer can also alter the function that defines the disutility of 
default to reduce its vulnerability and the risk of the project. It should be noted 
that in reality each policy is a combination of the pure approaches discussed in 
this section. For example, a policy might include changing the base of power to 
legal actions and change the utility of penalties to law enforcement instead of 
fines. Next section provides an elaborate discussion of the application of the 
methodology for the case of risks associated with social opposition, discussed 
throughout the manuscript. 
 
Table 4.6 Examples of Policy Development through its Mathematical Functions 
Category Function Description 
Utility of reward :;()  Commercial land instead of cash 
Utility of penalty :;() Law enforcement instead of cash 
Cost of reward <=(∗) Reward from government developments 
Cost of penalty <=(∗) Transfer to public officials 
 
 
4.6 Application, Implications, and Limitations 
In this section the example of social opposition risk in construction projects 
as an emergent risk is presented and the application of the proposed 
methodology is provided to show the procedures of the framework developed in 
this chapter. Assume that an international joint venture is planning to bid for a 
hydroelectric project in a developing country. The result of the initial risk 
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assessment, using models such as ICRAM-1 (Hastak and Shaked 2000) that 
channelizes input of experts on an extensive list of risk factors, indicates social 
opposition risk as a major challenge to the project. This result is highlighted by 
the historical data that indicates increasing costs associated with social 
embeddedness of hydroelectric projects. The joint venture aims to analyze this 
emergent risk and assess potential mitigation policies. For this purpose, potential 
scenarios associated with the emergent risks are defined based on the proposed 
framework. The procedures include framing the risk scenarios based on the 
proposed interactional framework of emergent risks (Fig. 4.2), developing 
alternative mitigation policies based on the proposed methodology and according 
to their interactional elements and mathematical functions, and assess the risk 
profile of scenarios as well as the impact of mitigation policies, according to the 
equilibria of bilateral or unilateral interaction. For the later purpose, the equilibria 
associated with the scenarios and policies are simulated to obtain risk profiles. 
 
4.6.1 Application of the Methodology  
The three scenarios in this example refer to common cases of emergent 
dynamics that project developers face in hydroelectric projects (Fig. 4.3). That is, 
the mobilization plan often faces an emergent actor such as public NIMBY as 
social opposition (emergent synergy). Other potential scenarios are emergent 
coalition of public NIMBY with local or international actors. Figure 4.3 provides 
interactional framework of these potential scenarios including the associated 
interactional elements. Lets assume that the developer is aware of the bilateral 
nature of the interaction while they initially only anticipated financial 
compensation as a reward mechanisms. Furthermore, the consequences 
associated with this risk include the default of power ranging from partial plan 
modification to completely scrapping the project. Additionally, in this example 
cost will be considered as the metric of power. 
While each scenario is analyzed to quantify the associated likelihood, the 
alternative mitigation policies are also reviewed to assess their effectiveness. Six 
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alternative policies are considered in this example from common policies in the 
literature of infrastructure management, which provide a combination of the 
enumerated categories both based on the modification of interactional elements 
and modification of mathematical functions of the policies. 
 
 
 Figure 4.3 Mitigation Policies for the Risk of Social Opposition 
 
Lets assume that the utility of the joint venture in case of no opposition (4∗) is 
equal to $5,000,000 that can be the net profit of the project. Assuming the 
disutility that the public NIMBY associates with the act of complying (i.e., no 
opposition) has a normal distribution N($500,000, $80,000) with the mean of 
$500,000 and the standard deviation of $80,000, while the developer also 
assigns $500,000 compensation in cash. The second and third scenarios 
mathematically translate into an increase in the amount of the disutility the 
opposition associates with the act of complying (4), as the collaborator should be 
also satisfied. This increase is partly rooted in the increased awareness because 
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of the involvement of NGOs and transnational groups and partly because of the 
demands of transnational groups. Lets assume that this disutility has the normal 
distribution N($1,000,000, $160,000), and N($5,000,000, $800,000), for the 
second and third scenarios respectively. Table 4.7 provides the utility values for 
base case scenarios and the alternative policies in terms of cost, while Figure 4.4 
provides the result of the simulation as the risk profile of all the base case 
scenarios (risk profile R1-R3) and the impact of mitigation policies that are 
labeled as R#a-R#f. 
 
Table 4.7 Disutility of the Opposition in the Interaction (x), in 1000 dollars 
Cases SC 1 SC 2 SC 3 
Base Case N(500,80) N(1000,150) N(5000,800) 
Policy (a) N(500,80) N(1000,150) N(5000,800) 
Policy (b) N(500,80) N(1000,150) N(5000,800) 
Policy (c) N(400,50) N(750,100) N(4500,750) 
Policy (d) N(500,80) N(1000,150) N(5000,800) 
Policy (e) N(500,80) N(1000,150) N(5000,800) 
Policy (f) N(400,50) N(1000,150) N(3500,600) 
 
Policies introduced in Table 4.7 and 4.8 are defined based on their 
interactional elements and mathematical implications. While Table 4.7 provides 
the disutility value of the opposition in different scenarios and considering 
different mitigation policies, Table 4.8 provides the utility of reward, utility of 
penalty, cost of reward, cost of penalty, and disutility of the act of opposition to 
the project developer. 
First two mitigation policies (R#a and R#b in Fig. 4.3 and Tab 4.7 and 4.8) 
explore the sanction mechanisms in addition to the incentives. Nye (2008) labels 
these policies as smart power, which effectively combines hard and soft policies. 
While the first policy explores financial punishments such as fines, the second 
policy looks into non-financial mechanisms such as repressive mechanism. For 
example, development of hydroelectric dams in Indonesia from 1971-1992, such 
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as the Kedungombo dam, involved several laws and decrees to regulate, co-opt, 
or intimidate public NIMBY (Aditjondro 1998, Khagram 2004). These policies 
were applied in combination with the resettlement compensation (Aditjondro 
1998, Khagram 2004). Mathematically, these two mechanisms introduce the 
utility and cost of penalty (, ∗) into the equilibria of bilateral interaction, while in 
the later a higher disutility associated with the penalty comes with the lower costs. 
 
Table 4.8 Variables that Change for Each Case, in 1000 Dollars 
Cases x* r r* t t* 
Base Case 5000 N(500,80) 500 0 0 
Policy (a) 5000 N(500,80) 500 N(250,40) N(250,40) 
Policy (b) 5000 N(500,80) 500 N(250,40) N(50,10) 
Policy (c) 5000 N(500,80) 500 0 0 
Policy (d) 5000 N(500,80) 250 N(500,80) N(100,10) 
Policy (e) 5000 N(1000,120) 500 0 0 
Policy (f) 5000 N(1000,120) 500 0 0 
  
The third policy (R#c in Fig. 4.3 and Tab 4.7 and 4.8) suggests concentrating 
the reward efforts on dominant subsets of the opposition. For example, the 
project developer can pursue policies that emphasize helping major businesses 
among the community to mitigate the risk of opposition. Besides, the developer 
may pursue different compensation plans based on the influence and power of 
the affected community. In these case the disutility that the opposition associates 
with the compliance would decrease, since the dominant subgroup changes the 
perception of the project for the opposition. This policy is a specific form of 
network building and coopting described by Miller and Lessard (2000) as the 
alliance is made with a sub-set of the opposition to increase efficiency of 
mitigation policies. 
The fourth policy alternative (R#d in Fig. 4.3 and Tab 4.7 and 4.8) is more 
generic form of coopting and networking and includes alliance with actors that 
are more familiar with the context of the project. As a result the developer 
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transfers the responsibility to actors that have more experience of the project 
context, such as local partners, or international actors with the experience in this 
specific market. As a result the cost of reward and penalty reduces for the project 
developer. For example, in the case of Machadinho and Ita dams in Brazil the 
developers pursued policies to co-opt local officials and leaders to reduce the 


































The fifth policy (R#e in Fig. 4.3 and Tab 4.7 and 4.8) looks into alternative 
reward mechanisms that focus on more efficient methods of reward. These types 
of policies increase the utility of reward as it shifts to reward mechanisms that 
seek more engagement with the public as suggested by Dietz and Stern (2008), 
such as job creation, award of special permits, award of government lands or 
government development such as the case of Delhi NOIDA bridge (Pargal 2007). 
In this case the land development around the project was considered in the 
concession to increase the utility of reward for the project developer. 
 
    Table 4.9 Summary of the Statistical Results of the Simulation 








Base Case R-1 0.436 0.123 
Policy (a) R-1a 0.204 0.164 
Policy (b) R-1b 0.184 0.165 
Policy (c) R-1c 0.315 0.133 
Policy (d) R-1d -0.043 0.215 
Policy (e) R-1e -0.078 0.218 








Base Case R-2 0.694 0.059 
Policy (a) R-2a 0.591 0.078 
Policy (b) R-2b 0.571 0.078 
Policy (c) R-2c 0.611 0.072 
Policy (d) R-2d 0.473 0.101 
Policy (e) R-2e 0.438 0.104 








Base Case R-3 0.899 0.012 
Policy (a) R-3a 0.898 0.017 
Policy (b) R-3b 0.878 0.016 
Policy (c) R-3c 0.893 0.014 
Policy (d) R-3d 0.882 0.022 
Policy (e) R-3e 0.847 0.022 
Policy (f) R-3f 0.862 0.020 
  
And finally the sixth alternative policy (R#f in Fig. 4.3 and Tab 4.7 and 4.8) 
uses influence devices suggested by Miller and Lessard (2000). It includes 
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policies to educate, or increase awareness of the community. It may also include 
political movements to support the project. For example, the media in Indonesia 
used manipulation as means of power to influence perception of the public 
against extensive programs of Indonesia for dam construction (Aditjondro 1998). 
This type of policies decreases the disutility of the compliance through 
awareness campaigns while it also increases the utility of reward. 
The equilibria of the bilateral interaction are then simulated based on the 
data provided in Tab. 4.7, and 4.8. For this purpose the Monte Carlo Simulation 
is applied using the student version of the software @Risk. The risk profile of 
each scenario associated with different scenarios is presented as the outcome of 
the simulation in Figure 4.4 and Table 4.9. As it can be observed from the results 
in Fig. 4.4 and Tab. 4.9, the mitigation policies may be less effective in scenarios 
such as the third scenario. This observation can be related to the increase in the 
utility that the opposition associates with the project (x). The result of the model is 
empirically confirmed by the cases that involvement of the transnational 
organizations has substantially increased risk of social opposition, such as the 
case of Bujagali dam in Uganda and the Belo Monte dam in Brazil (Bosshard 
2002, AfDB 2008, Khagram 2004). In all these cases the involvement of 
transnational groups increased the bargaining power of opposition through 
network, legal, and public resources of the transnational organizations. The 
results of the simulation, however, indicates that the response of each scenario 
to alternative policies is different, e.g. the fourth policy (d) is more effective in the 
first scenario and sixth policy (f) is more effective in the case of second scenario. 
This is in contrast with concrete guidelines for mitigation of emergent risk in 
complex construction projects. 
 
4.6.2 Implications 
One of the major implications of this model is the integration of behavioral 
patterns into the risk assessment. For example, in the case of social opposition 
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against construction projects, the opposition expects loss with high probability. 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in these cases the actor exhibits 
risk-seeking behaviors. In contrast to the risk neutral actor with the utility curve in 
the form of a straight line, the utility curve of a risk-seeking actor is convex. As a 
result the utility value of the same reward is less for this actor than the risk 
neutral actor, and disutility of penalty is more. Therefore, the behavior of the 
other actor is integrated into the risk assessment model. Utility values provide a 
venue to integrate these behaviors into the assessment. 
Figure 4.5 Utility Curve of Opposition 
 
Lets assume the example of emergent risks associated with social opposition 
in construction projects presented in section 4.4.1 of this dissertation. In that 
example the assumption of linear function of utility (i.e., a risk neutral opposition 
group) resulted in the risk of social opposition equal to 0.20% (∆ = 0.8). Now 
assuming that the opposition exhibits risk seeking behavior, according to figure 



















reward Urn=$400,000. Therefore, the likelihood of the emergent risk associated 
with the social opposition would increase to 0.30% (∆ = 0.7). Similarly, if under 
certain conditions (such as social status or institutionalized behavior of the 
opposition group) the opposition exhibits risk-averse behaviors; the quantified 
likelihood of the risk of social opposition would decrease. 
 
4.6.3 Limitations 
The proposed methodology assumes some limitations including its limit of 
analysis to two actors, assigning utilities, assuming the game of complete 
information between rational actors, and the policy level of analysis. In order to 
establish a clear proof of concept, the model assumed minimal complexity 
focusing on two actors. However, these two actors can represent two coalitions 
within the model in case the coalition is assumed as a single decision maker to 
fulfill the assumptions of unitary rational actor. Additionally, the equilibria of the 
interactions assume the game with complete information, that is, each actor is 
aware of the moves of the other actors and utilities associated with outcomes of 
the interaction. The equilibria also assume a rational actor that makes decision to 
maximize its utility. These limitations can be addressed in a methodological 
approach to increase the complexity of the model. Finally, the assignment of 
utilities to each actor might be a challenge to analysis and should be deliberated 
carefully. In this study the descriptive cases from literature were used to assign 
utility values, while the analysis was supported by studying range of variables to 
examine the impact of variations. However, there is a need for further study of 
behavioral patterns and preferences in different contexts to obtain more accurate 
account of utility values. Finally, the analysis only focuses on directions at the 
policy level and does not clarify specific actions and stages of interaction 
between two specific actor. At the policy level, however, the methodology 





The major contribution of the proposed methodology is to integrate a 
methodological analysis of emergent dynamics associated with a complex 
system of systems into the current risk analysis techniques. The procedures 
associated with this integration involved: i) interactional framework of emergent 
risk, ii) quantitative assessment of emergent risks based on the equilibria of 
unilateral or bilateral interactions (i.e., degree of complexity), iii) development of 
mitigation policies based on the interactional elements and the associated 
mathematical functions, iv) assessment of the impact of mitigation policies. 
Observation of numerous cases of project failures (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003) have 
proven that the impact of emergent dynamics associated with the interaction of 
institutionally diverse actors can be detrimental. This methodological approach 
can help policy makers to provide a descriptive QRA (quantitative risk 
assessment) for emergent risks in complex construction projects and to shed 
more lights on the concept of performance paradox in infrastructure development 
through the lens of complex system of systems. Furthermore, it provides a 
methodological approach to frame and assess the impact of common mitigation 
policies. 
One potential misconception for the decision maker in construction projects 
is to suppose that the consequences are solely determined by her decision. This 
misconception often results in optimism bias and negligence of costs associated 
with the emergent risks associated with interactional dynamics. Integration of 
interactional analysis methodology into current risk assessment techniques 
provides a decision space to account for multiple decision makers. The ability of 
the methodology is demonstrated to increase the understanding of emergent 
dynamics and consequently transparency of decision-making in complex system 
of systems such as complex infrastructure projects. A combination of quantitative 
assessment framework with scenario-based risk assessment platform provided a 
better understanding of the decision stratum. Besides, it facilitates institutional 
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arrangement and helps in the direction of aligning policies among diverse actors 
in dynamic and complex projects to ensure sustainability of projects not only 
economically, but also socially and environmentally. Since the outcome of this 
chapter was to assess emergent dynamics at the policy level to provide direction 
for actions there is a need for more detailed analysis of interactions. Next chapter 





CHAPTER 5.  INTERACTIONAL ANALYSIS AT THE STRATEGY LEVEL 
The first component of the research aimed to analyze the emergent 
dynamics associated with the interactions of institutionally diverse actors at the 
policy level (Chapter 4). Although the proposed analysis provided insights to 
general guidelines in the form of policies to govern these dynamics, it lacks the 
details necessary for strategy developers. Similarly, at the strategic level of the 
project context the outcomes of construction projects emerge from increasingly 
complex dynamics. However, common strategic management approaches have 
not sufficiently incorporated these growing complexities. As a result, managers 
regularly face cost and time over-runs, unforeseen conflicts, project renegotiation, 
and failure in project completion. These inconsistencies are coupled with the 
often costly dissatisfaction of target-users and unprecedented frictions with non-
contractual actors (such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local 
communities, or political parties.) 
At the policy level of IA, each interaction is modeled as a single episode with 
general information about the dynamics. This chapter aims to provide more 
detailed analysis of the interactions and provides discussion on the second 
component of the research: the strategy level of IA. The interactional model is 
developed according to the framework of IA to investigate the emergent 
dynamics of complex system of systems and studies the emergent dynamics of 
social opposition risk and consequent synergies at the strategic management 
level of construction projects. The model rests on game theoretic equilibria for 
the interactional analysis of the dynamics, and the equilibria are then simulated 
for two different structures: formal and informal actions. A methodological 
comparison of the two structures creates four scenarios of social opposition for
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each structure. These scenarios differ in variables that can represent real 
contextual cases. The goal of this chapter is not to provide a generic risk analysis 
tool; instead, it demonstrates the potential application of IA in analyzing emergent 
dynamics of a complex system of systems.  
This chapter includes a brief discussion of IA and risk as the core focus of 
the analysis at the strategy level and further develops an interactional model for 
the specific case of social opposition in construction projects. It further provides 
some insights into the other half of the third component of the research that aims 
to develop strategies based on the analysis of the second component. The 
strategy level of IA in this chapter is discussed in the context of social opposition 
to construction projects as a practical issue within the construction industry. The 
analysis can be used for policy-making and governance of complex systems in 
different fields other than large-scale construction projects. 
 
5.1 Transition from the Policy Level to Strategy Level 
The first component of the IA, proposed in Chapter 4, provides a generic 
approach to analyze the emergent dynamics associated with interactions in a 
complex system of systems. It also facilitates the development of policies to 
mitigate the consequences of these emergent dynamics and quantified the 
impact of mitigation policies. As a result, mitigation policies are devised in a 
descriptive and quantitative manner and can be further analyzed for different 
variations. Strategy developers often require more detailed analysis of emergent 
dynamics and associated actions. Therefore, the theories of power in social 
science and equilibria of interaction are applied to extend the methodology of 
interactional analysis into the strategy development level. For this purpose, each 
interaction is structured in an extensive form, including multi-stages with actions 
at each stage and their associated characteristics. This analysis provides a 
transition from the direction of actions in the form of policies to the detail of 
actions and their sequences.  
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For example, in the case of social opposition risk in construction projects, 
there has been a transformation in the power and normative structures of global 
governance (Sikkink 2002). As a result, emergent actors, such as local 
opposition groups, regional NGOs, national political parties, and international 
social movements influence project outcomes through strategies such as 
informal or soft power, protests, and media strategies. IA investigates these 
emergent dynamics in the context of the power relations among diverse actors to 
analyze the consequent risk at the strategy level. 
The transition in the case of social opposition can be described through the 
policy (b) at the example of the section 4.6.1. In that example, policy (b) includes 
direction of actions towards legal mechanisms without mentioning clear 
strategies. At the strategy level the planner need to know: i) what strategies are 
needed to be taken, ii) what are the variable that define that strategy, e.g. 
associated costs, and iii) at what stage of the interaction they should be applied. 
This chapter aims to answer these specific questions. The case of the emergent 
dynamics of social opposition in construction projects is further studied in this 
chapter, but before that discussion a review of the risk at this level of analysis is 
provided. 
 
5.2 Risk in the Strategy Level of IA 
As discussed, the definition of risk varies among different disciplines (such as 
psychology, finance, economics, and strategic management) based on varied 
assumptions, applications, and the inherent vagueness of the term. The strategic 
management approach was applied to risk, envisioning it as tied to the 
unpredictability of outcome variables (Bromiley et al., 2001). Through the lens of 
a complex system of systems, the variation in potential outcome state of the 
system defines the risk. If the project x is expected to transform from state a 
(O(a?)) to state b (O(b?)) while in reality the final outcome turns out to be state c, 
(O(c?)), the risk will be the difference between the predicted state (b) and the real 
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outcome (c), R?   = O(c? ) – O(b? ). This equation highlights a mathematical 
interpretation of the required strategic management approach to risk (R) in a 
complex system of systems. Each state of the system can be gauged through 
different metrics, so that R serves as a multi-dimensional indicator describing the 
outcome of the project. R can be considered to be any of the four basic project 
metrics used in construction management: cost, time, quality, and safety. Further, 
the distribution of R is more meaningful for analysis and strategy development 
than single point descriptions of risk (Kaplan and Garrick 1981, Aven 2012). In a 
complex system of systems this translates into consideration of several potential 
consequent states of the system where these states can be presented through 
the aforementioned metrics. This definition of risk is applied in interactional 
analysis to provide a foundation for quantitative analysis of emergent risks 
associated with interactions in a complex system of systems.  
Accordingly, IA provides a foundation for descriptive analysis of risk at the 
strategy level. This chapter models the specific case of risk of social opposition 
against construction projects and provides a detailed understanding of dynamic 
interactions, their emergent outcomes, and patterns of behaviors. Although these 
patterns are important for policy-makers who seek to develop long-term policies 
in fields such as energy, telecommunications, and infrastructure development, 
they can be used by firms and public agencies as a guideline for strategy 
development for any complex project that faces the emergent dynamics 
associated with the interaction of diverse actors. 
 
5.3 Structure of the Interactional Model 
According to the core philosophy of IA, the analysis at the strategy level 
strengthen the shift in the emphasis of analysis from the actors to their 
interactions as the roots of dynamic complexities. It views the interactions as the 
coupling of multiple complex systems (i.e., actors). As stated, Foucault (1982) 
suggested that interactions can be studied as communication networks or power 
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relations between actors. IA at the strategy level emphasizes the focus on the 
power relations among different actors in a complex system of systems to 
investigate the emergent dynamics of the system. This focus is facilitated with a 
more detailed model of the interaction based on the concept of the extensive 
games.  
The interactional model proposed in this chapter starts with the minimal 
complexity and variables to observe the emergent dynamics. It focuses on the 
dynamics resulting from the interaction of two actors i, such that in case of social 
opposition i = {the project opposition (N), the project developer (Y)}. In 
accordance with the social opposition literature, actor N is an emergent actor in 
the context of project while actor Y plans the project as the principal decision 
maker. Examples of opposition actors (N) include transnational organizations 
such as International Rivers in the case of hydroelectric dams, residents of 
nuclear power plant host communities in Japan, and regional and national 
political parties such as the Green Party in the case of Stuttgart 21 in Germany. 
The model assumes actors make rational decisions, that is, they seek to 
maximize their utility. Besides, as suggested by De Mesquita and Lalman (1992), 
it assumes a unitary rational actor so that the decisions are made as if an 
individual decision maker chooses strategies. The dynamic game reflects the 
interactions between actors as they choose their strategies after observing the 
move of the other actors (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). Furthermore, the 
interaction is considered as non-cooperative, as routine mechanisms to enforce 
contracts between these actors may not exist. Based on this assumption the 
interaction will not introduce a specific mechanism of cooperation between actors 
(Osborne and Rubinstein 1994), but it does not preempt cooperation cases 
between self-interested actors (De Mesquita and Lalman 1992). For example, the 
project developer and the opposition might decide to cooperate in the absence of 




The interaction starts as a game with the move of the opposition, since the 
developer favors the status quo in the case of social opposition to an 
infrastructure project. Developers often face unexpected and unpredicted action 
from opposition groups, which can emerge in the midst of project planning or 
construction (Khagram 2004). The interactional model assumes perfect and 
complete information, meaning that the players are aware of all the preceding 
moves, as well as the payoffs related to each outcome (Osborne and Rubinstein 
1994). These assumptions, based on the literature of game theory, allow us to 
shift the focus of study from the complexity of the model to its results and 
application. Figure 5.1 depicts a generic extensive representation of the 
interactional model for social opposition in infrastructure development. 
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5.3.1 Strategies for Sequential Stages of Interaction 
The model involves strategy space Si for each actor i, such that i = {N, Y}, 
where actors N and Y might interchange between formal (F) and informal actions 
(IF) such that the strategy space Si is equal to Si ={(IF, F), (IF, ~F), (~IF, F), (~IF, 
~F)}. Note that the latter two are impossible combinations though they are part of 
the strategy space. There are two major sections to the game: the informal 
confrontation sub-game followed by the formal confrontation sub-game (fig. 5.2). 
The informal strategies represent actions such as political, public, or media 
pressure, while the formal strategies represent explicit actions between the 
actors (e.g., lawsuits, licensing challenges, and other legal actions). 
As can be seen from figure 5.1, the interaction starts with the strategic choice 
by the opposition whether to initiate an informal action against the project (IFN) or 
not (~IFN). For example the opposition may decide whether to launch a public 
campaign against the project or not to do any action. In the latter case the project 
will not face any new risks, given that all other conditions were to remain as 
planned. The outcome in this case will be called status quo (sq). In the former 
case, the developer will have the choice of informal strategies to counter the 
move (IFY) or to acquiesce to the request of the opposition (~IFY). Acquiescence 
to the opposition party’s request at this stage will result in modification of plans 
(pm). In the case where both actors take informal action against each other, the 
interaction reaches the point when the opposition has the choice of taking formal 
action against the project (FN) or refraining from formal actions (~FN). The latter 
translates into the case of negotiation (ng) between the opposition and the 
developer. The former is the point where the interaction enters the formal 
confrontation sub-game. 
Up to this point of the interaction the choice of strategies was limited to 
informal moves such as protest, awareness campaigns, lobbying, and so forth. At 
this point, however, the developer will have the choice of formal action (FY), which 
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results in litigation (lg), or complying with the request (~FY) that results in 
settlement (st). There is a transaction cost associated with the formal and 
informal actions of each actor, as both sets of strategies require the use of 
resources including time, opportunity costs, and money. Each terminal node 
(outcome) involves a two-tuple of payoffs that is discussed in more detail in next 
section along with the transaction costs and probabilities. 
 
5.3.2 Terminal Node Outcomes 
If the confrontation leads to negotiations, the expected payoff takes the form 
of a lottery. Considering the probability of winning the negotiation for the 
opposition ( ;) , the expected payoff of each actor would be equal to the 
expected value of the lottery in cases of loss and gain minus the transaction cost 
of its informal actions (A; , A=). The results of the settlement will be similar to plan 
modification minus the transaction cost of formal action for the opposition (B;), 
while the developer has yet to pay the transaction for formal action and only pays 
the transaction cost of its informal action. Finally, the litigation results in a lottery 
(similar to negotiation) minus the transaction costs of both the formal and 
informal actions (A;,	B;, A=,	B=) and considering the probability of winning the 
litigation for the developer ( =). The interactional model presented in Figure 5.1 
and the payoff of each actor shown in table 5.1 is a generic model that can be 
modified and applied to a variety of interactional settings. 
Several assumptions and clarification may be illustrated to further structure 
the model. First, it should be clarified that table 5.1 presents payoffs and not 
utility values. Additionally, :;(∆=), serves as the ultimate capitulation for the 
opposition (i.e., the status quo) and can be seen as the acquiescence of the 
opposition to the project developer. Further loss due to informal and formal 
actions is captured within the transaction costs of those actions (i.e. A; , B; ). 
Furthermore, it can be assumed that the payoff of the opposition is higher in case 
its request is approved compared with the case where the request of the 
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developer would be endorsed, :;(∆;) > :;(∆=). If not, the rational opposition 
would not make any request at all. 
 
Table 5.1 Payoff of the Actors at Each Terminal Node 
 Expected Payoff of Opposition 
Status quo :;(∆=) 
Plan modification :;(∆;) −	A; 
Negotiation  ;[:;(∆;)] + (1 −  ;)[:;(∆=)] 	−	A; 
Settlement :;(∆;) −	A; − B; 
Litigation (1 −  =)[:;(∆;)] +  =[:;(∆=)] −	A; − B; 
 
 Expected Payoff of Developer 
Status quo :=(∆=) 
Plan modification :=(∆;) 
Negotiation (1 −  ;)[:=(∆=)] +  ;[:=(∆;)] 	− 	A= 
Settlement :=(∆;) −	A= 
Litigation  =[:=(∆=)] + (1 −  =)[:=(∆;))] 	− 	A= − B= 
 
As stated each actor will choose strategies according to their transaction 
costs and payoffs related to each outcome. The absolute cost of the requested 
change for actor Y,	<= = (:=(∆=) − :=(∆;)), is the cost of interaction for the 
developer considering zero transaction costs, and can range from zero to partial 
(or occasionally complete) modification of the project. The absolute value of 
request for actor N,	G; = H:;(∆;) − :;(∆=)I, is the reward of the dispute for the 
opposition considering zero transaction costs. <= and G; establish the range of 
the expected payoff of interaction for the respective actor and is used in 
conjunction with transaction costs to choose alternative strategies. 
 
5.4 Equilibria of the Interaction 
The interactional model is solved using the concept of sub-game perfect 
equilibrium, as a refinement to the Nash equilibrium (Osborne and Rubinstein 
1994). The solution of the interaction involves backward induction at each 
decision node using the payoffs discussed above.  
112 
 
The initial stage focuses on the last decision node concerning the decision of 
the developer to engage in formal action (or not). It states that the developer will 
avoid the formal action (J=), only if: 
B= ≥	 =<= 
• This equilibrium suggests that the developer will undertake litigation only if 
the transaction cost of litigation is less than the product of probability of winning 
litigation for the developer and the absolute cost of requested changes. Since 
this equilibrium suggests two conditions, the next stage of the game concerns the 
decision of the opposition to engage in the formal action (FN) or not (~FN)(~FN): 
1) 
	O	B= <	 =<=, 
P	Q	 
B; ≥	 (1 −  =− ;)H:;(∆;) − :;(∆=)I 
2) 
	O	B= ≥	 =<=, 
P	Q	 
B; ≥ (1 −  ;)H:;(∆;) − :;(∆=)I 
The next stage analyzes the decision of the developer on an informal action 
(	J=). In this case there are four conditions resulting from previous equilibria, two 
of which represent the same terminal node of the game (i.e., negotiation). As a 
result, the developer will not take informal action under three conditions, as: 
1) 
	O 
a. 	B= <	 =<= 	O
R	B; ≥	 (1 −  =− ;)(G;)	 only if 
:=(∆;) > :=(∆=), 
b. B= ≥	 =<= 	O




R	B; <	 (1 −  =− ;)(G;), 
P	Q 
∝=+ B= ≥	 =H:=(∆=) − :=(∆;)I  
3) 
	O	B= ≥	 =<=	O
R		B; < (1 −  ;)(G;), only if ∝=≥ 0 
In cases 1a and 1b (i.e., negotiation) the only condition under which the 
developer would not have to recourse to informal action is when :=(∆;) >
:=(∆=).  As was mentioned previously, the payoff to the developer is always 
more when the opposition takes no action. Consequently, in this case the 
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developer always chooses from the informal strategy space. In case 3, which is 
relevant to settlement, the developer will not take informal action only if the 
transaction cost of informal action is more than zero. As this is always the case, 
the developer never takes informal actions under these conditions. As a result, in 
the game of perfect information the chance of getting to settlement is 
theoretically equal to zero. 
The last stage of the interaction includes all the terminal nodes (outcomes) of 
the interaction. It integrates the initial decision of the opposition to take informal 
action against the project, and there are three conditions under which the 





R	B; <	 (1 −  =− ;)(G;), O
R ∝=+
B= <	 =<= , 
P	Q	 ∝;+ B; ≥ (1 −  =)H:;(∆;) − :;(∆=)I,	 
b. 
	O	B= ≥	 =<=	O
R	B; < (1 −  ;)(G;), 
P	Q	 ∝;+
B; ≥ (1 −  =)H:;(∆;) − :;(∆=)I	 
2) incaseβY ≥ P(L)YCYandβN < H1-P(N)NI(BN), onlyif ∝N+ βN ≥
(1-P(L)Y) bUN(∆N)-UN(∆Y)d
	O	 
a. B= <	 =<=O
R	B; ≥	 (1 −  =− ;)(G;), 
P	Q	 ∝;≥
 ;H:;(∆;) − :;(∆=)I, 
b. 	
	O	B= ≥	 =<=	O
R		B; ≥ (1 −  ;)(G;), 

P	Q	 ∝;≥  ;H:;(∆;) − :;(∆=)I  
3) 
	O	B= <	 =<=	O
R	B; <	 (1 −  =− ;)G;, O
R 
∝=+ B= ≥	 =G; , 
P	Q	 ∝;≥ H:;(∆;) − :;(∆=)I  
In the case of 1a and 1b, the opposition will not take any action against the 
project only if the sum of the transaction costs for informal and formal actions is 
more than the product of the opposition winning the litigation and the absolute 
value of dispute for the opposition. The cases of 2a and 2b occur only if the 
transaction costs of informal action for the opposition are more than the product 
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of the probability of the developer winning the negotiation and the absolute value 
of the dispute for the opposition. And finally in the last case, the situation occurs 
only if the cost of informal action for the opposition is more than or equal to the 
absolute value of the dispute for the opposition. 
 


















B= ≥	 =<= B; ≥ (1 −  ;)G;  ∝;≥  ;G; sq 
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B; < (1 −  ;)G;  ∝;+ B; ≥ G; sq 
  
 ∝;+ B; < G; pm 
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 ∝;<  ;G; ng 
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∝;< G; pm 
  
∝=+ B= <	 =<= ∝;+ B; ≥ (1 −  =)G; sq 
   
∝;+ B; < (1 −  =)G; lg 
 
Table 5.2 is a summary of the conditions and the consequent terminal node 
outcomes. Each actor will decide on formal and informal actions based on their 
transaction costs while comparing them with the expected payoffs. This table can 
be used as a risk assessment guideline at the planning stage of projects 
considering the distributions of payoffs, the probabilities of winning litigation and 
negotiation, and the estimated transaction costs. Changes in the value of the 
variables of the interaction result in switching the outcome state and the 
consequent payoff. Based on the distribution of variables the social opposition 
risk can be quantified as the distribution of the payoff for each actor. Since this 
chapter aims to investigate behavioral patterns in the case of social opposition 
interaction in construction projects, next the equilibria of the interaction will be 
simulated. The impact of informal actions on the risk of the project is emphasized 





5.5 Simulation of the Interaction 
Simulation facilitates observation of the behavior of complex, interactive 
systems under a wide range of conditions and allows for the comparison of 
emergent outcomes under alternative approaches (Ioannou and Martinez 1996, 
Law and Kelton 1991). Past studies of the dynamics of public participation in 
decision-making were lacking application of analytic and simulation methods 
(Dietz and Stern 2008). In this current study the simulation aims to study two 
types of variation within the model: 1) structural variation of the model and 2) 
contextual variation within the model. 
 
Figure 5.2 Meta-model for Selection of Interactional Structures 
 
Structural variation of the model results from the strategy selection by the 
actors. The goal of investigating structural variations is to observe the impact of 
different strategies on the outcome of the interaction. It involves comparison with 
interactional structures that are framed differently from the proposed interactional 
structure, 	e(%). Therefore, alternative interactional structures can be developed 
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and compared with each other to find the best combination of strategies that 
responds to the dynamics of each case (Fig. 5.2). 
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B; < G; st 
B= <	 =<=  B; ≥ (1 −  =)G; sq 
 βN < (1 − PY)BN lg 
 
The development of each structure can be based on observations and 
empirical case studies of the dynamics for each context. In the case of social 
movement against a construction project the opposition itself initiates the game; 
and creating structural variation simply includes adding one stage before the 
initial node. As depicted in Figure 5.2, this stage involves the opposition’s 
decision about the structure of the game. Therefore, the first move of the 
opposition group sets the structure for interaction. In the study of social 
opposition against construction projects the proposed interaction, (	e(%) ), was 
compared to another alternative structure of the interaction, 	e(-) , when the 
actors are deprived of (or choose not to recourse to) the choice of informal action 
(Fig. 5.2). For example, in the case of Kedung Ombo dam project in Indonesia 
the opposition pursued formal strategies in the form of legal actions from the first 
stage of the interaction (Khagram 2004). This interaction can be reflected 
through 	e(-) as the interaction does not involve informal strategies. However, in 
the case of the Asahan dams in Indonesia the opposition started with informal 
strategies such as petitions and campaigns and then moved to formal strategies 
such as legal actions (Aditjondro 1998). 
Through this comparison the impact of informal actions on the outcome of 
dynamics is studied. In 	e(-)  the strategy space f!  for each actor i, such that 
 = N, Y, is f! = J,~J. As can be observed in the case of formal confrontation 
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game, (	e(-)), there is no negotiation or plan modification and the terminal node 
outcomes are limited to status quo, settlement, and litigation (Fig. 5.2). Table 5.3 
presents the equilibria, as the conditions of this game, along with consequent 
terminal node outcomes. 
On the other hand, each structure of the game can be studied individually to 
analyze contextual variables. Changes in contextual variables can create 
different scenarios within a single structure of the game. The contextual changes 
can create a variety of challenges in the implementation of public participation 
strategies (Dietz and Stern 2008). This analysis can assist strategy developers 
with modeling each context and the associated strategies. Khagram (2004) 
suggested that higher degrees of social mobilization and democracy in each 
context provide extensive foundations for further involvement of opposition in the 
decision-making process. Under such conditions anti-facility groups find it easier 
to mobilize, engage in formal and informal actions against the developer, and 
recruit external allies to bolster their cause. Contextual variation of the model 
provides a basis to infuse the characteristics of these contexts through lower 
formal and informal transaction costs and better chances of winning the 
negotiation and litigation. The proposed interactional structures (	e(%), 	e(-)) of 
opposition to construction projects are simulated for four different scenarios. In 
this study the contexts vary in terms of the transaction costs of formal actions, B; 
and B=, as well as the cost of the requested change for the developer <=. These 
scenarios represent the cases of hydroelectric project development in the 
countries with high degree of social mobilization, while the degree of democracy 
increases through the understudied period as a result of democratization. This 
pattern is regularly observed in several countries such as Brazil or Indonesia 
(Khangram 2004), while in most cases the development of hydroelectric dams 
were influenced directly by these changes. Other variables remain the same 
within the four scenarios. 
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The combination of each set of variables is a scenario that depicts different 
contexts in the real world to examine the effectiveness of different policies. For 
example, in the context of France the cost of formal action such as a lawsuit or 
licensing challenge against a nuclear project might be high, while in the United 
States the transaction cost of the same formal action against a plant remains 
rather low. On the other hand, changes in the value of <= indicate the range of 
requested change in the scope of project from the opposition and its impact on 
the interactional dynamics. For example, in Indonesia in the case of 
Kotopamjamg dam the opposition demanded partial modification of the dam, 
while the opposition was completely against the construction of dams on Tandui 
River (Aditjondro 1998). These contextual nuances can help each actor to 
observe the dynamics associated with every specific context and impact of 
mitigation strategies in each context. 
 
Table 5.4 Variables Fixed Among All Scenarios, in the scale of 0 to 1 
α(Y) Uniform(0,0.05) 
α(N) Uniform(0,0.05) 
P(N) Normal(Mean=0.5, SD=0.16) 





Some assumptions are shared between the scenarios. In all the scenarios 
the expected payoff of the opposition is initially equal to zero (:;(∆=) = 0) and if 
its request is ratified the expected payoff would be equal to the unit (:;(∆;) = 1). 
Initially the expected payoff of the developer is equal to the unit (:=(∆=) = 1); but 
if it ratifies the request of the opposition, its expected payoff would fall 
somewhere between zero and one (0 ≤ :=(∆;) < 1). Therefore, the absolute 
cost of requested change is between zero and one (0 < <= ≤ 1) and the absolute 
value of the request for the opposition is equal to the unit G; = 1. Considering 
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the expected payoff between zero and the unit is the result of normalization of 
each actor’s payoff with the maximum payoff of the same actor. The rationale for 
using the normalized value is to align the degree of importance of payoffs for 
each actor regardless of its size. This assumption implies that half of the budget 
of a small opposition group is relatively as important for the opposition as is the 
half of the budget of the developer for the developer, despite the numerical 
significance of the budget of the developer compared with the opposition. The 
absolute value of the request for the opposition can be associated with the 
compromise on demands for impact mitigation in the case of a not in my back 
yard (NIMBY) protest, public appeal resources in the case of political parties, or 
outreach, funds, and donations in the case of transnational organizations or 
movements. On the other hand, the absolute cost of the request for the 
developer represents the costs associated with plan modifications, reductions in 
the scope of projects, or delays. 
The cost of informal actions is assumed to be lower than the 5% of the initial 
payoff of the developerH0 < (A; , A=) < 0.05:=(∆=)I with the uniform distribution. 
Furthermore, the probability of winning the litigation for the developer is 
considered to have a normal distribution with the mean of 0.5 and the standard 
deviation of 0.16, while the probability of winning the negotiation for the 
opposition is considered slightly lower at normal distribution with a mean of 0.35 
and a standard deviation of 0.16 (Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.5 Variables Changing Among Scenarios in the scale of 0 to 1 
Variables 1st Scenario 2nd Scenario 3rd Scenario 4th Scenario 
UY(∆N) Uniform(0,1) Uniform(0,1) Uniform(0,0.5) Uniform(0,0.5) 
β(N) Uniform(0,0.5) Uniform(0,0.2) Uniform(0,0.5) Uniform(0,0.2) 
β(Y) Uniform(0,0.5) Uniform(0,0.2) Uniform(0,0.5) Uniform(0,0.2) 
 
Simulations of each scenario were conducted using matched pairs of random 
variables to cancel the effect of the changes in the random variables in the 
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comparison of the two alternative games. Matched pairs simulation synchronizes 
the effect of uncertainty for both alternative interactional structures (Ioannou and 
Martinez 1996). As a result, the comparison only reflects the impact of structural 
or variable variation in the behavior of the models. As stated above, the two 
structures of the model are simulated for four scenarios as following (Table 5.5): 
1. The first scenario involves relatively high transaction costs for formal 
actions and the complete range of the modification request from the opposition. 
For this case the uniform distribution was considered for the cost of formal action 
in the range of 0 to 0.5.  
2. The second scenario involves cases with relatively low transaction costs 
for formal actions and the complete range of the modification request from the 
opposition. The difference between scenario one and two is the cost of formal 
actions, which in this case is a uniform distribution in the range of 0 to 0.2. 
3. The third scenario involves relatively high transaction costs for formal 
action with a large sized modification request. This is the equivalent of scenario 
one while being truncated for only significant modification requests. It translates 
into cases where the opposition requests significant modification in the scope of 
the project and alters the payoff of the developer by more than half of the initial 
plan. 
4. The fourth scenario involves relatively low transaction costs for formal 
actions and a modification request of considerable size. This is the equivalent to 
the second scenario while, like the third scenario, it is truncated to exclude 
opposition requests with extreme impacts on the developer. 
The first and third scenarios reflect the dynamics of hydroelectric 
infrastructure development in Brazil from the late 60s to the late 80s, while the 
second and fourth scenarios reflect the cases of hydroelectric infrastructure 
development in Brazil after the late 80s. As suggested by Khagram (2004), in the 
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Figure 5.3 Comparison of Outcomes for IA(1) and IA(2) 
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In order to compare the two structures within each scenario, the final payoffs 
of each actor are plotted for 	e(%)  on the X-axis against 	e(-)  on the Y-axis. 
Figure 5.3 provides the result of this comparison for 1000 simulation runs. The 
comparison of structures 	e(%) and 		e(-) provides a basis to assess the decision 
of the opposition on strategy selection so as to initiate the interaction with formal 
or informal actions. Visual observation of the graphs indicates that the opposition 
has a cluster of cases that strongly favors application of informal model		e(%). 
Several cases in the development of dams in Indonesia and Brazil such as the 
case of the Kedung Ombo dam confirms this result, as the opposition was not 
successful in cases that they pursue interactional structure 	e(-). The rest of the 
cases are clustered around the 45° line, indicating indifference with slight 
inclination to use of 	e(%). The developer exhibits a clustered payoff around the 
45° line, although there is a slight preference towards formal interactional 
structure 	e(-).  
Four metrics to analyze each graph in Figure 5.3 was looked at, including the 
percentage of cases below the 45° line, the average and variance of the 
difference between the two alternative structures, the distribution of outcomes for 
each actor, and the total number of each terminal node. The percentage of the 
cases below 45° line indicates the degree of preferring 	e(%)  (and hence the 
informal action) for each actor. However, merely counting the numbers below the 
diagonal line is not sufficient to understand the dynamics. The complementary 
indicator is the magnitude of the differences in payoffs between the two 
structures, or the cost implications of each structure. The average and variance 
of the differences was used within the simulation results to display the extent of 
preference or the cost implication of choosing each structure as a strategy. In 
order to have a comparable tool for common risk assessment approaches in 
projects the distribution of outcomes is also presented as a risk profile for each 
scenario. The distribution of outcome provides quantified assessment for the risk 
of social opposition to projects. Figure 5.4 depicts the distribution of outcomes as 
123 
 
a risk profile of the developer for each structure within the four scenarios. Finally, 
the number of each terminal node outcome for each scenario is counted. The 
results of the analysis as well as their practical implications are discussed next. 
 
Table 5.6 Preferences of Interactional Model IA(1) 
Scenarios 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Percentage of preference 
Actor N 0.82 0.55 0.77 0.42 
Actor Y 0.50 0.32 0.52 0.30 
Average magnitude of preference 
Actor N 0.193 0.072 0.178 0.052 
Actor Y 0.027 0.003 0.054 0.002 
 
5.6 Discussion and Practical Implications 
In the case of infrastructure development, social embeddedness is a major 
challenge to deliver sustainable projects (Khagram 2004, Aldrich 2010, McAdam 
et al. 2010). The main reason for the enormity of this challenge rests on a lack of 
understanding of the dynamics resulting from social opposition. As stated before, 
project planners often develop their strategies in a normative or static manner 
and hence lack a clear methodology to forecast emergent dynamics. Simulation 
of the interaction provides a foundation to understand the dynamics of social 
opposition and the associated risk, as the decision models need to reflect a 
decision space including multiple decision makers. 
The first metric used for the comparison of different structures is the 
percentage of cases in 1000 simulation runs that each actor prefers 	e(%) to 		e(-) 
or is indifferent to the two structures. As can be observed in the first two rows of 
table 5.6, the preference of both actors for 	e(%) reduces in the second and fourth 
scenarios where the cost of formal action is relatively low. For actor Y (the 
developer) the indifference changes into preference for 	e(-) . Observation of 
Figure 5.3, however, suggests that actor Y is still marginally indifferent as the 
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data points are clustered around the 45° line. The complementary metric as the 
magnitude of the difference confirms this observation, as the magnitude of 
difference in the second and fourth scenarios is still positive and close to zero as 
seen in table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.7 Potential Outcomes as Terminal Nodes (Percentage) 
Scenarios 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Interactional Model IA(1) 
Status Quo 0.02 0 0.02 0 
Plan Modification 0.50 0.26 0.27 0.03 
Negotiation 0.37 0.36 0.54 0.44 
Settlement 0 0 0 0 
Litigation 0.12 0.39 0.19 0.53 
Interactional Model IA(2) 
Status Quo 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.01 
Settlement 0.51 0.23 0.26 0.02 
Litigation 0.40 0.77 0.62 0.97 
 
Based on the metric of average magnitude of preference and graphs in 
Figure 5.3 it can be concluded that even in the cases of low transaction cost for 
formal action, actor Y slightly prefers 	e(%)  to 	e(-) , while otherwise it strongly 
favors the 	e(%). Furthermore, review of the terminal node outcomes within the 
simulation reveals that 	e(%)  substantially reduces the cases of litigation and 
increases the cases of negotiation and plan modification for all scenarios (see 
Table 5.7). Khagram (2004) and Aditjondro (1998) indicated that the observed 
data exhibits an increase in the cases of litigation in Indonesia and Brazil. 
For risk assessment purposes the outcome of the project is presented as the 
average of the final payoffs for each actor in 1000 simulation runs. As mentioned 
above, social opposition risk can be quantified as the difference between the 
predicted outcome of the complex system of systems (here equal to 1) and the 
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Figure 5.4 Distribution of Outcomes for Actor Y (Black lines Indicate IA(1) with White Lines 
Indicating the IA(2) 
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For example, in the first scenario the payoff of actor Y (the developer) decreases 
to 0.634 in 	e(-) while 	e(%) reduces this risk by 0.027 (see Table 5.8).  
Further, the distribution of outcomes as an indicator for the risk pattern of 
social opposition reveals substantial risk reduction in the case of 	e(%)for high 
costs of formal action (first and third scenarios) as the graphs in Figure 5.4 
moves towards the right. The risk pattern in the cases of high costs of formal 
action does not reveal any observable pattern.  
The results indicate the cost benefits from informal actions with a more 
tangible impact in cases of high transaction costs for formal actions. The rational 
developer in the case of complete information is relatively indifferent to recourse 
to informal actions with its slightly positive cost consequences. As negotiation 
advantages were not considered within the model and both actors were assumed 
homogeneous within the model, this behavior may be attributed to the fact that 
the developer is reacting (rather than initiating) within the model as the opposition 
starts the action against the project.  
 
Table 5.8 Average Outcome of Actor Y (in the scale of 0 to 1) 
Scenarios 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
IA(1) 0.661 0.679 0.524 0.539 
IA(2) 0.634 0.677 0.469 0.537 
 
Finally, the cost of formal action may be a significant determining factor in the 
decision to opt for informal action. For example, scholars have illuminated how 
the institutional and governmental structures in France have created strong 
deterrents to formal action against nuclear power plants. Anti-nuclear movements 
find it difficult to obtain“standing” in the courts and also in finding sympathetic 
judges willing to take lawsuits seriously (Aldrich 2010, Boyle 1998). Under such 
conditions where opposition groups find it difficult to reach decision-makers 
through standard, institutional channels, they may move their mobilization into 
informal channels instead. 
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In order to gauge the accuracy of the model in reflecting the emergent 
dynamics of social opposition in construction projects, validation and verification 
was performed as suggested by Law and Kelton (1991). The interactional model, 
its equilibria, and definition of payoffs for terminal nodes first were discussed with 
game theory experts to validate their theoretical robustness. Subsequently, the 
performance of the simulation model was verified to ensure that it mirrored the 
equilibria of the game. Pilot runs were performed with predetermined inputs-
outputs to ensure that the simulation reflected the equilibria. The next step 
involved validating the interactional model and its simulations to test its level of 
accuracy in reflecting the purpose of the research. This chapter proposed an 
interactional analysis of emergent dynamics associated with social opposition 
risk in a complex system of systems such as a construction project. Through 
case analyses of real world phenomena in the cases of dam construction in 
Brazil it was found that the model approximated empirical reality. The case study 
accompanied examples of other infrastructure in other parts of the world such as 
the case of the nuclear construction in France. 
Nevertheless, the current structure of the proposed model has a number of 
limiting factors. The assumptions include the rationality of each actor in 
maximizing its payoff. It was believed that this supposition needs more 
deliberation, specifically in the case of opposition groups where the informality of 
these actors is coupled with varying motivations and power networks (Sikkink 
2002).  Further, the interactional model is based on the assumption of complete 
information, and the elimination of a settlement possibility from the informal game 
comes from this assumption (Tab. 5.7). Moreover, the game remains confined to 
two actors with the impact of other actors not considered explicitly in this 
interaction. Finally, the interactions have been modeled with a focus on payoffs 
instead of utilities; using utilities at the terminal nodes would integrate preferential 
attributes of actors within the decision framework. The limitations and 
assumptions are vital to understand the extent of the validity of the model. The 
goal of the interactional model was to design a simple framework with clear 
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assumptions to showcase the methodology and its suggested application. The 
framework can be modified and developed for other cases of emergent risk 
associated with the interactional dynamics of a complex system of systems (Fig. 
3.3). As shown in the structure of the model, it can be varied depending on the 
observations from each real case. Similarly, the variables can be changed to 
reflect a wide range of empirical and contextual observations. These flexibilities 
are integrated within the model with the hope for its actual implementation in the 
decision–making process, as the ultimate step in development of the model is to 
establish its credibility through its application in the decision-making process 
(Law and Kelton 1991). 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
Although this chapter discusses the emergent dynamics of social opposition 
and compares informal and formal strategies in this interaction, its primary 
purpose was to showcase the methodology to analyze emergent risks in a 
complex system of systems. Infrastructure development, as a complex system of 
systems, faces several emergent dynamics that impact the consequence of 
projects despite detailed technical designs and plans. Improving sustainability of 
infrastructures through reducing the impact of emergent dynamics requires 
identifying the sources of the complexities and illuminating their interactions. The 
interactional models were introduced to study dynamic emergence in complex 
systems of systems such as infrastructure projects, shifting the emphasis of 
analysis from the actors (the vertices of a network) to their interactions (the 
edges of a network). The focus was on the power dimension of interactions 
between the actors to address their emergent dynamics, and the methodology 
was applied as a proof of concept to study social opposition against construction 
projects.  
The equilibria of the interaction were developed to model the scenarios 
defined by transaction costs, the magnitude of the dispute for the project 
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developer, and the chances of winning litigation and negotiation. Interactional 
models can be used at different levels of project planning, and strategy 
development for firms, as well as public sector and governance at the global level. 
While this chapter has narrowed its discussion to the first two, in the long term 
the focus of this sort of analysis can improve policy-making and governance. 
Simulations of the interactional model for the different scenarios suggested 
measurable impacts for the informal strategies on the risk of social opposition for 
both actors, although they were different in scales. Several steps have been 
taken to enhance the confidence level in the simulation. The comparative 
analysis provided a case to simulate multiple contexts and observe the changes 
in risks based on the deviation of variables. Besides, the simulation was tested 
for extreme cases to observe the outcome and its variations. However, to 
enhance the confidence of the model there is need for further applications and 
case studies. The equilibria can be simulated similarly for any specific context 
and a sensitivity analysis of each variable may provide the scheme of impact for 
each variable. Further, the proposed structure can be altered for cases of 
different sub-games such as different legal dynamics or completely different 
interactions among other actors in the complex system of systems. 
This analysis increases the transparency of the planning stages of 
controversial construction projects, raising the cost of opportunistic behavior from 
all actors. Such transparency can help both project developers and opposition 
groups to avoid cost, time, and energy consuming confrontations and provides a 
basis for compromise and integration of the project. This study is an initial step in 
analytical study of the emergent behaviors of complex infrastructure 
developments in terms of social sustainability. Hopefully this model will serve as 





CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Requirements for construction projects have changed drastically to address 
the increasing need for the service of these projects, as well as the higher 
requirements and standards. For example, there is an increasing need for energy 
infrastructure to address the upsurge in the energy consumption, while at the 
same time projects need to meet higher sustainability standards to ensure 
prolonged resources for the generations to come. As a result there is a need for 
more robust projects to satisfy the increasing demand, withstand exogenous 
fluctuations, and ensure the prolonged resources. To achieve higher levels of 
robustness, complexity of construction projects have increased in multiple 
dimensions such as institutional diversity of actors and their interactions.  
However, projects perform poorly and face several emergent dynamics in the 
form of social opposition, regulatory issues, political power games, or conflicts. 
Based on the literature of complex systems, increasing complexity of projects to 
achieve certain robustness results in more fragility towards cascading failures 
such as the emergent dynamics. Performance paradox (Flyvbjerg et al. 2013) 
points to poor performance of complex infrastructure projects in terms of 
sustainability despite the upsurge in the number and complexity of projects. This 
dissertation aims to elucidate this paradox through the lens of complex system of 
systems. Additionally, it provided the methodology of interactional analysis as a 
quantitative and descriptive approach to assess emergent dynamics associated 
with the interaction of institutionally diverse actors as the missing link in 
performance paradox. It further provides a framework to develop and assess 
actions to mitigate risks associated with these emergent dynamics at the policy 
and strategy level. The methodology can be integrated within the existing risk
131 
 
analysis techniques within the construction industry to address the increasing 
requirements of construction projects in terms of capacity and sustainability. 
 




6.1 Research Summary 
The objective of this research was to provide a descriptive and 
quantitative methodology to analyze emergent dynamics associated with 
interactions within a complex system of systems. The proposed methodology 
has been further developed for risk analysis in construction projects. 
Therefore, this methodology assists project planners to: 1) frame emergent 
risks associated with the interactions in complex construction projects, 2) 
quantify risks at the policy level, 3) quantify risks at the strategy level, 4) 
develop mitigation policies and assess their effectiveness in terms of reducing 
the emergent risk, and 5) develop mitigation strategies and assess their 
impact. 
The study reviewed definition of complexity in the literature with the focus 
on construction projects and established its emphasis on institutional diversity 
of these projects and the associated interactions. It further reviewed the 
concept of emergence as a property of the complex system of systems and 
its implication in construction projects. Additionally, the concept of 
performance paradox suggested by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) was reexamined 
within construction projects in view of the literature of complex systems. It 
was argued that the increasing complexity of projects aims to enhance 
robustness of projects, while the poor performance was the resulted fragility 
associated with the increasing complexity of the system in the form of 
emergent dynamics. 
In order to address the emergent dynamics associated with the 
interaction in complex construction projects the study frames interactions 
according to the concept of power relations in social science. In this study the 
scope was limited to the interaction between two actors to provide clear 
understanding of the concept. The framework including ten interactional 
elements was integrated into the definition of risk as multiple expected 
scenarios, their associated likelihoods, and consequences. This framing of 
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risk provided a methodological platform to define the cases of emergent 
dynamics associated with the interactions in a complex system of systems 
(Figure 6.1). 
The proposed framework provides a methodological descriptive 
framework to identify risks. In order to have an assessment of the risk the 
quantification is performed at two different levels of policies and strategies. 
The mitigation at the policy level is a guideline for the direction of the 
mitigation actions and does not provide detail mitigation actions with their 
sequences. This detail level of analysis is performed at the strategy level with 
focus on each sequence of interaction, the alternative actions at that 
sequence, and outcomes at each stage of the interaction.  
The policy level analysis applies the framework of emergent risks 
associated with the interactions and quantifies the likelihood of the risk based 
on the bargaining game between the two actors. It applies the normal form of 
games which is suitable for the analysis at the policy level. In this sense the 
risk will be linked to the dominant action and one actors aims to control the 
action of the other actor to mitigate the risks associated with the dominant 
action of the interaction, i.e., the scope of power. The quantification is 
therefore shaped according to the power balance between the two actors. 
The quantification at the policy level is based on the degree of complexity 
of the interaction. Accordingly, the assessment models the interaction for 
unilateral and bilateral interactions. The input of the analysis in this step is the 
utility value that each actor associates with different states of the scenario as 
well as reward and penalty mechanisms. The analysis is accomplished with 
the consequences associated with each scenario of the dominant action and 
would include detailed descriptive and quantitative profile of risk through 
scenarios, likelihoods, and consequences. 
Furthermore, mitigation policies would be developed through two different 
approaches based on interactional elements and mathematical functions of 
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the interactions. The impact of each alternative mitigation policy can be 
similarly quantified to observe the changes in the outcome of the project as 
the risk profile associated with the respective scenarios. 
Accordingly, multiple prospective scenarios can be developed and 
simulated along with different alternative mitigation policies to assist the 
decision makers to manage emergent dynamics. Development of potential 
scenarios is based on the experience of experts along with the data on any 
specific project. The list of potential scenarios and the associated result of 
simulation as a spectrum of outcomes helps the decision maker with a better 
understanding of potential emergent risks and their associated dynamics. 
As stated the previous level only provides directions in the form of policy 
to mitigate emergent risks in complex construction projects. For more detailed 
analysis of actions at different stages of the interaction, the methodology 
provides the analysis at the strategy level. This level of analysis helps 
decision makers with the assessment of scenarios while scenarios are 
defined at the action level considering different sequences of the interaction. 
Besides, certain characteristics of each strategy are determined in the model 
to analyze the impact of alternative mitigation strategies on the overall risk of 
the project. 
In order to analyze risk at the strategy level the interaction was modeled 
as an extensive game between the two actors. This extensive game is then 
solved using the concept of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Scenarios of 
risk are modeled based on structural and contextual variations. Structural 
variations are made by different sequences of interaction or different 
combination of strategies. Contextual variations, on the other hand, are made 
through changes in the input of the variables. The combination of these two 
categories of variations results in different scenarios that can be simulated 
and quantified based on the equilibria of the interaction. Changes in the 
variables may be a reflection of the changes in the interactional elements, 
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such as the change in the base of power from financial to legal and 
authoritative that can change the transaction cost of actions. It can also be 
the result of changes in the context of the interaction, such as changes in the 
national policies of the home country that increases the transaction cost of 
certain actions. 
Similar to policy level analysis, mitigation strategies can be developed 
and applied to analyze the impact of diverse strategies. In this case mitigation 
strategies are defined as a set of strategies that together shape different 
structures of the game and cover different sequences of the interaction. 
Additionally, each strategy is defined by its contextual variables such as 
transaction costs and each strategy may be represented by changes in these 




Figure 6.2 IA Procedures 
 
The combination of all the proposed steps as a consolidated framework 
can provide a comprehensive methodology to provide a descriptive and 
quantitative analysis of the emergent dynamics (Figure 6.2). This 
comprehensive methodology can be integrated into the existing planning 
procedures to add different dimension of analysis to project plans and provide 





6.2 Research Limitations 
To develop a methodological approach to analyze emergent dynamics 
associated with the interaction in complex system of systems, the modules and 
sub-sections of the model start with minimal complexity. At the outset, the model 
focused on the interaction of two actors in a complex system of systems to 
observe the emergent outcome and the accuracy of the model to reflect them. 
This deliberate choice reflects the fact that the study focuses on the concept, 
methodology, and its application while complexity of the model can increase 
gradually as required. Impact of interactions in a complex network of project was 
considered as exogenous and has been integrated into the analysis through 
associated variables. However, the impact of other directions on any specific 
actor is synergic and simply integrating them through variables may result in 
ignoring synergies and emergent dynamics at a higher level of complexity. 
At both policy and strategy levels, the actors were assumed to be rational 
actors that seek to increase their utility and payoff, respectively. This approach to 
model rationality simplifies decision space by assuming that the decision maker 
has complete knowledge of the choices and dynamics of the decision, has clear 
preferences, has perfect ability to choose optimal actions, and is indifferent to 
logically equivalent choices (Rubinstein 1998). Similar to the focus on two actors, 
this assumption shifted the emphasis of the analysis to the concept, its 
application, and results instead of computational complexity. In the bargaining 
model at the policy level, the decision maker is assumed to be aware of the 
scenarios, utility values associated with different scenarios, and the alternative 
choices of the other actors. At the extensive game at the strategy level the 
decision maker is assumed to know different structures of the game, outcomes, 
preferences of the other actor, and variables such as transaction costs, and 
probabilities of winning negotiation or litigation. Besides, at the policy level and 
strategy level the actors were assumed to make decisions only based on utility 
and payoff maximization. However, in reality actors do not possess a clear 
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preference system, are not able to calculate optimal decisions, and are not 
indifferent to the selection of logically equal choices. Integrating the concept of 
bounded rationality can increase the accuracy of the methodology to reflect 
emergent dynamics of a complex system of systems. This integration, however, 
is based on the field data of the problem and may be different for any specific risk. 
For example, in order to integrate the bounded rationality in the case of social 
opposition there is a need for detail analysis of the behavioral patterns of 
opposition. This pattern might be different for risks associated with claims, 
regulatory risks, or other emergent risks of interactional nature. 
 
6.3 Intellectual Merits 
The intellectual merits of this study are beyond the construction industry and 
extend to analysis of emergent risks associated with interactional dynamics in 
any complex system of systems. The study is organized in three major steps: 1) 
identification and formulation of emergent risks associated with interactions in a 
complex system of systems 2) quantification of the emergent risks 3) 
development and assessment of the effectiveness of mitigation policies and 
strategies. The major steps are accompanied by extensive literature review of 
risk, institutional theory, power, construction planning, system of systems, 
complex systems, emergence, international business, game theory, and 
simulation. Among others, some intellectual merits of the study are: 
i. Simulation of social and political dynamics: in the field of construction 
simulation is mainly focused to construction operations including fleet 
management, construction process optimization, productivity of workers, etc. 
Extending the application of simulation to social and political dynamics 
associated with construction projects is important for several reasons: i) recent 
observations indicate that social and political dynamics are the major determinant 
of the fate of projects, ii) social and political dynamics are considered emergent 
and almost completely ignored from planning stages, iii) applying same 
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methodologies to assess this risk reduces the boundary obstacles to introduce 
this assessment into construction practices. 
ii. Integrating knowledge of social science into a problem of engineering 
nature: the interdisciplinary nature of the problem requires combination of 
expertise from different fields. This holistic approach will add to the depth of the 
solution and contributes to understanding of the problem, delivering more specific 
solution to what is a global problem. Integrating knowledge of diverse fields into 
common practices of construction industry in a collaborative manner to fit the 
methodology within the existing techniques reduces the challenges of applying 
the innovative concept within the industry. 
iii. Paradigm shift in analysis of synergies: Several research have been 
performed to evaluate synergies of Joint Ventures (JV), contractor-owner 
relationships, etc (e.g. Kumaraswamy 1997, Loosemore and McCarthy 2008). 
The focal point of these studies is their focus on contractual interactions. Shifting 
the focus to power relations will add a new dimension to evaluation of 
interactions. It will provide broader application arena for studying interactions. 
The proposed methodology offers a new approach to reassess resources and 
mechanisms used in any synergic relationship such as a Joint Venture. 
Furthermore, project actors who diversify their resources and mechanisms as an 
analytical move can apply the methodology, for example, in the case of a 
contractor that seeks local embeddedness. 
iv. Provision of a bridge to traditional risk assessment methods in 
construction: Traditional methods of risk assessment in construction industry 
underrated the real causal sources of emergent dynamics. On the other hand, 
qualitative researches neglect risk assessment models common in construction 
research. This study attempted to reduce that gap through connecting risk 
assessments presented by traditional models to interactional elements and 
strategic alternatives. Therefore, it narrowed the gap between social science 
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oriented research in construction and traditional management oriented research 
through collaborative study. 
v. Facilitating the application of institutional theory in engineering: 
Institutional diversity proved to be a major factor in global business environment 
and global construction (Kostova (1996), Xu and Shenkar (2002), Mahaalingam 
and Levitt (2007), Orr and Scott (2008)). Interactional Analysis (IA) facilitates the 
integration of institutional arrangements into project strategy development 
through institutional resources and mechanisms along with conventional 
resources and mechanisms. Institutional elements can be regarded as a 
significant resource for any actor within interplays of the strategic games. The 
study has carefully explored, categorized, and defined interactional resources 
and mechanisms. It provided an analytical approach for actors to recourse to 
alternative resources or mechanisms as a modification to strategies. 
vi. New approach to analyze behavior of system of systems with emergent 
behavior: emergent is an important property of the construction projects, as 
agendas of the actors would evolve during the project. There are several 
approaches to address evolution within systems. IA methodology integrates 
evolution of basic resources and mechanisms into analysis through inclusion of 
project phase for definition of unit of cases. This may facilitate casual explanation 
of backward and forward evolution as well as lock-ins within the network of actors. 
vii. Aligning policy making in different hierarchical levels: the proposed 
methodology can be applied to interactions of different actors within a project 
rendering any actor with better understanding of consequences of policies. This 
will help to align policies that actors choose from strategy sets, since strategies 
will take more actors, broader resources, as well as evolutionary nature of the 
project setting into account. While the construction project setting is a 
disassortative network by nature, analysis of interactions reflected this 
characteristic of the network by considering non-contractual interactions e.g. 
interaction of NGO and project developer. 
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viii. Inclusion of the triple sustainability bottom-lines into initial roots of policy 
and strategy development: interactional elements cover broad concepts that can 
be added to policy making such as economical aspects, social and institutional 
aspects, political aspects, etc. Integrating all factors within one framework avails 
planners with more insights to prevent myopic plans and strategies. This 
inclusion is facilitated through a multi-decision maker space that was developed 
in this dissertation. Considering multiple actors and broader agendas within 
different stages of project may avail more social and economical sustainable 
project plans. As it was discussed in chapter 2 and 3, reflection of complexity in 
decision models provides an inherent mechanism to increase sustainability of 
infrastructure development. 
 
6.4 Contributions to Practice 
The main contribution of this methodology to practice may be: i) to increase 
the transparency of decision making in construction projects, ii) to simulate 
emergent dynamics associated with social and political dynamics and assist 
planners in review of potential dynamics, iii) provide a quantitative tool to 
increase sustainability of projects and assess the impact of policies and 
strategies.  
The equilibria of emergent risks with clear assumptions and analysis provide 
a descriptive decision making model that is supported by quantitative analysis. 
Getting distance from existing culture of normative decision-making in 
construction industry may help reducing conflicts and improving performance of 
projects. As a result, this study will improve our understanding of complex 
settings that involve synergies among project actors such as: project governance, 
strategy development, conflict analysis, project integration planning. 
The proposed analysis can be modified for the purpose of educating 
community groups such as minorities to build resilience in the process of 
integration within their network and search for appropriate resources and 
141 
 
mechanisms that can help them to increase institutional integration. These 
modifications would be made considering both the nature of the problem as well 
as how the tool can communicate with the target actor (i.e. minority group). 
To summarize, IA, developed initially for construction projects, not only aim 
to be applied in cases of integrating construction projects within the social and 
political contexts, it can be also applied to provide a common language for 
different actors in any context that requires involvement of institutionally different 
participants. The simple structure of the proposed approach will help creating 
modified versions to broaden educational benefits while the analytical depth and 
mathematical verification may help planners to analyze complex situations. 
 
6.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
The results of this study aim to contribute to the analysis of the emergent 
dynamics of complex system of systems. The intellectual merits of IA involve a 
paradigm shift in analysis of the emergent dynamics associated with interactions 
within complex system of systems. Its contributions may help align different 
hierarchical decision levels to build more coherent and sustainable relations 
based on efficient interactions. In addition, it may increase the transparency of 
decision-making in controversial construction projects. Accordingly, the cost of 
opportunistic behavior from any actor would increase and the political difficulties 
that continue to plague a number of large-scale infrastructure projects around the 
world hopefully could be diminished. 
Future research plans in the case of IA may expand the scope of the 
methodology in an interdisciplinary collaborative, as it is applicable to a wide 
range of issues within and outside the construction area. Three main areas of 
future research may include:  
i) further study of the multi-lateral risk dynamism to investigate patterns of 
risk within the network of actors to assess: a) the behavioral patterns associated 
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with interactional risk b) the dissemination of mitigation strategies within the 
network c) the role of actors within the interactional network d) the resilience of 
the interactional network in case of emergent actors and e) the systemic risk of 
complex construction projects;  
ii) test the application of interactional analysis for in-depth study of a variety 
of interactional problems within construction, such as: a) interactional patterns in 
the economical and cultural dimensions of safety, b) institutional exceptions as a 
mechanism of interaction, and c) interactional analysis of counterfeiting risk in 
construction. 
Besides, the broader impact of the research may be extended for other areas, 
including: homogeneous networks (e.g. financial network), urban and coastal 
systems, transportation systems, energy networks, and disaster response 
networks.  
iii) develop a marketable tool for project planners, strategy developers, and 
policy makers to analyze emergent dynamics associated with interaction of 
complex system of systems such as complex infrastructure projects. 
This research aimed to explore an innovative methodology for analysis of 
emergent dynamics. The merit of this research will be further scrutinized through 
its application in diverse areas and its expansion to more complex settings. As is 
the nature of scientific approach, it is necessary to test, revise, refute, and verify 
the theory to increase its benefit. Hence, I do hope that the future studies will 
provide a clinical improvement for the proposed methodology. 
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Comparative Analysis of Emergence in Dam Construction 
The proposed framework of interactional analysis is applied to study 
emergence in construction of hydroelectric projects. In order to address 
variations the case of emergent risks of social opposition is studied in the form of 
a comparative analysis. The goal of the comparative analysis is to provide further 
empirical validation of the proposed methodology. This validation is provided 
through modelling different contexts for a wider range of variables and to observe 
the variations in the outcome of the model. Ultimately, the performance of the 
model is observed for different cases.  
 
Description of the Contexts 
The case study includes the interactional model of four comparative contexts 
of dam construction. Khagram (2004) performed a case study of dam 
construction based on two factors of the degree of democracy and the degree of 
social mobilization. This analysis aims to model the four categories proposed in 
Khagram (2004) based on the equilibria of the interaction between the two actors: 
the project developer and the social opposition. The output of the comparative 
analysis is the emergent risk associated with the interaction of these two actors 
in each context. As Khagram (2004) indicated these four contexts provide a 
range of outcomes to study dynamics of social opposition in different contexts.  
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• Context 1: Low level of democracy and low level of social mobilization 
In this context the mechanisms to impact the decision-making process is very 
limited or non-existent, while any attempt to leverage decision-making is also 
inhibited (Khagram 2004). Besides, different actors can not mobilize their action 
and there is a minimal possibility to link to transnational organizations. Khagram 
(2004) named China as an example of this context, while the public had 
negligible participation in public decision-making and limited access to 
transnational organizations. Jackson and Sleigh (2000) indicated the common 
practice of involuntary resettlement and authoritarian measures of decision-
making. 
• Context 2: low level of democracy and high level of social mobilization 
Although in this context campaigns can be formed through linking different 
groups and mobilizing the society, the decision-making process is still top-down. 
Khagram (2004) indicated the case of Indonesia as an inhibiting and repressive 
context with the record of social movements against hydroelectric projects.  
• Context 3: high level of democracy and low level of social mobilization 
In this context the higher level of democracy and decentralized mechanisms 
of decision-making lacks the strong domestic social mobilization (Khagram 2004). 
As a result the linkage among different actors of the opposition such as the public 
and transnational organizations is weak. Khagram (2004) discussed the case of 
South Africa as an example of this context.  
• Context 4: high level of democracy and high level of social mobilization 
In this context the high level of social mobilization enables transnational 
groups to form coalitions that oppose projects including public and non-
governmental organizations (Khagram 2004). The example of this context is the 




Interactional Model of the Comparative Cases 
As it was exhibited within the examples at chapter 4 and 5, and according to 
the flowchart of interactional analysis depicted in Fig. 3.5, interactional analysis 
focuses on dynamics associated with a risk indicator, in this case social 
opposition against dam construction. The analysis involves framing the emergent 
risk and modelling the emergent dynamics at the policy and strategy levels for 
each context. The framework of social opposition in construction projects, 
presented in Table 4.3, is used in this comparative study. The first assumption in 
the analysis is to consider the dynamics between the two actors as the project 
developer and the opposition. The executor of power, as the project developer, 
may involve the government, contractors, and financiers (such as World Bank or 
Export Credit Agencies). The extent of power, as the opposition, may include the 
public, the NGOs, as well as the transnational organizations (such as 
International Rivers). Regardless of the combination of the two sides of 
interaction, the study assumes a unitary actor for both actors, i.e., the project 
developer and the opposition. 
 
Interactional Analysis at the Policy Level 
Assuming the equilibria of the bilateral interaction at the policy level of 
analysis and considering the utility of the developer as the unit, the cost of 
rewards and penalties are defined in proportion to the utility of the developer from 
dam construction in general at each context. Similarly, the disutility of the 
opposition is initially defined as the unit and the utility of rewards and penalties is 
defined with reference to this utility. Based on the descriptive nature of the input, 
each case is modelled with reference to standard cases that are presented in 
section 4.6. 
Associated Variables 
As Khagram (2004) mentioned, the lower level of democracy is usually 
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reflected through repression and penalties. Therefore, degree of democracy is 
mathematically translated in the model through increase in the disutility of the 
penalties (t). On the other hand, the social mobilization can be reflected in 
increasing participation of local or transnational actors in decision-making. 
Therefore, degree of social mobilization is mathematically translated into 
increase in the disutility that the opposition associates with the project (x). This 
assumption is based on the fact that social mobilization often empowers criticism 
of the project and augments negative perceptions of the public towards these 
projects. However, as suggested by Khagram (2004), and will be discussed 
further in the analysis, the magnitude of this increase is significantly higher in 
cases that transnational groups are involved. 
Many researchers have discussed the insufficiency of compensations in dam 
construction (Menezes 1991, Jackson and Sleigh 2000, Khagram 2004, Tilt et al. 
2009, Wilmsen et al. 2011). Accordingly, the utility of reward (r) is considered to 
be equal to 0.75. On the other hand, the cost of reward (r*) is assumed to be 
equal to 0.06 which is equal to 6% of the utility of the project for the developer. 
This value is justified based on case studies such as Myagase Dam in Japan: 
(Hattori and Fujikura 2009). Finally, the cost of penalties for the developer (t*) is 
assumed to be equal to 0.01, accounting for 1% of the utility of the developer 
from the project. Accordingly, the likelihood of the emergent risk is calculated for 
the four contexts suggested by Khagram (2004). 
In order to reflect different degrees of democracy in the model, four ranges 
for the disutility of penalty (t) are considered as: 0-0.25, 0.25-0.5, 0.5-0.75, 0.75-
1. In this case the disutility of penalty equal to the unit implies that the disutility of 
penalty is equal to the disutility that the opposition associates with the project. 
That is, if the opposition associates loss of $500,000 to the project because of 
the resettlement, the utility of the penalty is also equal to $500,000 in the form of 
cash penalty or law enforcement to repress the opposition. 
In order to reflect the degree of social mobilization in the model, the risk is 
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calculated for disutility of the opposition equal to one as the standard case and 
then increased up to 10, that is, the social mobility increases the disutility of the 
project to 10 times more than the base case. There is no case study to measure 
the increase in disutility of the project as the opposition is mobilized. Logically, 
the worst case is the infinity, which represents the cases that the opposition will 
not comply regardless of penalties and rewards. However, the case studies such 
as Menezes (1991) or Tilt et al. (2009) suggest that the compensation has a 
ceiling that satisfies the opposition. In order to observe the outcome for a wide 
range of disutility of opposition (x), the risk of social opposition at the policy level 
is calculated for the value of x in the range of 1 to 50. After observing the results, 
the ceiling was chosen to be 10 since it provided an acceptable range of risk 
(close to 100% risk of social opposition). Therefore, the disutility of dam 
construction for the opposition varies between 1 to 10 (x={1,…,10}). 
 

















 0 0.645 0.833 0.895 0.926 0.945 0.958 0.966 0.973 0.978 0.983 
0.25 0.520 0.770 0.853 0.895 0.920 0.937 0.949 0.958 0.964 0.970 
0.5 0.395 0.708 0.812 0.864 0.895 0.916 0.931 0.942 0.951 0.958 
0.75 0.270 0.645 0.770 0.833 0.870 0.895 0.913 0.926 0.937 0.945 
1 0.020 0.520 0.687 0.770 0.820 0.853 0.877 0.895 0.909 0.920 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
Disutility of the project (x) 
 
Results of the Interactional Analysis for Four Contexts 
The risk is calculated based on the proposed variables and the equilibria of 
the bilateral interaction at the policy level. The result of interactional analysis at 
the policy level for dam construction in four contexts indicates extremely high risk 
of social opposition in the context with higher degree of social mobilization and 
democracy, such as Brazil, (upper right section of Tab. A.1) with the likelihood of 
risk being more than 90%. The lower row of the table indicates the cases with 
minimal social mobilization. As it can be observed these cases represent 
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contexts such as China and exhibit a very low level of risk in some cases close to 
zero (2% risk of social opposition). As mobilization of the public increases, while 
moving right in the Tab. 5.9, the risk of opposition increases substantially. 
 
Interactional Analysis at the Strategy Level 
At the strategy level of analysis the interactional model IA(1) (Fig. 5.2) and its 
equilibria (Tab. 5.2) is applied in the analysis. Therefore, the degree of 
democracy is mathematically represented through the transaction costs 
associated with formal actions and the degree of social opposition is 
mathematically translated through transaction costs associated with informal 
actions. In order to provide a full spectrum of potential dynamics in all the four 
contexts, the equilibria of the game is simulated for different ranges of variables, 
i.e., the transaction cost of formal actions and the transaction cost of informal 
actions. The average payoff of each actor is obtained for all the cases to 
compare risks in each context. Considering four data ranges for each of the 
variables (transaction cost of formal and informal actions), sixteen simulations 
has been performed, while each simulation includes 1000 runs. The results of 
these simulations are displayed in Tab. 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5. The conclusions of the 
comparative case study performed by Khagram (2004) are compared to the 
results of the simulation to provide another step in empirical validation of the 
simulation. 
 
Table A.2 Variables Fixed Among All Contexts, in the scale of 0 to 1 
α(Y) Uniform(0,0.05) 
β(Y) Uniform(0,0.25) 
P(N) Normal(Mean=0.5, SD=0.16) 







• Context 1: Low level of democracy and low level of social mobilization 
This context is mathematically modelled with the high transaction cost of 
informal and formal actions for the opposition. Therefore, the transaction costs 
for both formal and informal actions of the opposition (actor N in Tab 5.1) are 
more than the half of the utility of the opposition H0.5:;(∆;) < (A;, B;) <
:;(∆;)I. Khagram (2004) concluded that in contexts with lower degrees of social 
mobilization and democracy (e.g., China), changes in projects (or risk of social 
opposition) is unlikely. In this context the developer is more likely to achieve its 
expected payoff (lower left corner of Tab. A.3). Besides, the observation of 
simulation results further confirms the minimal payoff for the opposition in 
contexts with lower degrees of social mobilization and lower degrees of 
democracy such as the case of China (lower left corner of Tab. A.4). Observation 
of potential outcome nodes also indicates that in the contexts such as China, the 
risk of facing litigation is negligible (lower left corner of Tab. A.5). 
 
          Table A.3 Payoff of the Deverloper in Each Pattern (0-1) 
Beta(N) 
     0-0.25 0.953 0.845 0.689 0.661 
 0.25-0.5 0.989 0.898 0.743 0.699 
 0.5-0.75 0.993 0.921 0.768 0.723 
 0.75-1 0.993 0.921 0.777 0.732 
 
 
0.75-1 0.5-0.75 0.25-0.5 0-0.25 Alpha(N) 
 
• Context 2: low level of democracy and high level of social mobilization 
Considering the equilibria of the interaction at the strategy level (Tab. A.2), 
this context is modelled through high cost of informal actions and low cost of 
formal actions. Therefore, the transaction cost of formal action is less than half of 
the utility of the opposition: 0.5:;(∆;) < A; < :;(∆;)	O
R	0 < B; < 0.5:;(∆;). 
Khagram (2004) argued that in contexts with low level of democracy and high 
level of social mobilization, as well as contexts with high level of democracy and 
low level of social mobilization, the results are mixed “with intermediate level of 
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reform in dam construction”. The results of the simulation with the assumptions of 
the variables presented at Tab. A.2 indicated a relatively high payoff for the 
developer and relatively low payoff for the opposition (upper right side of Tab. A.3. 
and Tab. A.4)  
• Context 3: high level of democracy and low level of social mobilization 
This context is modelled through high cost of formal actions and low cost of 
informal actions. Therefore, mathematically the context is modelled with the 
transaction cost of formal action less than the half of the utility of the opposition 
and the transaction cost of the informal action more than the half of the utility of 
the opposition: 0.5:;(∆;) < B; < :;(∆;)	O
R	0 < A; < 0.5:;(∆;).  While 
Khagram (2004) indicated mixed results in this context, the simulation indicated 
some risks for the developer as the payoff of the developer is lower than the first 
and second contexts (lower right section of the Tab A.3 and Tab. A.4) 
 
    Table A.4 Payoff of the Opposition in each Pattern (0-1) 
Beta(N) 
     0-0.25 0.027 0.137 0.315 0.558 
 0.25-0.5 0.002 0.069 0.265 0.501 
 0.5-0.75 0.001 0.023 0.178 0.423 
 0.75-1 0.001 0.023 0.144 0.373 
 
 
0.75-1 0.5-0.75 0.25-0.5 0-0.25 Alpha(N) 
 
• Context 4: high level of democracy and high level of social mobilization 
This context involves low cost of formal and informal actions for the 
opposition. That is the transaction costs of formal and informal actions are less 
that the half of the utility of the opposition H0 < (A; , B;) < 0.5:;(∆;)I. Khagram 
(2004) suggested that in the contexts with higher degrees of social mobilization 
and democracy, the project reforms are more likely (i.e., higher risk of social 
opposition). The simulation results indicate lower payoff for the developer in 
highly democratic and socially mobilized contexts such as India or Brazil (upper 
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right corner of Tab. A.3), while the payoff of the opposition is significantly higher 
than other contexts (upper right corner of Tab. A.4). 
 
Table A.5 Number of Litigation Cases in each Pattern (0-1) 
Beta(N) 
     0-0.25 0 26 131 155 
 0.25-0.5 0 0 9 26 
 0.5-0.75 0 0 0 2 
 0.75-1 0 0 0 0 
 
 
0.75-1 0.5-0.75 0.25-0.5 0-0.25 Alpha(N) 
   
 
Interactional Analysis at the Strategy Level 
To summarize, the results of the simulation indicated that increase in the 
disutility that the opposition associates with the project (as a proxy for the degree 
of social mobilization) significantly increases the risk of social opposition. 
Similarly, increase in the disutility of the penalty (as a proxy for the degree of 
democracy) increases the risk of social opposition. Therefore, the risk of social 
opposition can be quantified in any context that with the combination of 
contextual variables. 
Although the application of the proposed methodology provided a consistent 
outcome with the conclusions that are made by Khagram (2004), it also indicated 
several limitations. The most important limitation is the assigning of utilities and 
disutilities. This shortcoming has been further explored through modeling 
different cases in this comparative study and limited the sensitivity analysis of the 
outcome considering a range of variables. However, to completely address this 
shortcoming there is a need for complementary studies to determine the 
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